


The Logic of the Trinity

Augustine to Ockham

PAUL THOM

THE LOGIC OF THE TRINITY

Medieval Philosophy
TEXTS AND STUDIES


Militia est uita hominis super terram
Caritas
Bona uoluntas

The Logic of the Trinity

Augustine to Ockham

PAUL THOM

Fordham University Press • New York • 2012

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Thom, Paul.
The logic of the Trinity : Augustine to Ockham / Paul Thom. — 1st ed.
p. cm. — (Medieval philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 978-0-8232-3476-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Trinity—History of doctrines. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. I. Title.
BT109.T45 2011
231'.0440902—dc23
2011019591

Printed in the United States of America
14 13 12 5 4 3 2 1
First edition

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PREFACE

The history of logic is not just a history of logic books. All sorts of writings provide a fitting context for logical theorizing. In the Middle Ages, one of those contexts was the tradition of philosophical theology surrounding questions about the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The reason is that some of the theological questions about the Trinity centered on concepts that are fundamentally logical—concepts of sameness and difference, the relative and the absolute. And so in these pages I want to explore part of that theological tradition of writing from the point of view of the history of logic.

I will offer analyses of the ways in which the medieval thinkers understood these concepts and adapted them for theological use. My analyses will be semantic and ontological. But I will not attempt to deploy the machinery of mathematical logic, with its formalized syntax and semantic models. Instead, I will use notions that the medievals themselves had at their disposal—basic semantic notions such as the distinction between language and the nonlinguistic world, and the idea that between these two there are relations of naming or being-true-of, as well as metaphysically charged notions such as the distinction between what a term is true of and what it is essentially true of, and the distinction between the concrete and the abstract.

The history of efforts by medieval thinkers to accommodate the ontology of the Trinity within the framework of Greek logic and ontology is a remarkable one. These efforts were remarkable because they pushed creatively beyond the boundaries of existing thought while being subject to three often-conflicting types of constraint. Because they were aimed at interpreting Scripture and the Church's traditional teachings, they had to remain faithful to those objects of interpretation. But because they were a type of logico-ontological theorizing, they had to be logically rigorous and ontologically illuminating. What counted as good philosophical

theory didn't always count as good biblical exegesis. And to make matters worse, a third set of constraints arose from the fact that any public utterance regarding the Trinity had to be weighed in the light of its potential effects on the current interests of powerful institutions and individuals. In some cases, good theology, good philosophy, and good politics turned out to be three different things.

The main thinkers I will discuss are Augustine, Boethius, Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. I will begin with Saint Augustine's discussions, in Books 1–7 of his *De Trinitate*, about the ontological status of the divine Persons and the relations that bind them together and also separate them. My discussions will not extend to the celebrated passage in Book 9 in which Augustine introduces psychological models of the Trinity, or to the further development of those psychological models by thinkers such as Anselm.

This work was carried out as part of the project "The Reception of Aristotle's *Categories* in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions" under a Discovery Grant funded by the Australian Research Council. My co-researchers on that project were John Marenbon, Sten Ebbesen, and Tony Street. It is a great pleasure to be able to record my thanks to them for the support, encouragement, and inspiration they gave me over the period of the grant as my interests gradually focused on the reception of the *Categories* in the Christian theological tradition. I also extend my warm thanks to those who graciously invited me to air my evolving thoughts at various seminars and conferences or who contributed to those discussions—especially Allan Bäck, John Bishop, Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, Moira Gatens, Gyula Klima, Simo Knuuttila, Chris Martin, and Calvin Normore. Two readers for Fordham University Press generously alerted me to numerous ways in which I could improve the manuscript, and for that I thank them. Any remaining errors of fact or logic are bound to be mine, as are any imperfections of interpretation. Translations, where unattributed, are mine.

THE LOGIC OF THE TRINITY

1

Background

The tradition of reflection on the internal nature of the Holy Trinity draws together sacred writings from the Bible and Church Fathers and theories of the Greek philosophers. In this introduction I outline some of the sources that formed that tradition, and I introduce some techniques for representing them in the languages of modern logic.

Philosophy

Before Christianity there was philosophy. And when Christianity came, it was not long before Christians returned to philosophy in an effort to give systematic rational sense to their religious beliefs. The philosophy to which they turned had its roots in the pre-Christian writings of Plato and Aristotle.

One of these roots was Plato's Theory of Forms, a theory motivated not by religious considerations but by reflection on the ways we think about some of the qualities that give our lives meaning—qualities such as beauty and justice. We commonly think of these qualities as coming in degrees. One object is more beautiful, one act more just, than others. We could think of the less beautiful and the less just as possessing beauty and justice in a mixed form: the lower the grade of beauty, the more it is mixed with other, possibly contrary, qualities. Conversely, we might think of the highest grade of beauty as pure beauty, not mixed with any other quality. Beauty, then, in this pure sense, is beautiful; indeed, it is the only thing that *is* beautiful, strictly speaking. Everything else that is entitled in some way to be called beautiful is so only because of the share of pure beauty that it contains, mixed with other qualities. This train of thought can be found, for example, in Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates hypothesizes that there exists something that is "beauty, itself by itself," and adds,

> It seems to me that if anything is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it participates in that beautiful.[1]

The general idea, as Alexander Nehamas aptly puts it, is that "there is, strictly speaking, only one way of having a characteristic, namely, being that characteristic itself."[2]

What could have led to this idea that a characteristic in its pure or strict form is its own sole instance? It seems like a merging of the idea of a universal with the idea of a paradigm. A universal is that by virtue of which a number of things fall under a common description: all these objects are called beautiful by virtue of the fact that they are instances of the universal, beauty. A paradigm is an exemplary instance of some characteristic—a standard by reference to which other instances may be judged. Now, if we assume that the universal *is* the paradigm, it will follow that beauty is beautiful. And that assumption can seem reasonable if we take the universal to be that which makes beautiful things beautiful, and we also take it that the source of beauty must itself possess at least as much beauty as the objects to which it imparts beauty. Whatever its origins, the notion of a being that *is* its own properties, and is the sole instance of those properties, is a commonplace of Platonic philosophy. The notion is mentioned in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where he suggests that the proper subjects of such reflexive predications should be things that are "self-subsistent and primary":

> The good, then, must be one with the essence of good, and the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and primary.[3]

The Christian God being such a thing, it is not surprising that in due course He was thought of as *being* all the attributes that He possesses.

Another strand in the Theory of Forms holds that there is something that is "beyond being." The thought can be found in Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates, having compared the Form of the Good with the Sun in its beauty and generative power, concludes,

> The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power.[4]

The term translated "reality" here, *ousia*, is one that was destined to play an important role in Trinitarian thinking. The idea that there might *be* something

that was beyond being could seem reasonable to someone who thought that the source from which an object's qualities derive must possess those qualities in a greater degree than the degree to which they are found in the object. On that assumption, when we consider the quality of *being*, we must conclude that its source is beyond being in any ordinary sense of "being."

These are powerful thoughts—alluring in their simplicity and in their paradoxicality. They received further development at the hands of the Neoplatonic philosophers, notably Plotinus and Porphyry. For Plotinus, all of being flowed from a single principle, the One, which

> is simple and the principle of all things[5]

and stood like Plato's Good,

> "itself by itself of single form," or rather formless.[6]

(The quoted phrase is from Plato's *Symposium*.[7])

The One, according to Plotinus is without accidents:

> he is by himself without any incidental attributes.[8]

Like Plato, Plotinus thinks that some beings are self-predicable. The One is one. However, he makes it clear that when we speak of the One we are not using the term "one" in its everyday sense:

> We do not when we call it one and indivisible mean it in the sense of a point or unit,[9]

since

> "One" must be understood in a larger sense than that in which a unity and a point are unified. For there the soul takes away size and multiplicity of number and comes to a stop at the smallest and rests its thought on something which is partless but was in something divisible and is in something else; but what is not in something else or in the divisible is not partless either in the same way as the smallest; for it is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power.[10]

In the early years of Christianity, when any educated person knew Platonic philosophy, it was natural that these ideas should be given a theistic reinterpretation. God, after all, is thought of as an ultimate source, and therefore is naturally thought of in terms that are both reflexive and transcendent.

Trinitarian thought also draws on the philosophy of Aristotle, particularly his little book *Categories*. There Aristotle distinguished ten kinds of being (Substance, Quantity, Relative, Quality, Action, Passion, Where, When, Position, Possession). He does not explain the basis for this list; his commentators, however, came up with a variety of ideas about how the list of categories could be rationally generated. Dexippus in his commentary on the *Categories* (written about A.D. 330) reports that some people "make a division of things into Absolute (*kath' hauto*) and Relative (*pros ti*), and these they regard as taking in all the categories."[11] Those people perhaps include Dexippus's master Iamblichus (c. A.D. 240–c. 325), who (Simplicius tells us) postulated,

> In the first place, there is something which underlies all things; something pre-existent in which there come to inhere those things which come into existence in it alone. Next, those things which co-exist with the substrate are observed along with it; and these are Quality and Quantity, one of which pluralizes the substrate, while the other specifies it. Relations are observed in conjunction with the substrate, and it is in accordance with these relations that the other categories are observed.[12]

In any event, the idea that there are some things whose being is relative will be of vital importance in theorizing the Trinity; and some theorizations will draw on the idea that relations do not "coexist" with their substrate but rather are found "in conjunction" with [*peri*] it, being attendant on it or merely accompanying it.[13] Iamblichus's division is shown in Figure 1.1.

The *Categories* mentions features peculiar to the principal categories. It is common to all substances (primary substances such as the individual man, and secondary substances such as man in general), and also to the differentiae whereby one species is distinguished from another, that they are not present in any subject (3a7). It is common to all substances and also peculiar to them that, while remaining numerically identical, they can receive contrary qualities through a process of change (4a10).

What is distinctive about the category of quantity is that subjects can be equal or unequal to one another in respect of quantity (6a26). Quality is the




FIGURE 1.1 Division of the categories (Iamblichus)

category in respect of which attributions of similarity or dissimilarity are made (11a15).

For all Aristotelians, the primary kind of being is Substance, *ousia*. The non-Substance categories are collectively called "accidents," a term that is defined in Aristotle's *Topics*:

> An accident is what is none of these, not definition, not peculiar property, not genus, but which belongs to a thing, and admits of belonging or not belonging to any one and the same thing.[14]

This definition merges two different conceptions of the accidental—that which is changeable about a subject, and that which does not fall within the essence of the subject. The Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry (232–309) makes a further distinction among accidents:

> Some are separable and some inseparable. Sleeping is a separable accident, whereas being black is an inseparable accident for ravens and Ethiopians—it is possible to think of a white raven and an Ethiopian losing his skin-colour without the destruction of the subjects.[15]

The importance of the notion of an accident for Christian theology is that God is thought of as *lacking* any accidents—even inseparable ones.

In the system of the *Categories*, a concrete entity whose name is derived from the name of an accident is called a *paronym*, or, as the Latins said, a *denominative*. The *Categories* gives two examples:

> The grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery.[16]

Porphyry analyzes denomination as having three necessary components:

> Q. What is required for something to be a paronym? A. Three things. Q. What are they? A. First, there must be something in which the thing in question must participate; second, there must be a name in which it must participate; and third, the name when applied to the thing must differ somewhat in its grammatical form.[17]

The notion of a denominative, then, is partly ontological and partly linguistic. Our interest will be in its ontological aspect. Porphyry describes this in terms of one thing participating in another—a description that carries Platonic connotations. Aristotle uses the more neutral description, "This is *from* that," which I will generally follow. That which is from something in this sense stands to that from which it is, as concrete to abstract; so I will sometimes say, "That is *abstracted* from this" or "This is *concreted* from that."

Sometimes we wish to say about something which is described as being concreted from a certain abstract, what it *is*, that is, what it is essentially. For example, we may pick something out as "the white thing" and say what it is essentially: "The white thing is a log." Predications of this sort are described in the *Posterior Analytics* as a type of incidental predication:

> For when I say that the white thing is a log, then I say that that which is incidentally white is a log, and not that the white thing is the underlying subject for the log.[18]

Notice that these are only incidentally predications, as Aristotle says; though their predicates are per se beings. Predications of this type will play an important part in the theorization of the Trinity, where they will be needed in saying what the Persons of the Trinity essentially are.

The *Categories* itself does not discuss predications of this sort, but it does draw a basic distinction between two ways in which one item may be predicated of another: it may be *said of* the other or it may be *present in* it. Aristotle differentiates these two types of predication, saying,

> if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.[19]
>
> By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.[20]

Substances, and accidents, can be either universal or individual. Man is universal, and so is bravery; this man and this bravery are individual.

An accident is present in something.[21] A substance is never present in anything, but it may have accidents present in it. One and the same substance may be subject to contrary (and hence changeable) attributes:

> A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good.[22]

(This, however, will not apply to God, if indeed God is a substance.)

A universal is said of something.[23] An individual substance is neither said of nor present in any subject, although it will itself be a subject of predications that are either said of it or present in it. Indeed, Porphyry thought that individuals are "constituted of proper features the assemblage of which will never be found the same in anything else," so that

> the proper features of Socrates will never be found in any other of the particulars.[24]

The differences that hold between pairs of individuals are only one of the three types of difference mentioned by Porphyry:

> Let differences be so called commonly, properly, and most properly. For one item is said to differ commonly from a diverse item when it is distinguished in any fashion by a diversity either in relation to itself or in relation to another item—Socrates differs from Plato by diversity, and indeed from himself as a boy and as a grown man, and as being active in some way or having stopped, and always in respect of diversities in what he is like. One item is said to differ properly from a diverse item when it differs from it by an inseparable accident—inseparable accidents are, for example, blue-eyedness or hook-nosedness or even a hardened scar from a wound. One item is said to differ most properly from a diverse item when it is distinguished by a specific difference—as man differs from horse by a specific difference, that of rational.[25]

Of the accidental categories, one will have special importance in theorizations of the Trinity, namely, the category of relatives. This is because the three Persons in the Trinity will be thought of as somehow constituted by their relations to one another.

Items in the category of relatives are not relations in the modern sense, that is, many-place properties. According to Aristotle, a relation such as mastery inheres in a single subject (a master), which stands toward an object (a slave). Relatives are items (such as master and slave) that are what they are in reference to one another. As Aristotle says,

> those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something.[26]

A relative, like a master, is concreted from a relation (in this case, mastery). The *Categories* states that every relative has a correlative, namely a relative whose subject is the object of the first relative and whose object is the subject of the first relative. Master and slave are correlatives:

> All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. For example, the slave is called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave.[27]

The *Categories* mentions another feature that many relatives have:

> Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature.[28]

When one man becomes a master another becomes a slave and when one becomes a slave another becomes a master. (Aristotle discusses knowledge and the knowable as a possible counterexample to this claim.)

Plotinus in his *Enneads* distinguishes a number of classes of relatives. Some, like knowledge and sense perception, have "a single active substantial existence" in relation to their correlatives;[29] others, for example similars or equals, do not exist in that way. In the former case, there is an active principle in one of the correlatives; in the latter, the correlatives are related by virtue of their participation in a Form (similarity or equality).[30] Again, in some cases (e.g., being to the right) the things themselves are not altered by coming into a relative state, while in other cases they are altered.[31] And he raised two main questions about

relatives: whether there is anything common to all of them,[32] and whether in any case they signify something substantial.[33]

Porphyry, in his commentary on the *Categories*, says that

> relatives are present in their subjects neither as essential complements of them nor as any sort of accident that comes to be in its subject, as for example an affection or an activity, but that they are external to their subjects. It is for this reason that they can come to be and pass away without their subjects being affected.[34]

He treats all relatives on the model of right/left, as extrinsic to their subjects, and such that their onset or demise cannot change the subject. In doing so, he seems to ignore his master Plotinus's division of relatives into kinds, only some of which are extrinsic to their subjects. Porphyry's understanding of relatives perhaps influenced his pupil Iamblichus, who, as we saw earlier, thought of relatives are merely attending on their substrates as accompaniments rather than as constituents.

Plotinus conducts a critical examination of the whole theory of the categories, from the point of view of Neoplatonism. He asks whether all ten of the Aristotelian categories have application in the intelligible as well as the sensible realm, and

> whether the ten are there in the same way in the intelligible beings and the beings perceived by sense, or whether they are all in the beings of the sense-world, but in the intelligibles some are there and some are not: for it certainly cannot be the other way round.[35]

Plotinus also asked whether, if the term "substance" is applied in the intelligible as well as in the sensible realm, it has the same sense in both applications.[36] Similar questions would soon be asked about whether the term can be applied to God and to creatures in the same sense.

Theology

In the gospel of Saint Matthew we read that Jesus, after His resurrection, bade his disciples to "Go, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."[37] Numerous rival

doctrines arose about the interpretation of such holy writings. For example, Arius (c. 256–336), a presbyter in the Church of Alexandria, claimed that the Father and Son were different in essence, the Son being a creature of the Father. According to Boethius,

> the Arians, . . . by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and convert it to Plurality.[38]
>
> Arius, for instance, . . . while calling the Son God, declares him to be in various ways inferior to the Father and of another substance.[39]

In the year 325, the emperor Constantine—himself having converted to Christianity—convened a universal council of bishops at Nicaea in order to settle the issue of Arianism. Proceedings were formally opened by the emperor, and Arius was present in person. The council resolved on a profession of faith affirming that the Father and the Son are of one substance:[40]

> We believe in one God the Father all powerful, maker of all things both seen and unseen. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten from the Father, that is from the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father . . .[41]

The specifically philosophical notions here—that the Son is from the *substance* of the Father, and is *consubstantial* with the Father—were "additions made by the council to an underlying form of the creed."[42]

The Council also affirmed, against the Arians, that the Son is not a creature of the Father.

> And those who say "there once was when he was not," and "before he was begotten he was not," and that he came to be from things that were not, or from another hypostasis or substance, affirming that the Son of God is subject to change or alteration these the catholic and apostolic church *anathematizes*.[43]

While the Council of Nicaea defined the Church's position against that of Arius, declaring that the Father and Son were consubstantial, it was not specific about whether the Holy Spirit was consubstantial with the Father. However,

at the Council of Constantinople in 381, the assembled bishops, after complaining about "the many sufferings that have been brought upon us under Arian domination,"[44] and reaffirming the Council of Nicaea's condemnation of Arianism, went on to condemn the heresy of Macedonius and his followers (known as Pneumatomachi, or "enemies of the Spirit") who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit.

> It [the Nicaean creed] tells us how to believe in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: believing also, of course, that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have a single Godhead and power and substance, a dignity deserving the same honour and a co-eternal sovereignty, in three most perfect hypostases, or three perfect persons. So there is no place for Sabellius's diseased theory in which the hypostases are confused and thus their proper characteristics destroyed. Nor may the blasphemy of Eunomians and Arians and Pneumatomachi prevail, with its division of substance or of nature or of Godhead, and its introduction of some nature which was produced subsequently, or was created, or was of a different substance, into the uncreated and consubstantial and co-eternal Trinity.[45]

Boethius describes the theory of Sabellius referred to here as follows.

> The Sabellians also have dared to affirm that there are not three separate Persons but only one, saying that the Father is the same as the Son and the Son the same as the Father and the Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; and so they declare that there is but one Person signified under the diversity of names.[46]

In their use of the terms "consubstantial" and "hypostasis," the Church Councils were overlaying concepts drawn from Greek philosophy onto the scriptural texts, so that from that time on the doctrine of the Trinity was to be part of a combined philosophical/theological system of thought.

The Trinitarian formula "One ousia, three hypostases" can easily give rise to a tritheistic interpretation, according to which there are three primary substances and one derivative secondary substance. This, according to Christophe Erismann, was the view of Philoponus (c. 490–575). Erismann writes, "A current of interpretation pervaded Greek Patristic thought, from Gregory of Nyssa to

John of Damascus, which proposed to understand the *ousia* of the Trinity as a secondary substance in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. as a universal."[47]

Erismann points out that the Councils' formula according to which the persons of the Trinity are *homoousion* (of the same substance) can be used as an argument for the view that *ousia*, as found in the Nicaean formula, should be taken as a universal substance. Accordingly, he argues, "The only coherent position for a philosopher who considers the Trinity as a universal and believes in a particularist ontology is to endorse tritheism."[48]

He quotes Philoponus, as reported by John of Damascus:

> Now, this common nature of man, in which no one man differs from any other, when it is realized in any one of the individuals, then is particular to that one and is not common to any other individual, as we set forth in chapter 4. Thus that rational mortal animal which is in me is common to no other animal.[49]

Erismann speaks of a "principle of parity" whereby "if the Trinity is a universal, then what is true of the universal man is true, by analogy, of the universal God."[50] The theological consequence of applying the principle is clear:

> The unity of nature in God promulgated by the Church can only be a purely intellectual unity, an abstraction. The divine unity cannot be an objective reality, because such an entity would be a real, unitary essence common to several hypostases, a type of entity that does not exist in Philoponus' ontology.[51]

Of course, as we shall see in Chapter 2, this was not the interpretation of "three hypostases, one essence" that Augustine adopted.

Another point of contention concerned the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and Son. Here is the Council of Constantinople's statement:

> And the Holy Spirit, lord and giver of life, proceeding from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is to be adored and glorified.[52]

Peter Lombard, writing in the twelfth century, refers to this statement, which according to tradition Leo III had transcribed at Rome on a silver tablet. Peter says "the Greeks" have several reasons for their belief that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, one reason being that

> in the principal Councils which were held in their parts, Creeds were approved to which were appended anathemas declaring it unlawful for anyone to teach or preach concerning faith in the Trinity anything other than what was there contained. And since in those Creeds the Spirit is remembered as proceeding from the Father, and not from the Son, they say that whoever adds procession from the Son incurs anathema.[53]

Nevertheless, as we shall see, the standard interpretation in the Western Church was that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father *and Son* (the *filioque* clause).

Formal Analysis

Aristotle's *Categories* constantly played a role in medieval theories of the Holy Trinity. The role played by this work was not, however, that of an authoritative text whose concepts and doctrines were to be received without question. Rather, it was seen as a source of materials to be adapted for theological use. The changes that were wrought on those materials were often intricate and subtle. And for this reason, it will be useful to conclude this introduction with a summary of the main concepts and theses in the *Categories*.

The ontology of the *Categories* can be seen as a theory about a small number of relationships. First there is the relationship of being said of something; this I will call the *de* relationship. Second, there is the relationship of being present in something, which I will call the *in* relationship. Third, there is the relationship of the concrete to the abstract: the *ab* relationship. And there is a fourth ontological relationship in the *Categories*, the relationship that holds between two correlatives. I shall designate this relationship *ad*.

The *Categories* division of beings into those that are said of some subject versus those that are not said of any subject, and into those that are present in some subject as against those that are not present in any subject, exhibits an elegance that derives in part from the fact that it demarcates two classes of beings—accidents and universals as the *domains* of the *in* and *de* relationships. That is to say, it identifies one class of beings as the class of things that stand in the *in* relationship to something or other, and another as the class of things that stand in the *de* relationship to something or other. These demarcations can be made only if we assume that every accident is present in some subject, that everything present in some subject is an accident, that every universal is said of some subject, and that everything said of some

subject is a universal. In short, the ontology of the *Categories* assumes Definitions 1.1 and 1.2.

DEFINITION 1.1. *univ*(A) iff for some *B* : *A de B*
DEFINITION 1.2. *acc*(A) iff for some *B* : *A in B*

A universal is whatever is said of something, and an accident is whatever is present in something.

Two other classes of beings—substances and individuals—can be characterized by opposition to accidents and universals. The *Categories* gives the impression that this characterization proceeds simply by negation, so that substances can be defined as beings that are not present in any subject, and individuals can be defined as beings that are not said of any subject. In fact, however, the definitions need to be limited to the class of terms that are not concreted from anything; otherwise it would turn out that all terms that are so concreted were both substances and individuals. So we can define a substance as a nonaccident that is not from anything, as in Definition 1.3.

DEFINITION 1.3. *subst(A)* iff not acc(*A*) and for no *B : A ab B*

The definition of an individual also needs to be restricted to what is not from anything, because otherwise there could be individuals and universals concreted from their respective abstracts and linked by the *de* relationship. It is of course true that there are cases in which one such concrete term is truly and non reciprocally predicated of another ("The brave are virtuous"); but this does not imply that such cases fall under the *de* relationship. The definition of "said of" in the *Categories* requires that the name and definition of the predicate apply to the subject, thus implying that what is said of something has a definition. Now, strictly speaking concreted terms like these do not have definitions. So if we are to follow a strict understanding of "definition," we should define an individual as a nonuniversal that is not from anything, as in Definition 1.4.

DEFINITION 1.4. *indiv(A)* iff not *univ(A)* and for no *B* : *A ab B*

Definition 1.3 entails that no substance is from anything. While this is not explicitly stated in the *Categories*, we do not find any instances there in which a substance is concreted from an abstract (such as Humanity). It should also be the case that no accident is from anything. This seems to be assumed in the

Categories. At any rate, we find there no examples of higher-order accidents such as Whiteness-ness from which an accident would be concreted. The assumption is reflected in Rule 1.1.

RULE 1.1. If *acc(A)*, then for no *B : A ab B*

This rule and the definitions as stated imply that no universal is an individual, that no substance is an accident, and that no substance or accident is from anything.

It is significant that the *ab* relationship links entities from outside the four main classes of being with entities within one of those classes. Those "external" entities are denominatives, and denominatives include relatives.

The four ontological relationships that are central to the theory of the *Categories* obey certain formal principles, some of which follow from Definitions 1.1 to 1.4. It follows from Definition 1.1 that if *A de B*, then *univ*(A). Similarly, it follows from Definition 1.2 that if *A in B*, then *acc*(*A*).

We can lay down some rules specifying the general character of the converse domains of *de*, *in*, and *ab* (that is, the classes of things to which something




FIGURE 1.2. Basic ontology (Aristotle)

stands in those relationships). Though these are not explicitly stated in the *Categories*, they do seem to be implicit.

RULE 1.2. If *A* in *B*, then subst*(B)*
RULE 1.3. If *A ab B*, then *acc(B)*

We can also lay down some rules about the logical properties of our four relationships. Firstly, *de* is irreflexive (that is, nothing is said of itself).

RULE 1.4. Not *A de A*

This is not stated explicitly in the *Categories*; however, it appears to be assumed in Aristotle's statement that "things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject."[54] Without the assumption of irreflexivity, that statement would be open to the objection that an individual may be said of itself.

Next, *de* is transitive (that is, if one thing is said of a second, and the second is said of a third, then the first is said of the third).

RULE 1.5. If *A de B* and *B de C*, then *A de C*

This is stated explicitly:

> Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.[55]

As a consequence of Rules 1.4 and 1.5, we can see that *de* is asymmetrical (that is, if one thing is said of another, the second is not said of the first). Suppose *A de B* and *B de A*. Then by Rule 1.5 *A de A*, which is contrary to Rule 1.4.

The *in* and *ab* relationships are also irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetrical. This can be proved from what we have already laid down. Consider the *in* relationship. We know from Definition 1.2 that its domain (the class of things that inhere in something) consists of accidents. And we know from Rule 1.2 that its converse domain (the class of things that have something inhering in them) consists of substances. Substances and accidents have been defined so as to exclude one another (Definition 1.3). So we know that the domain of *in* excludes its converse domain. Thus, nothing inheres in itself: *in* is irreflexive.

Put another way, Rule 1.2 plus Definitions 1.2 and 1.3 allow us to deduce a contradiction from the supposition that *A in A*:

$$\neg acc(A) \xleftarrow{\textit{Definition } 1.3} subst(A) \xleftarrow{\textit{Rule } 1.2} A \; in \; A \xrightarrow{\textit{Definition } 1.2} acc(A)$$

A parallel argument shows that *ab* is irreflexive. By Rule 1.1, the domain of *ab* excludes the class of accidents. By Rule 1.3 the converse domain is the class of accidents:

$$\neg acc(A) \xleftarrow{\textit{Rule } 1.1} A \; ab \; A \xrightarrow{\textit{Rule } 1.3} cc(A)$$

As a further consequence of the fact that the domains of these relationship exclude their converse domains, we can see that both *in* and *ab* are transitive. Suppose that *A in B* and *B in C*. Then *B* would belong to both the domain and the converse domain of *in*, contrary to hypothesis. Thus, there is never a case in which *A in B* and *B in C*. Therefore, in any case in which *A in B* and *B in C*, *A in C*—there being no such cases. A parallel argument demonstrates the transitivity of *ab*.

Because these two relationships are irreflexive and transitive, they must be asymmetrical. If *A in B* and *B in A*, then (by transitivity) *A in A*—contrary to our earlier result that *in* is irreflexive. Therefore, there is no case in which *A in B* and *B in A*. A parallel argument shows the same for *ab*.

It follows from what we have shown that an accident always inheres in some substance. But this can happen in two different ways: an accident can inhere in a universal substance, or in an individual substance (color inheres in body but also in the individual body). The second sort of case of inherence can be seen as involving the relative product of an *in* and a *de* relationship. Color inheres in Body, which in turn is said of the individual body; and as a consequence, Color inheres in the individual body. In general when *A* inheres in *B* and *B* is said of *C*, *A* inheres in *C*.

Rule 1.6. If *A in B* and *B de C*, then *A in C*

Again, color is in body and therefore also in an individual body.[56]

Also, when *A* is said of *B* and *B* inheres in *C*, *A* inheres in *C*.

Rule 1.7. If *A de B* and *B in C*, then *A in C*

Categories 2 tells us that the individual knowledge of grammar is in the soul, and also that knowledge is in the soul.[57] We may assume that the second of these statements is a logical consequence of the first.

The fourth ontological relationship in the *Categories*—the *ad* relationship that holds between correlatives—is symmetrical. This is simply the property of correlativity.

Rule 1.8. If *A ad B*, then *B ad A*

This relationship is not transitive, but we can assume Rule 1.9:

Rule 1.9. If *A ad B* and *B ad C*, then *A* = *C*

The *Categories* does not explicitly rule out the possibility that a relative and a correlative are actually the same thing. Thus, we cannot say that *ad* is reflexive or that it is irreflexive.

Finally, a relative is assumed to be concreted from something (namely, a relation).

Rule 1.10. If *A ad B*, then for some *C* : *A ab C*

It follows that a relative (that is, something that stands in the relationship *ad* to something) must be denominated from an accident—that is, that relations are accidents. The question whether the relations between the divine Persons are accidents was an acute one for theorists of the Trinity who on one hand believed that the Persons are constituted by the relations and on the other hand denied that there are any accidents in God.

As will now be clear, the content of Aristotle's *Categories* can be expressed as an axiomatized formal theory of four fundamental ontological relations. But, as we are about to see, the major medieval philosophers use their own adaptations of the *Categories* ontology as a way of making sense of the doctrine of the Trinity. Accordingly, in the chapters that follow we will refer to our formal presentation of the *Categories* ontology. And, as one or another medieval thinker introduces modifications to the Aristotelian ontology, we will make corresponding modifications to our formal presentation of it.

2

Augustine

> I used to say to my friends: "Do we love anything except that which is beautiful? What then is a beautiful object? And what is beauty? What is it which charms and attracts us to the things we love? It must be the grace and loveliness inherent in them, or they would in no way move us." I gave the subject careful attention, and saw that in bodies one should distinguish the beauty which is a kind of totality and for that reason beautiful, and another kind which is fitting because it is well adapted to some other thing, just as part of the body is adapted to the whole to which it belongs as a shoe to a foot and like instances. This thought bubbled up in my mind like a spring from the deepest level of my heart, and I wrote *On the Beautiful and the Fitting* in two or three books, I think.[1]

Here, in his mature *De Trinitate*, Augustine reflects on his love of Platonic philosophy as a young man.

Introduction

The fifteen books of Saint Augustine's *De Trinitate* were written over the period 400–420.[2] The author says in his prefatory letter to Aurelius Bishop of Carthage, "I was a young man when I began these books on the Trinity which the one true God is, and I am now an old man as I publish them."[3]

The work falls into two parts. Books I–VIII deal with the mystery of the Trinity in itself; Books IX–XV explore the ways in which images of the Trinity are found in the human mind. In this chapter we look at what Augustine writes about the Trinity in itself, particularly in Books V, VI, and VII, where he enlists Aristotle's *Categories* in the service of giving a philosophical account of God's unicity and simplicity, and of the distinctness and divinity of the three Persons. Our aims will be (1) to understand how this appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy alters the Christian thought world into which it is

integrated, (2) to understand how the Aristotelian material is itself altered in the process, and (3) to understand the resulting synthesis from the viewpoint of contemporary logic and metaphysics, analyzing its semantic and ontological implications.

Augustine's own account of what he is doing in the work draws on the famous simile in Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians:

> I fed you with milk, not with meat; for you weren't yet ready. Indeed, not even now are you ready.[4]

Augustine explains:

> When some people are told this they get angry and think they are being insulted. . . . That is why, with the help of the Lord our God, we shall undertake to the best of our ability to give them the reasons they clamor for, and to account for the one and only and true God being a trinity, and for the rightness of saying, believing, understanding that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same substance or essence.[5]

The words that Augustine uses to describe this process are *reddere rationem*, "to give an account." That an account was needed is evident when we consider that the decrees of the Church Councils were expressed in a language that drew deeply on Greek philosophy but was not restrained within the discipline of philosophy. Edmund Hill succinctly explains Augustine's program:

> He is not arguing in favor of the mystery in the sense of attempting proofs of it from reason, but he is arguing, chiefly against the Arians who seem to have been most accomplished "natural theologians," that the Catholic faith is not at variance with acceptable logic and metaphysics.[6]

Augustine's concern was to demonstrate not truth but logical consistency. His project resembles the task of showing a mathematical theory to be consistent by constructing a model of it. Augustine pursues his aim by modeling the doctrine of the Trinity in an Aristotelian-based theory of categories.

As a work that synthesizes two disciplines, *De Trinitate* draws on both theological and philosophical sources. It takes Holy Scripture as a datum, and

offers interpretations of that datum. Among the numerous scriptural authorities he cites, Augustine places special emphasis on Matthew 28:19, describing the passage as "the text which presents this trinity to us the most plainly."[7] He takes this as the text for the prayer with which he closes *De Trinitate*:

> O Lord our God, we believe in you, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Truth would not have said, *Go and baptize the nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit* unless you were a triad. Nor would you have commanded us to be baptized, Lord God, in the name of any who is not Lord God.[8]

From among the decrees of the Church Councils he emphasizes those that reject the heresies of Arius and Sabellius, particularly the former. Indeed, Augustine's expression "the Trinity which the one true God is" already contains a rejection of Arianism, because the Arians seem to be committed either to saying that Father and Son are two Gods or that only the Father is God.

Augustine's youthful love of Platonism had intensified when in 384, while in Milan, he read some works by unnamed Neoplatonists, as he reports in his *Confessions*:

> So I visited Simplicianus, father to the then bishop Ambrose in the receiving of grace. Ambrose truly loved him as one loves a father. I told him the story of my wanderings in error. But when I mentioned that I had read some books of the Platonists, which had been translated into Latin by Victorinus, at one time rhetor in the city of Rome who had, I learned, died a Christian, he congratulated me that I had not fallen in with the writings of other philosophers full of fallacies and deceptions "according to the elements of this world" (Col. 2: 8), whereas in all the Platonic books God and his Word keep slipping in.[9]

Augustine thought that some of these Neoplatonic writings showed an awareness not just of God but also of at least some of the divine Persons. He states that Porphyry

> speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he

> says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two.[10]

Along with these Platonist influences, Augustine recollects that Aristotle's *Categories* also played a part in his intellectual formation—though not one that he rates as highly as the Platonist influence:

> What good did it do me that at about the age of twenty there came into my hands a work of Aristotle which they call the *Ten Categories*? My teacher in rhetoric at Carthage, and others too who were reputed to be learned men, used to speak of this work with their cheeks puffed out with conceit, and at the very name I gasped with suspense as if about to read something great and divine. Yet I read it without any expositor and understood it.[11]

The Categories

Alain de Libera argues that the theory of categories employed by Augustine is not the unadorned Aristotelian theory. Augustine divides the categories into those that involve *ad se* and those that involve *ad aliud* predications. De Libera sees in this division the influence of the Middle Platonic distinction between *kath 'hauto* (absolute) and *pros ti* (relative) predications.[12] We noted in Chapter 1 that the latter distinction, as reported by Dexippus, may be the basis for Iamblichus's division of the ten categories. On such a division, the relational categories would include not only Aristotle's category of relatives but also the last six categories (Action, Passion, Where, When, Position, Possession), and the ten categories would be grouped as in Figure 2.1.

Augustine was aware of Plotinus's critical questions about whether all ten categories applied in the intelligible as well as the sensible realm, and whether, if the term "substance" is applied in the intelligible as well as in the sensible realm, it has the same sense in both applications. He thought that some but




FIGURE 2.1. Division of earthly predications (Augustine)

not all of the Aristotelian categories had application in the supernatural world. And he thought that not only "substance" but also the names of the other categories had to mean something different when applied in the two worlds:

> Thus we should understand God, if we can and as far as we can, to be good without quality, great without quantity, creative without need or necessity, presiding without position, holding all things together without possession, wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, without any change in himself making changeable things, and undergoing nothing.[13]

The quality word "good" applies to God; but God is not good in the same sense as created things are good, nor does God have qualities in the same sense of "quality" that applies to created beings. Augustine runs through the other categories, in every case other than the category of Passion stating that the category has application to the divine realm but in a sense different from that in which it has application to created things. However, he does not explain what these differences are. This unanswered question is part of his legacy to the Middle Ages.

De Libera understands Augustine as holding that not all the categories can be applied to God, and those that are so applicable have to be conceived of differently from the way they are thought of in their earthly application. He finds in Augustine the following division of divine predications.[14]

Here, the category of Passion has disappeared, God not being subject to any Passions. The last four categories, along with the category of Action, are subsumed under *ad se* predications—Action and the first three categories being properly or substantially *ad se*, Where and When, and Position and Possession, being metaphorically or nonsubstantially *ad* se. The Aristotelian category of Relatives is the sole *ad aliud* category.




FIGURE 2.2. Division of divine predications (Augustine)

All nonmetaphorical predications about God are either substantial or relative. And Augustine's treatment of the divine relations does indeed assume that

> With God, nothing is said modification-wise, because there is nothing changeable with him. And yet not everything that is said of him is said substance-wise. Some things are said with reference to something else.[15]

However, the substantial predications include some that are drawn from the non-Substance categories of Quantity, Quality, and Action.

Augustine's thinking about relatives was influenced by Plotinus's distinctions among the kinds of relative. He states,

> it is true that a man is called friend by way of relationship, and he does not begin to be a friend until he begins to be friendly; so there is some change in his will involved in his being a friend. But when a coin is called the price of something it is so called relationship-wise, and yet in this case no change occurs in it when it begins to be a price; and the same is true of pledge and similar things.[16]

Here he alludes to two of Plotinus's distinctions. Friends are relative to one another by virtue of an active principle in both of them, while this is not so when a coin becomes the price of something; and when I gain a new friend I change in some way, but when a commodity increases in price it may remain unchanged. Augustine adds that if among created things a relative can apply to a subject without implying a change in the subject, how much more so this must be possible with God, who is not subject to change.

The Problem of the Trinity

Augustine's aim of defending the doctrine of the Trinity against the Arians who maintained that there is more than one god, and against the Sabellians who maintained that the divine Persons are not really distinct from one another, can only be achieved if it can be shown that the following four propositions are compossible:

1. that there is one and only one God;
2. that God is utterly simple;

3. that the Persons of the Trinity are really distinct from one another;
4. that each of the Persons of the Trinity is substantially God.

Here, in outline, is how Augustine understands these propositions.

God's Unicity

Augustine takes God to be one substance:

> There is at least no doubt that God is substance [*substantia*], or perhaps a better word would be being [*essentia*]; at any rate what the Greeks call *ousia*.[17]

But he prefers the term *essentia* over *substantia*:

> The word [*sc. substantia*] is rightly used for ordinary things which provide subjects for those things that are said to be in a subject, like color or shape in a body. Thus body subsists, and is therefore substance; but those things are in the subsisting, in the subject or underlying body, and so they are not substances, but in substance. Therefore if that color or shape ceases to be, it does not stop the body being body, because it is not the same for it to be as to retain this or that shape or color.[18]

To understand Augustine's hesitation over the word *substance* we have to return to Aristotle's *Categories*, where Aristotle had characterized Substance in two different ways. The first criterion (3a7) stated that a Substance does not inhere in anything; the second (4a10) states that other things do inhere in Substance (namely contrary things inhere, one after the other). By the first criterion, God is just as much a substance as is any sensible substance. But of course the second criterion is not true of God. Augustine's view is that if anything were to inhere in God as in a subject, then God would not be unalterable:

> But it is impious to say that God subsists to and underlies his goodness, and that goodness is not his substance, or rather his being, nor is God his goodness, but it is in him as in an underlying subject. So it is clear that God is improperly called substance, in order to signify being by a more usual word. He is called being truly and properly in such a way

> that perhaps only God ought to be called being. He alone truly is, because he is unchanging.[19]

Augustine's denial that God has incidental attributes recalls Plotinus's similar denial about the One. The assumption is that if anything inheres in God, then God is not unchanging. But this assumption could be countered if we allowed that, while attributes inhere contingently in their subjects, generally speaking, God's attributes inhere necessarily. However, Augustine also thinks that God has no inseparable accidents:

> We usually give the name "modification" to something that can be lost by some change of the thing it modifies. Even though some modifications are called inseparable, *achorista* in Greek, like the color black in a crow's feather, it does lose it, not indeed as long as it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. The stuff it is made of is changeable, and so the moment it ceases to be that animal or that feather, and that whole body turns and changes into earth it loses of course that color. . . . So there is no modification in God because there is nothing in him that can be changed or lost.[20]

In this way, Augustine reduces inseparable accidents to separable ones: rather than being separable from their subjects, they are separable from the stuff of which their subjects are made. But his argument does not show that it is impossible for God to have accidents in the sense of "accident" according to which accidents are what is not directly contained in a thing's essence—because in this sense the presence of accidents in no way involves the possibility of change.

What the doctrine of divine unicity gains by being expressed in the language of substance is that the question "One *what*?" as applied to God is given an answer with definite philosophical content. But this gain is achieved only by subjecting the Aristotelian concept of substance to a significant alteration. What is (according to Aristotle) most characteristic of Substance does not hold for God; and for this reason Augustine concludes that God can at best be called a substance only improperly. But God *can* be called a Substance improperly, in the precise sense that, like all substances, He is not in any subject. This modified Aristotelian concept of substance applies to God, but an unmodified Aristotelian concept of substance does not.

God's Simplicity

Augustine is sensitive to the distinction between concrete and abstract names, and he uses a Platonic turn of phrase to signal the way in which the concrete derives from the abstract:

> In things that are great by partaking of greatness, things where being is one thing and being great another, like a great house and a great mountain and a great heart, in such things greatness is one thing and that which is great from this greatness [*ab ea magnitudine*] is another.[21]

This usage also recalls Aristotle's talk in the *Categories* of the concrete as being *from* the abstract. Augustine however takes a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian view of the logic of the *ab* relationship, because of the way he understands divine simplicity.

Just as Plotinus saw the One as utterly simple, as lacking all accidents, and as being called whatever it is called in a sense that is unique to it, Augustine too distinguishes some terms as applying in a "proper" or "primal" sense such that the concrete name can be predicated of the abstract name. These terms include the names of the divine perfections. Thus, the greatness "by which not only is a great house great or any great mountain great, but by which anything at all is great that is called great" is primally great.[22] And he speaks of "primordial equality and primordial likeness."[23]

Not only do the terms "great" and "good" as applied to God have a sense different from their quotidian one, but the divine and nondivine senses are also mutually incompatible. This is clear from the fact that in one case but not the other, the concrete name can be predicated of the abstract. If one takes divine Goodness to be *perfect* goodness, one might put the point, as Barry Miller does, by saying in theological contexts that the qualifier "perfect" is an *alienans* adjective.[24] In other words, it can be said that perfect Goodness is not Goodness, in somewhat the way it can be said that the ideal gas is not a gas.

In the case of the divine perfections, the concrete and the abstract are identical:

> God is called great, good, eternal, omnipotent, and he can also be called his own godhead, his own greatness, his own goodness, his own eternity, his own omnipotence.[25]

Thus, contrary to the *Categories* account of the *ab* relationship, Augustine thinks that there are true statements of the form *A ab A*. That which is great (in the appropriate sense of "great") is the same as the greatness by which it is great. Once again, philosophical illumination of a Christian idea is achieved only by modifying the philosophical material to suit the interpretive task to which it is being put.

Since God's greatness is the same as God, and His goodness is the same as Him, His goodness must be identical with His greatness (assuming that God is one being):

> God . . . is indeed called in multiple ways great, good, wise, blessed, true, and anything else that seems not to be unworthy of him; but his greatness is identical with his wisdom . . . and his goodness is identical with his wisdom and greatness, and his truth is identical with them all; and with him being blessed is not one thing, and being great or wise or true or good, or just simply being, another.[26]

This is the sense in which God is simple. God, in this respect is like Plato's Good and Plotinus's One.

We can distinguish two types of integration that together comprise Augustine's notion of divine simplicity. On one hand, there is the vertical integration of God with the divine attributes (Divinity, divine Goodness, etc.), so that God is the same as God's attributes. There is no difference between the attribute and that which is named *from* the attribute. There being no difference, we can say that God is from God, or the divine Goodness is from itself, and so forth. On the other hand, there is the horizontal integration of all the divine attributes with one another: God's greatness is the same as God's goodness, and so on. The horizontal integration follows from the vertical. If each of God's attributes is the same as God, then all are the same as one another. Nonetheless, the horizontal integration of the divine perfections leads to an epistemological problem: If divine goodness is in reality the same as divine greatness, why do we use two different words for this reality? It is a problem that will receive at least two distinctive answers in the thirteenth century.

The Persons' Relativity

Augustine accepted the Nicaean formula, "One essence, three hypostases" as capturing the paradox that there is one God but three Persons.[27] His key tactic,

in constructing a philosophical theory of the Trinity, is to use the Aristotelian category of relatives as a way of understanding the three Persons. He took the Persons, or hypostases, to be relative to one another:

> In very truth, because the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit who is also called the *gift* of God is neither the Father nor the Son, they are certainly three.[28]

Augustine understood the claim that the Persons are relative to have three components, all drawn from Aristotle's account of relatives. The Persons are *ad aliud*, not *ad se*; their relativities are reciprocal, so that each relative has a correlative; and the correlatives are simultaneous in nature.

AD SE/AD ALIUD

As we saw earlier, Augustine thinks that, with one exception, all predications about God are *ad se* even if their linguistic form suggests that they are predications of Quality or Quantity or one of the other categories. The exception occurs where the category of Relatives is concerned. Here, Augustine thinks that some predications about the Divinity genuinely are relative. When we say that God is Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, we are making genuinely relative predications. God's goodness and greatness are not qualitative or quantitative; they are *ad se*. But the divine Persons are not *ad se*; they are genuinely *ad aliud*.

According to the characterization of relatives in Aristotle's *Categories,* to say that the Father is relative is to say that the being of the Father is to be related to the Son; and similarly for the other Persons. In this way the Persons have a different type of being from that of the divine essence, which is what it is entirely by itself, not requiring reference to anything else. To say that the being of the Persons is *ad aliud* and not *ad se* is thus to reject the Arian view that the Father and the Son are two distinct substantial beings.

CORRELATIVITY

The Persons are related to one another as correlatives, and Augustine assumes with Aristotle that relatives come in correlative pairs. This holds also in the case of the divine Father and Son:

> Some things are said with reference to something else, like Father with reference to Son and Son with reference to Father.[29]

The Holy Spirit is relative to both Father and Son:

> This relationship, to be sure, is not apparent in this particular name, but it is apparent when he is called *the gift of God*. He is the gift of the Father and of the Son.[30]

He asks what is the correlative of the Holy Spirit. In reply he observes that we can replace the term "Holy Spirit" by "gift." Its correlative is then "giver,"[31] and he clearly means that the giver includes both the Father and the Son. So, whereas the subject of the giver-relation is a pair—the Father and the Son—its object is the Holy Spirit.

SIMULTANEITY

Third, the Persons are simultaneous in nature with one another. Aristotle attributed this property to many (though not all) relatives. Augustine thinks that the property holds for divine Father and Son even more evidently than it does for an earthly father and son. An earthly father exists in time before his earthly son (though he does not then exist as a father—at least, not as that son's father). But the divine Father and Son exists from all time simultaneously with one another,

> because the one is always Father and the other always Son—not "always" in the sense that he is Son from the moment he is born or that the Father does not cease to be Father from the moment the Son does not cease to be Son, but in the sense that the Son is always born and never began to be Son.[32]

So the divine Father and Son clearly possess the two distinguishing marks by means of which Aristotle distinguishes items in the category of relatives from items in the other categories.

What is missing from this description of the Persons' relativity is a developed account of what it is that makes the relativity of one Person different from that of another. Later in Book XV Augustine does indeed speak about the Father's relativity toward the Son in terms of the Father *generating* the Son, and of the Holy Spirit as *proceeding* from Father and Son.[33] And this suggests that there are different relations—relations of generation and its converse, and of procession and its conversion—which make the Persons different from one

another. But this talk of relations is not integrated with the talk of relatives in the early books.

The semantic analysis of relatives and relations is a difficult matter. Later in this chapter we will make some suggestions about how it might be done.

The Persons' Divinity

Each of the Persons is something relative to the other Persons, and what they are relatively is what distinguishes them one from another. At the same time, each of the Persons is something substantially, and it is the same thing that each of them substantially is. For Augustine, this distinction gives the key to an intelligible description of the Persons of the Trinity and the way in which they stand to God. He illustrates his notion of substantial predication by reference to the general principle that

> every being that is called something by way of relationship is also something besides the relationship; thus a master is also a man, and a slave is a man, and a draught-animal is a horse, and a security is a sum of money. Man and horse and sum of money is said with reference to self, and signify substances or beings; while master and slave and draught-animal and security are said with reference to something else, to signify certain relationships.[34]

We saw in Chapter 1 that what Augustine calls substantial predications are in the *Posterior Analytics* treated as ones whose predicate gives the essence of what is referred to incidentally by the subject. Later in this chapter we will propose an analysis of these predications in terms of the fundamental ontological relations.

On Augustine's account, the unicity of God is indicated by the fact that God is predicated of the divine Persons substantially: a multiplicity of gods would require a multiplicity of substances. The trinity of Persons is indicated by the fact that each of them is predicated relatively: a multiplicity of Persons requires only a multiplicity of relativities. This distinction enables him to maintain that the unicity of God is compatible with a multiplicity of divine Persons. More than that, he holds that although the divine Persons are really distinct, each of them is substantially the one God.

Notwithstanding all of this, the correlativity of divine Father and Son seems to be unlike the sorts of correlativity considered by Aristotle. Though distinct

from one another as relatives, the divine Father and Son are the same substance as each other, whereas an earthly father is always a different substance from his earthly son. Augustine notices that there are examples in creation where two distinct substances are correlated by the one relation—cases like two substances that are friends or neighbors of each other. Each substance can be said in this case to be a friend or neighbor with reference to the other. But, he observes, the case of Father and Son is not like this, because

> father and son do not have the same sort of reference to each other as friends or neighbours. Friend of course has reference to friend, and if they love each other equally, there is the same friendship in each; and neighbour has reference to neighbour, and because they neighbour equally on each other (A is as near to B as B is to A), there is the same neighbourness in each.[35]

The divine Father and Son, unlike earthly friends, are correlated by two distinct relations; and unlike two earthly friends (or an earthly father and son), they are substantially identical. Still, there does not seem to be anything in the doctrine of the *Categories* to rule out such a correlation.

In sum, Augustine's analysis postulates a single substance and three relatives, which, while distinct from each other in their relativities, are all substantially identical. It leaves one important question unanswered: Is the distinction between the three relatives grounded on anything further? Because it leaves this question unanswered, Augustine's analysis seems to be only partly successful in its aim of demonstrating the consistency of the four points mentioned earlier in this chapter. Let us see whether formal analysis confirms this assessment.

Formal Analysis

Aristotle's project in the *Categories* can be seen as aiming to identify the fundamental categories of being, to which all beings are reducible. Not everything that exists belongs straightforwardly to one of his ten categories, but that by itself does not mean that his project is a failure. The project can be counted a success provided that everything with a genuine claim to be called a being can in some way be accounted for by reference to the ten Aristotelian categories. Thus, the theory needs to be understood in the context of a set of techniques whereby beings that do not immediately fall under one of the categories can

be shown to do so upon analysis. One of these analytical techniques (a simple but important one) involves statements of the kind that Augustine calls substantial predications.

Let us use the abbreviation *est* to express the relationship between a term such as "slave" and a corresponding term such as "man," where it is true that slaves are substantially men. We can use the *est* relationship to clarify some features of Augustine's understanding of the semantics of Trinitarian language and the associated ontology. To do this we need to distinguish linguistic items from items in non-linguistic reality to which those names correspond. This can be done by using simple matrixes divided into two columns, where the left-hand column lists linguistic items such as names of God or of the Persons, and the right-hand column shows how items in reality correspond to these names. For the left-hand column I will represent the name "God" by the letter *d*, and the names of the Persons by the letters *p* (*pater*), *f* (*filius*), and *s* (*spiritus sanctus*). For the right-hand column, I will use the letter *x* for the being that is named by the name "God." With these conventions, we can give a simple representation of Augustine's semantic understanding of the names of the divine Persons by means of a matrix like that shown in Figure 2.3, where the left-hand column lists the names of God and the Persons, and the right-hand column lists the beings that are so named. There is only one such being, which we represent by the letter *x*.

To represent Augustine's semantic understanding of the names of the divine perfections, I arbitrarily choose two of the divine perfections, wisdom and goodness. Here we can distinguish the names of the beings that are divinely wise and divinely good, from the beings so named. (Augustine holds that there is only one being so named, and it is the same as the being that is God.) I will use the letter *a* (*sapiens*) to stand for the name "wise," and the letter *b* (*bonus*) to stand for the name "good." To distinguish the wisdom and goodness that

d	*x*
p	*x*
f	*x*
s	*x*

FIGURE 2.3. Simple semantics of the Persons (Augustine)

only God has from wisdom and goodness in an ordinary sense, I shall add a prime mark to these names, so that *a′* and *b′* stand respectively for the names "divinely wise" and "divinely good." Augustine's understanding of the names for the divine perfections can then be represented by the matrix shown in Figure 2.4, which shows that the names "God," "divinely wise," and "divinely good" all name the one being.

In order to represent substantial predications, we need to go beyond such simple semantics. We will need not just a way of identifying what beings a term is true of, but also a way of identifying what beings it is essentially (i.e. not accidentally) true of. This can be achieved as follows. Given any term "*t*" we distinguish among beings that are *t* those that are *essentially t*.[36] Of special interest is the case in which the class of beings that are essentially *t* is identical with the class of beings that are *t*. This case is exemplified in the created world by any term, such as "horse," that names a species or genus: there are no horses that are not essentially horses. Let us call terms like this essential terms. Only essential terms are terms that are predicated substantially.

For Augustine, neither "Father" nor "Son" nor "Holy Spirit" is predicated substantially of God. That which is God is not essentially Father, and so on. And if that which is God is not essentially Father, surely nothing is essentially Father. Using this device we can introduce a sophistication into our simple semantics, whereby we specify for each term, not only the individuals of which the term is true, but also those of which it is essentially true. This information is entered in a new column, which is headed by a star. The matrix in Figure 2.5 shows "*d*" as an essential term, but shows the names of the Persons as not essential. There is a being, for example, which is named by the name "Father," but there is no being which is essentially the Father. The matrix indicates that

d	*x*
a	*x*
b	*x*

FIGURE 2.4. Simple semantics of the divine perfections (Augustine)

		*
d	x	x
p	x	–
f	x	–
s	x	–

FIGURE 2.5. Essentialist semantics of the Persons (Augustine)

each of the Persons is substantially God, in the sense that the being which each Person is, is God, and that being is essentially God.

This semantic analysis differentiates Augustine's understanding of the Trinity from that of the Arians. On one way of taking their doctrine, suggested by Boethius's statement that Arius, "while calling the Son God, declares him to be in various ways inferior to the Father and of another substance,"[37] Father and Son are both God but are distinct beings, and thus there is more than one God. On a second way of taking it, suggested by the formulation of the Nicaean Council, there was a time when the Son was not, and thus the Son is not God.[38] On the first way of taking Arianism, the doctrine requires that the name "God" is true of two beings (let them be x and y). One of these is named by the name "Father," and the other by the name "Son," and all three names are essential. On the second way of taking Arianism, the name "God" names only one being, and that being (let it be x) is named by the name "Father." The name "Son" names another being (let it be y). Both names are essential, but there is only one being that is God. The two doctrines are represented in the two matrixes shown in Figure 2.6.

The Augustinian semantics is also different from a Sabellian understanding, which implies that there is no ontological difference among the Persons, or

		*
d	x, y	x, y
p	x	x
f	y	y

		*
d	x	x
p	x	x
f	y	y

FIGURE 2.6. Essentialist semantics of the Father and the Son (Arius)

		*
d	*x*	*x*
p	*x*	*x*
f	*x*	*x*

FIGURE 2.7. Essentialist semantics of the Father and the Son (Sabellius)

between the Persons and God. There is only one being, which is named by the name "God" and by the names of the Persons, as shown in Figure 2.7.

Augustine's semantics of the divine perfections will be different from that of the divine Persons, precisely because the names for those perfections are not relative names but come (in their secular usage) from the category of Quantity (like the name "great") or Quality (like the name "good"). As we have seen, these names become substantial when predicated of God. In this respect they are unlike the Personal names. The matrix in Figure 2.8 represents what I take to be Augustine's view of their semantics. It shows that the names "divinely wise" and "divinely good" (a' and b') are not just true, but essentially true, of the being that is God.

The next problem is how to represent the distinctive ways in which, according to Augustine, the Persons stand toward one another. We could try expanding our semantic matrixes so as to include a column in which the correlative of any relative term can be entered (or a blank, in the case of a nonrelative term). The resulting matrix would then be as in Figure 2.9 (where the ⟶ column lists the correlatives, if any, of the names in the leftmost column).

But this will not do. The difference between the first and all the other columns is supposed to be that the entries in the first column are conceptual or linguistic items (terms), while those in the other columns are objective beings (referents). The matrix was supposed to tell us what in reality corresponds to the names in the leftmost column; but what we have done in the arrow-

		*
d	*x*	*x*
a'	*x*	*x*
b'	*x*	*x*

FIGURE 2.8. Essentialist semantics of the divine perfections (Augustine)

		$*$	$\rightarrow$
d	x	x	–
p	x	–	f
f	x	–	p
s	x	–	$\langle p, f \rangle$

FIGURE 2.9. Relational semantics of the Persons (first attempt)

column is to give linguistic correlatives of our relative terms, thus blurring the distinction between the conceptual or linguistic on one hand and the objective or metaphysical on the other.

Perhaps the situation can be remedied by thinking of a relative term as the result of removing terms from the ordered pair that constitutes the extension of the corresponding relation. Thus, if the relation of fatherhood had for its extension the set {<Andrew,Matthew>, <Andrew,Mary>, <Cyril,Elizabeth>}, then the "towardness" of the term "father" could be represented by the set {<–,Matthew>, <–,Mary>, <–,Elizabeth>}. The "towardness" of the term "child" would then be represented by the set {<Andrew,–>, <Andrew,–>, <Cyril,–>}. Similarly, the "towardness" of the term "divine Father" could be represented by the sequence $\langle –, x \rangle$, where x represented the being which is the Son, viz. God, and that of the term "Son" by the sequence $\langle x, – \rangle$. This is just to say that the Father is the subject of a relation whose object is God, and the Son is the object of a relation whose subject is God. Similarly, it can be said (according to the Western Church) that the Holy Spirit is the object of a relation whose subject is the ordered pair <God, God>. All of this is shown in Figure 2.10.

One might wonder whether an ordering of elements is an objective reality or whether it exists only in our understanding of those elements. In favor of

		$*$	$\rightarrow$
d	x	x	–
p	x	–	$\langle –, x \rangle$
f	x	–	$\langle x, – \rangle$
s	x	–	$\langle \langle x, x \rangle, – \rangle$

FIGURE 2.10. Relational semantics of the Persons (second attempt)

an objectivist view, one might appeal to an example: A line of people with me at the front is a different reality from a line with me at the back, and this difference is not something that pertains solely to our understanding. If so, we may have found a way of representing an objective difference between Father and Son, even though that which is the Father is the same as that which is the Son.

In any case, the most that is shown by the relational semantics in Figure 2.10 is that the Father stands in some relationship to something which is substantially God, and that something which is substantially God stands in some relationship to the Son, and that an ordered pair of beings both of which are substantially God stand in some relationship to the Holy Spirit. This does not add up to an account of what distinguishes one Person from another.

Augustine's views about the beings and relationships internal to the Trinity can now be given a formal representation. The beings include substances and nonsubstances. (The nonsubstances are relative beings.) The relationships linking these beings are *ad*, *ab*, and *est*. The structure is represented in Figure 2.11.

Substances are represented by filled circles, beings that are not substance by unfilled circles. Concretion is represented by an arrow marked "*ab*," sub-




FIGURE 2.11. Ontology of the Trinity (Augustine)

stantial predication is represented by an arrow marked "*est*," and correlatives are joined by a double arrow marked "*ad*." Note that the Spirit's correlative is the pair comprising the Father and the Son, and so there is a split arrow leading from the Spirit to that pair.

This ontology is very sparse. The only substance is God (who is identical with divinity and with the divine perfections). The Persons exist, but only as relative and not as substantial beings: their being reduces substantially to that of God. The structure stands in stark contrast to the structure that is implicit in Philoponus's tritheistic ontology, as shown in Figure 2.12.

In a tritheistic ontology there are four substances, only three of which are individuals. The fourth substance, God, is said of the Persons; and, in accordance with the *Categories* definition of a universal (Definition 1.1), it is a universal. By contrast, the Persons, which are not said of any subject, are not universals.

Three questions must be asked about the Augustinian structure. Does it actually model the four propositions that make up Augustine's view of the Trinity (the unicity and simplicity of God, the relative distinction of the Persons, and their substantial identity with God)? Is it consistent with the ontology of the *Categories*? And is the model internally consistent?

According to the structure shown in Figure 2.11, there is one and only one God; so it asserts divine unicity. According to the structure, the divine perfections are God; and in that sense the model affirms divine simplicity. The model also shows the substantial identity of the Persons with God. What it does not show is the relative distinction of the Persons. This, indeed, was already clear in our




FIGURE 2.12. Ontology of the Trinity (Philoponus)

semantic matrix for the Persons, which does not give a representation of the relationality of the Persons; and the ontological structure, while it shows the Persons as being interrelated, does not give a representation of what these interrelationships are. Consequently, it does not show what it is about the Persons that makes them distinct from one another. So, the model does not finish the task Augustine set himself. It is inconsistent with Arianism, but it does not ground its anti-Arianism in anything more basic.

In order for the structure displayed in Figure 2.11 to be realized, some of the principles governing the *Categories* ontology must be dropped. Because a substance in this structure stands in the relationship *ab* to something, we have to drop Definition 1.3 ("a substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything"). This can be replaced by a new definition of substance:

DEFINITION 2.1. *subst(A)* iff not *acc(A)* and for no *B* $(B \neq A)$: *A ab B*

This definition states that a substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything other than itself. Everything falling under Definition 1.3 also falls under Definition 2.1; but some things that fall under Definition 2.1 do not fall under Definition 1.3, for example, a nonaccident that is from itself. Thus, the conception of substance that is expressed by Definition 2.1 is more general than the one expressed by Definition 1.3. In order to encompass God within the concept of substance, we have to generalize it beyond what is given in the *Categories* conception. So, part of what is going on in Augustine's revision of the *Categories* ontology is that he is generalizing it to cover cases that the *Categories* did not envisage.

Nothing in the structure violates Rule 1.1 ("an accident, i.e. whatever is in something, is not from anything") because nothing in the structure is in anything.

Rule 1.2 ("only substances have anything in them") is satisfied.

However, Rule 1.3 ("Whatever anything is from is an accident, i.e., is in something") is not satisfied, because in Augustine's structure God stands in the *ab* relationship to himself, but is not in anything. We can apply to this rule a generalization similar to that which we applied to the definition of substance. The new rule will be

RULE 2.1. If *A ab B* $(B \neq A)$, then *acc*(*B*)

The *de* relationship does not occur in Augustine's structure, and so all of the rules about *de* (Rules 1.4 to 1.7) are satisfied vacuously.

Rule 1.8 ("a relative has a correlative") is satisfied because only the Persons are relatives and they have correlatives.

Rule 1.9 ("a correlative's correlative is the original relative") is satisfied.

Rule 1.10 ("a relative must be from something") is not satisfied in Augustine's structure because only the Persons are relatives, and they are not shown as being from anything.

Nothing in the *Categories* ontology rules out two correlatives being substantially the same as one another. Augustine is right to say that an earthly father cannot be identical with his child. But equals are correlatives, and two equals can be substantially identical. Moreover, equals satisfy Rules 1.8 to 1.10: if $A = B$, then $B = A$, if $A = B$ and $B = C$, then $A = C$, and equals are relatives.

Thus, the ontology implicit in Augustine's structure differs from the ontology of the *Categories* in two respects. The definition of substance must be altered from Definition 1.3 to Definition 2.1; and Rule 1.3 must be replaced by Rule 2.1. There is no obvious internal inconsistency in this ontology.

3

Boethius

He sought and told
All Nature's secret causes.
But now he lies
His mind's light languishing.
Bowed with these heavy chains about his neck,
His eyes cast down beneath the weight of care,
Seeing nothing
But the dull, solid earth.[1]

Here the Lady Philosophy, a literary creation of Boethius's, describes the pitiful sight of her author in prison awaiting his execution.

Introduction

Boethius was born in 480 and lived most of his life in Rome. At that time Justin ruled the Empire from Constantinople, and the Ostrogoth King Theoderic ruled Italy from Ravenna. Boethius, his emperor, and his king were adherents of three different Christian sects, Boethius being a follower of the decrees of the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople, the Emperor Justin a Monophysite, and Theoderic an Arian.

Boethius's theological writings, the *Opuscula sacra*, comprise five works:

OS I, *De Trinitate*, sometimes referred to as *De Trinitate* I
OS II, *Utrum Pater et Filius*, sometimes referred to as *De Trinitate* II
OS III, *Quomodo substantiae*, also referred to as *De Hebdomadibus*
OS IV, *De Fide Catholica*
OS V, *Contra Eutychen*

These works were written in a context where, on one hand, Church authorities were compiling an ever-growing catalogue of heresies, and on the other hand sporadic attempts were being made to heal the schism between Eastern and Western Christianity. One such attempt occurred in 519, when a group of Scythian monks traveled to Rome seeking approval for the formula "One of the Trinity suffered in the flesh." It is possible that *OS* I and *OS* II were the result of reflection on this proposition and its implication that the members of the Trinity can be counted.[2]

John the Deacon, the dedicatee of all but the first of Boethius's theological treatises, was Pope from 523 to 526, and was known for his sympathetic attitude toward the Eastern Church. In 522 Boethius was appointed as Theoderic's Master of the Offices, and he moved to Ravenna. Not long after (around 524–525) Theoderic imprisoned first Boethius then John. While in prison, Boethius wrote *The Consolation of Philosophy*, a dialogue between the Lady Philosophy and himself. He was executed, and John died in prison. Boethius's father-in-law Symmachus, the dedicatee of his *OS* I, was executed soon afterward.[3]

John Marenbon presents two possible explanations for Boethius's imprisonment and execution: the envy of local officials in Ravenna, or religious and political differences with the King. Marenbon himself does not opt for one of these explanations to the exclusion of the other, but Boethius's own comments in the *Consolation of Philosophy* emphasize the petty jealousies in Theoderic's administration:

> Who are the accusers, then, by whom I have been brought down? One of them, Basil, once in the king's service but dismissed, was forced to denounce me because of his burden of debts. Two others were Opilio and Gaudentius: on account of their many different frauds they were condemned to exile by the king's judgement, but they refused to obey and took sanctuary in a temple. When the king learned of this he ordered that unless they left Ravenna by a certain date they should be branded on the forehead and driven out. Could they possibly have been more severely treated? And yet on that very date the accusation against me was lodged, with their names on it! I ask you![4]

On the other hand, evidence in favor of the influence of religious/political factors might be drawn from the facts that Boethius's theological treatises had

openly attacked the king's religion, and that the king had acted not only against Boethius but also against the two dedicatees of the theological treatises.

In this chapter we will look at Boethius's achievement in his *Opuscula sacra*, particularly the first tract, where he set himself the task of giving a purely philosophical account of the Trinity. We will also glance at his commentary on the *Categories*. The aims will be to study his deployment of Greek (mainly Aristotelian) philosophical ideas in the task of interpreting the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. As we did in Chapter 2, we will focus attention on the value that philosophical theology brings to the understanding of Christian doctrine, on the way it transforms the philosophical ideas it appropriates, and on its ontological and semantical implications.

In *OS* I and in some his other theological tracts, Boethius sets out to show by purely philosophical reasoning that the Arian sect of Christianity is committed to errors regarding the nature of God. He does not engage in scriptural interpretation, although he does assume the doctrines of the Catholic Church. His methodology is thus very different from Augustine's. As he himself says, "You must, however, examine whether the *semina rationum* sown in my mind by St. Augustine's writings have borne fruit."[5]

The philosophical analyses that Boethius puts forward are on the whole the same as we find in Augustine, but he goes beyond Augustine in one significant way: by giving an answer to the question his predecessor left unanswered—the question whether the relative differences between the Persons have any further grounding. In addition to this, what makes Boethius's relation to Augustine interesting is the way in which he deepens Augustine's analyses. He formulates a criterion for substantial predication. And he sketches an ontological theory on which the analysis of the divine perfections can be based.

Divine Simplicity

Like Augustine, Boethius believes God to be utterly simple.[6] However, Boethius provides this thesis with a different, and deeper, philosophical rationale than that which Augustine had given. Whereas Augustine had relied on the Platonic notions of primal senses and self-predication, Boethius, in *OS* III, elaborates his account of the divine perfections through a set of "common conceptions of the mind" that are in effect the elements of a Neoplatonic ontology. These common conceptions are intended to be such that no one who grasps them

would deny them (although perhaps only someone who is sufficiently learned will grasp them).

Richard Sorabji notes that Boethius "was one of those who saw Neo-Platonism as one with Christianity and helped it to penetrate deep into Christian sensibility,"[7] and John Marenbon counts Proclus (412–485) among the Greek Neoplatonists whose work was known to Boethius.[8] Certainly we can see Boethius's statement that God is "beyond being" as echoing Proclus's proposition that "Every god is above Being."[9] Proclus also proposed,

> Every whole is at the same time an existent thing, and participates Being; but not every existent is a whole. . . . Primal Being is beyond wholeness.[10]

This proposition seems to be reiterated by Boethius when he distinguishes Being (*esse*) from what-is (*id quod est*), saying that because what-is is, it must have the form of Being:

> Being is different from what-is. For what-is (having taken on the form of Being) is and subsists but Being itself is not yet.[11]

"Not yet," I take it, signals that we cannot simply assume that Being is, as we can assume that what-is is. We could conclude that Being is, if we could assume that Being participates in itself, but there is no need to assume that what-is participates in Being, because it does so simply by virtue of being what-is.

Boethius sees what-is as participating in Being, where Being and what-is are mutually exclusive classes:

> What-is can participate in something, but Being itself in no way can participate in anything. For participation happens when something already exists, and when something receives Being it is.[12]

Notice that Boethius's view does not exclude self-predication; he does not rule out the possibility that within the class of what-is, something participates in itself. From his contrasting characterization of what-is and of Being in terms of participation, he infers that while what-is can "have something other than itself" and thus can be an ontological mixture, Being cannot be mixed with anything besides itself:

> That which is can possess something besides what it is itself, but Being itself has nothing else mixed with it.[13]

Boethius also distinguishes between being-something and being-something-in-virtue-of-existing; the former predication is accidental, the latter substantial:

> There is a difference between just being something and essentially being something. The former signifies accident, the latter substance.[14]

Unlike Augustine, Boethius characterizes the accidental not in terms of changeability, but by its opposition to what falls within the subject's essence.

Consequent on the distinction between Being and what is, he states that everything that is (sc. everything that participates in anything) must participate in Being in order to be (i.e., everything is subject to some substantial predication); but in order to be something it must participate in something other than Being (i.e., something may be something by an accidental predication):

> Everything that is participates in what-it-is-to-be, so that it can be; but participates in something else, so that it can be something. Consequently, that which is participates in what-it-is to be, so that it can be; but it is, so that it may participate in something else.[15]

However, not everything is subject to accidental predications—for there are no accidental predications about what is simple. Boethius defines the simple and the composite as follows:

> For every simple, its to-be and that-which-it-is are the same. For every composite, its to-be is other than what it is.[16]

It follows that if God is simple then His being is the same as what He is, so that to be and to be God are the same. The composite is distinguished from the simple by the fact that it is an ontological mixture: it has within it some otherness, namely the otherness between it, as something that is, and its Being.

We may wonder whether the notion of simplicity as Boethius defines it is satisfiable. Could there be a simple being? I think it's clear from the way he sets out the notions of what-is, Being and participation that there is no internal

contradiction in his notion of a simple being. A simple being is one that does not participate anything, or only participates itself; and Boethius's notion of participation allows both for the possibility that some beings do not participate anything and for the possibility of self-participation.

This whole set of ontological principles can be summarized in two diagrams. The first represents a classification of subjects of predication and is displayed in Figure 3.1; the second represents a division of predications and is displayed in Figure 3.2.

The Divine Perfections

In his commentary on the *Categories*, Boethius follows Porphyry in stating that denomination requires three conditions: participation in the thing, participation in the name, and variation in the name.[17] Because the name of a denominative must be different from the name of that which denominates, and because denomination is a partly linguistic relationship, it follows that nothing is denominated from itself. But that does not mean that nothing can be concreted from itself; and Boethius, like Augustine, takes divine simplicity to entail that God's divinity is none other than God, and that therefore God is concreted from divinity, that is, from God.

The divine perfections also must be identical with the divine essence: God's greatness can be nothing other than God himself.[18]




FIGURE 3.1. Division of beings (Boethius)




FIGURE 3.2. Division of predications (Boethius)

Where there is accidental predication there is composition; and there may be composition, too, in essential predication; so, there can be essential as well as accidental predications about composites. But there can only be essential predications about simples, and in such a predication subject and predicate stand for the same being.

Given, then, the sentence "God is just" where we seem to be attributing a quality to God, in order to save the sentence's truth we must avoid interpreting "just" in the sense of an accidental quality. Instead we must understand it to signify a substantial (or, rather, ultrasubstantial) quality—one that is not susceptible to change and that does not introduce any plurality into its subject. The case is similar with predications that, in everyday language, would be thought of as belonging to the category of quantity, as when we talk about God's greatness:

> For when we say "God" we do seem to signify a substance (but one that is beyond substance); a quality when we say "just" (but not an accident) but a substance that is beyond substance. For what-is is not other than what it is to be just; but it is the same to be God and to be just. Again, when we say "great" or "greatest," we do seem to signify a quantity but one that is the very substance, such as we said to be beyond substance; for it is the same to be God and to be great.[19]

Here, as in several other instances, Boethius's reflections on Augustine's thinking about the Trinity result in the formulation of concepts and principles which provide philosophical foundations that were not explicitly formulated by his great predecessor, who had in effect stated some particular cases of Boethius's principles in the form that God is "good without quality, great without quantity" and so on. Douglas Hall sees here also the influence of Proclus,[20] and rightly so. In Proclus's *Elements of Theology* we find the following theorems:

> The substance of every god is a supra-existential excellence; he has goodness neither as a state nor as part of his essence (for both states and essences have a secondary and remote rank relatively to the gods), but is supra-existentially good.[21]

The strategic importance of Boethius's classification of beings is clear from the fact that near the beginning of *De Trinitate* Boethius notes that the Arians

graduate the Trinity according to merit, thus (as he says) breaking it up into a plurality whose principle (as with all pluralities) is otherness [*alteritas*].[22] But there is no otherness in God because God is utterly simple. Of the divine substance, Boethius says that it "*est id quod est*"[23]—it is what it is. By contrast, in nondivine things the attribute differs from its subject, which depends for its being on something other than itself, whereas this is not case with the divine being, which shows no such dependency:

> For the remainder are not that which they are. For one has its being from those things by which it is, that is, from its parts. And it is that, i.e. its parts conjoined; but not this or that individually, as when terrestrial man comprises a soul and body, not a body and soul in part; and so he is not what he is. But what is not from this and that, but is only this, is truly that which it is; and it is, in the most beautiful and strongest way, because it depends on nothing.[24]

Subject and attribute are divided in nondivine things, but conjoined and united in God.[25]

In the divine substance, nothing inheres, and it is not a substrate for anything since it is pure form. When form is a substrate, it is not pure form but an image:

> That is genuinely one in which there is no number, nothing other than that which it is. And it cannot be made a subject; for it is a form, and forms cannot be subjects.[26]

It follows that God cannot be other than his goodness and greatness. Predication may or may not involve an ontological plurality. Terms like "great" (in the sense in which some earthly things are great) are not self-predicable: the concrete adjective cannot be predicated of the abstract noun, and no great being is itself greatness; instead, great beings are great because of a greatness that is other than them. This type of predication involves a plurality of distinct beings, those of which the adjectival term is true, and those of which the abstract noun is true. By contrast, in the sense in which God and God alone is great, the term "great" is self-predicable: the concrete adjective can be predicated of the abstract noun, greatness is great, and so (converting subject and predicate) the one being which is great (God) is greatness, and thus is the great itself (*deus vero*

ipsum magnus exsistit),[27] because that from which God's greatness comes is God himself. There is indeed an abstract being here, but it is identical with that for which the concrete adjective stands. A third type of term is such that there is no abstract being by virtue of which they are what they are. Boethius takes predicates from the last six categories to be like this: they merely "attach something external."[28] In this sense they are "extrinsic" to their subject. This account of what it is to be simple provides a grounding for the Augustinian analysis of divine simplicity, and therefore of Augustine's account of the divine perfections.

> But the Divine Substance is form without matter, and is therefore one, and is its own essence. . . . Wherefore that is truly one in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its own essence.[29]

Since God is his own essence, evidently it is true to say that God is divinity.

The Categories

Boethius, like Augustine, frames his account of the Trinity within an altered version of Aristotle's theory of categories. Like Augustine, he reconceives the Aristotelian categories; however, his reconception differs somewhat from that of Augustine. Boethius agrees with Augustine that the names of the categories, and the names of beings falling under any individual category, undergo an alteration of meaning when they are transferred from the created to the divine realm. He uses the term *mutatio* (rather than Augustine's *translatio*) to capture the difference between the use of terms to describe God and to describe things of this world.[30] And by way of demonstrating the need for such a *mutatio*, he formulates a principle of contextual interpretation that was to be cited throughout the Middle Ages:

> These [the categories] are such as their subjects allow.[31]

Like other principles of contextual interpretation, Boethius's principle takes it as the default assumption that the sentences under interpretation are true.

Boethius and Augustine have different views about the way divine substance compares with nondivine substance. Alain de Libera points out that whereas Augustine simply notes an improper sense of "substance" as applied to God

as compared with a proper sense attaching to sensible substances, Boethius assumes that the everyday sense of "substance" that has application in the sensible world *requires* an extension to a concept of transcendent substance that also embraces the qualities and quantities attributable to God—all of this under the expression "beyond substance."[32] Both agree, however, that the divine substance shares with created substances the feature that it does not inhere in any subject, as required by Definitions 2.1 (a substance is what is neither an accident nor from anything other than itself) and 1.2 (an accident is what is in a subject). The divine substance differs from created substances in that a created substance has accidents inhering in it, whereas the divine substance does not.

The second major difference between Boethius's and Augustine's reconceptions of the categories concerns the underlying rationales in their division of the ten categories. According to Boethius, among what-is there are three classes: the simple (where there is no plurality, because what-is is the same as its Being), the composite (where there is a plurality arising from the fact that what-is differs from its Being), and the case where what participates in something has no Being of itself (and thus is not plural). The beings in the nine accidental categories are all of the second and third types.

> Have I now made clear the difference between the kinds of predication? Because one set points, as it were, to the thing, the other to the circumstances of the thing; and because those things which are predicated in the first way point to a thing as being something, but the others do not point to its being something, but rather in some way attach something external to it.[33]

Among earthly predications he divides the non-Substance categories into two groups at precisely the same point where Augustine makes the cut—Quantity and Quality on one side, and the remaining six on the other. But the two philosophers give different rationales for the division. For Augustine, it is the *ad se/ad aliud* distinction; for Boethius it is the distinction between what concerns the thing and what is an external accompaniment:

> All this kind of predication arises from what lies outside substance.[34]

He characterizes predication in the categories of Substance, Quantity, and Quality as referring to something internal to the subject:

> And we easily distinguish the difference of this sort of predication in this way: the terms "man" and "God" refer to the substance in virtue of which the subject is—man or God. The term "just" refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz. just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which he is something, viz. great.[35]

By contrast, in the last six categories,

> there is nothing like this. For he who says that someone is in the market or everywhere, is surely referring to the category of place, but not to anything by reason of which he is something, as he is just in virtue of justice.[36]

Each of the last six categories, including the category of relatives, is in some way relational,[37] and they are all of this third type. But what exactly *is* this type?

It *seems* that Boethius is saying that, just as there is no abstract entity of which in-the-Forum is the concretion, so, if we consider any way of being related, there is no abstract being of which being so related is the concretion. In the theological case, this would amount to saying that while the Father is relative there is no abstract entity, no relation, of which the Father is the concretion. There is no such thing as Paternity. Clearly, this is a position that can be constructed as a modification of the *Categories* ontology, by denying Rule 1.10 (any relative is from something).

What is not so clear is whether it is a position that is consonant with Christian doctrine. So we need to look for alternative readings of Boethius's statement that there is nothing by virtue of which those in the marketplace are in the marketplace, in the way that it is in virtue of possessing justice that the just are just. I see two possibilities. Perhaps he is admitting the existence of abstract relations of which relatives are the concretion, but just denying that they are accidents. In this case it is Rule 1.3 that he is denying (an abstract is an accident). Alternatively, he might be admitting that relations exist and are accidents, but denying that relational accidents are *in* their subjects, as affirmed by Definition 1.2.

The Personal Relations

Augustine had not put forward any idea that predications in some of the categories attach something external to their subject—an idea that (as we saw in

Chapter 1) had been advanced by Porphyry. Augustine, as we have seen, followed Plotinus's view that it is only in some cases that the advent of a relation does not alter the related subjects, rather than Porphyry's view that all relations are external to their subjects and therefore that all relations can come to be and pass away without their subjects being affected. Of course, what is important for sustaining the Augustinian analysis of the divine Persons is that a relational analysis of the Persons does not entail that God can change; and this point can be made provided that *some* relations have this feature. So Boethius's failure to account for all relations does not damage his case. What can be said, however, is that his analysis of relative predications makes no advance on what Augustine had already proposed.

Like Augustine, Boethius takes it that relative predications about God (as when we speak about the divine Persons) share the characteristic feature of relative predications in the created world, namely that they do not imply an otherness of substance.

> Wherefore if "Father" and "Son" are predicates of relation, and, as we have said, have no other difference but that of relation, but relation is not predicated as if it were the thing itself and objectively predicated of it, it will not imply an otherness of the things of which it is said.[38]

Of itself, this conception of relatives promises little help in understanding what it is that makes the three Persons distinct from one another. We will return to this question.

Substantial Predication

Wherever there is a plurality of substances, "numerical difference is caused by variety of accidents."[39] Boethius here takes up Porphyry's doctrine that individuals are different by virtue of their properties; he makes it explicit, however, that the properties in question are accidental.[40] The relevance of this question to Boethius's argument is highlighted by Hall:

> The actually unstated conclusion in this section is that numerical plurality cannot apply to the divine Persons of the Trinity, for they cannot differ in accidents.[41]

The idea is that in order for substances to be plural, there has to be otherness not only *between* them but also *within* each one, because one substance must be other than the accidents whereby it is distinguished from another substance.

The Persons do not differ in accidents, and thus do not differ numerically. On the contrary, Boethius maintains, with Augustine, that they are substantially the same as each other. He thinks that the particular way in which substantial predications are configured in the semantics of the Trinity is not replicated anywhere in the created world:

> But if a relation of this kind cannot be found in all other things, this is because of the otherness natural to all perishable, transitory objects.[42]

Boethius's use of the notion of substantial predication goes beyond Augustine's in that he formulates a criterion for judging when a predication is substantial. The argument in *OS* II takes as its starting point the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the three Persons. From that doctrine Boethius infers that while substantial predicates apply equally to all three Persons of the Trinity, relative ones do not. The Father, for instance, is truly wise and great but cannot truly be called Son:

> For he who is "Father," does not pass this name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Consequently, it is not a substantial name. For if it were substantial (like "God" or "truth" or "justice" or indeed "substance") it would be said of the others.[43]

Some predicates that are true of their subjects remain true of them no matter how the subjects are described. Others do not: they are only true of their subjects under certain descriptions, or only *qua* this or that. These *qua* propositions may be true *provided* that the subject satisfies a certain condition, or *because* the subject satisfies a certain condition.[44] Boethius's point is that substantive predications are not *qua* propositions of either of these types; rather, they are such that their predicates remain true of their subjects no matter how the subjects are described.

Predicates concerning Persons of the Trinity are not substantial in Boethius's sense.

> Hence neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity is predicated substantially of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, truth,

> justice, goodness, omnipresence, substance, immutability, virtue, wisdom and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are said of the divinity substantially.[45]

Applying this criterion Boethius can arrive at the desired conclusion that, while predications such as "God is good" are substantial, predications such as "God is Father" are not.

David Bradshaw[46] finds in the following passage from *OS* II an argument for the conclusion that God is indivisible:

> If, then, I ask whether he who is called the Father is a substance, the answer is that he is a substance. And if I ask whether the Son is a substance, the reply is the same. So, too, no one would doubt that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other hand, I take together Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the result is not several substances but one substance. The one substance of the Three, then, cannot be separated in any way or divided, nor is it combined into one as if from parts: it is simply one.[47]

According to Bradshaw, the argument is that each of the Persons is *substantia*, yet when taken together the result is not several substances but one substance. He goes on to criticize the argument, saying that it equivocates on the expression *substantia*. If this expression is taken throughout as a count noun, then the argument illegitimately concludes that if three substances somehow make up a single substance, that substance must be indivisible. But if throughout the argument the expression is taken in the sense "the substance *of* something," that is, the essence of something, then again the argument wrongly concludes that if three things have a common essence, then that essence is indivisible. Bradshaw finds this to be a serious logical problem.

I do not agree with this judgment. The passage in question is not an argument for the conclusion that God is indivisible. It is an attempt to show that it is possible for God to be indivisible consistently with each of the three Persons sharing their *substantia*, there being only one *substantia*. Bradshaw is right to point out that *substantia* is here used in two different senses. It is the *essence* of the three (that is, that which they are substantially) that is referred to when Boethius says that the Persons share their *substantia*; and it is *substance* in the count-noun sense that is applied to God (given the Boethian reservation that it is really substance "beyond substance"). But this

ambiguity does not undermine Boethius's point, if that point is rightly understood.

The Distinction Between the Persons

Boethius tells us that "though the same, [they] are not identical":[48]

> But since no relation can be related to itself, inasmuch as one which makes a predicate by itself is a predication which lacks relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is produced in the fact that it is predication of a relation. . . . The substance preserves the unity, the relation makes up the Trinity.[49]

He writes:

> Wherefore if father and son are predicates of relation, and, as we have said, have no other difference but that of relation, but relation is not predicated with reference to that of which it is predicated as if it were the thing itself and objectively predicated of it, it will not imply an otherness of the things of which it is said, but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we could hardly understand, as otherness of Persons.[50]

The end of this passage closely reflects Augustine's "Yet when you ask 'Three what?' human speech labors under a great dearth of words. So we say three Persons, not in order to say that precisely, but in order not to be reduced to silence."[51]

Now, there seems to be no inconsistency in supposing that relatives are external accompaniments of substance in a sense that denies all substantial being to them, and at the same time supposing that the Persons differ in their relativities; but to suppose all this is not to achieve any understanding of *how* it is possible. And so we return to the question whether the relative differences among the Persons are grounded on something further. This question, which was left unanswered by Augustine, is answered by Boethius. His answer is that there is no further grounding:

> It cannot be said that anything was added to God, that he might become the Father; for he never began to be Father, since the begetting of the

> Son belongs to his very substance; however, the predication of father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous discussion, let us consider that God the Son proceeded from God the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both.[52]

Were anything added to God in order that he might be the Father, it would be Paternity. So Boethius is telling us that Paternity belongs to the very substance of God. But, given that there is no plurality in God, if Paternity belongs to His substance then Paternity *is* God. So, while one might think that because the Persons are differentiated by their different relativities, it follows that the Father is differentiated from the other Persons by Paternity, Boethius holds that this would be to say that the ground of the Father's differentiation from the other Persons is simply the divine essence. Since the Father is the divine essence, his view is that there is no further distinct thing that provides a ground for the Father's differentiation from the other Persons. The only thing that differentiates the Persons from one another is their different relativities.

Formal Analysis

Augustine's main ideas about the Trinity can be summarized under three theses:

1. God can be characterized as a Substance or Essence in a sense of "substance" that differs from its everyday use, and there is only one God.
2. The Persons can be characterized as falling under the Aristotelian category of Relatives, suitably modified to accommodate utterances about the divinity, and this characterization entails a distinction between the three Persons.
3. The Persons, even though distinct from one another relatively, are substantially God and thus are substantially the same as one another.

Boethius is in agreement with these ideas, but he places them within the context of the following principles:

1. The substantiality of God is in accord not with the Aristotelian concept of "substance" but with a prior concept of substantiality.
2. The relativity of the Persons is extrinsic to their substance.

3. The Persons are substantially identical with God in the sense that what is truly predicated of one of them substantially is truly predicated substantially of all of them.

With regard to the substantiality of God, it is worth recalling that Aristotle had proposed two different criteria of substantiality—not inhering in any subject, and being a subject of fluctuating inherent accidents. God does not satisfy the second of these criteria; however, He does satisfy the first. These facts lend support to Boethius's description of God as suprasubstantial. God is suprasubstantial not only in the sense that He is of higher value than created substances, but also in the sense that His substantiality is conceptually more general, lacking one of the criteria of created substantiality. In this sense it is prior to the everyday concept of substantiality. This difference between the substantiality of God and that of creatures, however, is not exhibited in the matrix that we used to summarize Augustine's essentialist semantics of the Persons.

What is exhibited there is that the term "God" is not just true but essentially true of all its subjects. This part of the concept of substantiality is not explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, but it is explicit in Boethius's notion of substantial predication. The concept of substance that we find in the *Categories* requires that (1) a substance-term is true essentially of whatever it is true of; (2) it is never true that a substance inheres in any subject; and (3) it is true that substances are subjects of fluctuating inherents. From this concept we can derive a more general one that is applicable to God, a concept that requires only (1) and (2). From this more general concept an even more general one can be abstracted—defined just by (1)—and it is this concept that we will use in representing Boethius's semantics of the divine perfections. We will return to the concept defined by (1) and (2).

With regard to the semantic analysis of theological language, Boethius's distinction between just being something and being something essentially corresponds to our distinction between essential and nonessential predications. His common conception that everything which is, participates in what-it-is-to-be, can perhaps be taken as stating that any being is essentially something or other. In our semantic matrixes, what this amounts to is that, corresponding to any non-null term t, there must be a term s such that s stands for any being that t stands for, and s is an essential term.

Boethius's distinction between what-is and the Being in which it participates requires a level of semantic analysis more complex than what we have used

thus far. In order to accommodate it, we need to add a further column to our semantic matrixes, a column that lists the entities named by the abstract of a given term. We will label this extra column with a cap (^). To illustrate its usefulness, let us consider Boethius's analysis of the divine perfections. This can be represented by Figure 3.3, where a' stands for "primally wise" and b' for "primally good."

		*	^
d	x	x	x
a'	x	x	x
b'	x	x	x

FIGURE 3.3. Semantics of the divine perfections (Boethius)

This analysis replicates that of Augustine in the first two columns on the right, but in adding the last column we have shown that the divinity of God and his greatness and goodness are one and the same thing, namely God himself, and that thing is a substance in the sense that it satisfies condition (1).

Given what I have argued is Boethius's view about the abstract entities corresponding to the Persons, his semantics of the divine Persons must be as shown in Figure 3.4.

This matrix absorbs Augustine's analysis, but it goes beyond it in identifying an abstract of each of the Persons, namely the Personal relations of Paternity, Filiation and Spiration. Each of the Persons in connected via both *est* and *ab* relationships to the unique being that is at once God, divinity, the divine perfections, and the Personal relations. Given the interpretation for which I have argued, Boethius's ontology of the Trinity may be represented as in Figure 3.5.

		*	^
d	x	x	x
p	x	–	x
f	x	–	x
s	x	–	x

FIGURE 3.4. Semantics of the Persons (Boethius)




FIGURE 3.5. Ontology of the Trinity (Boethius)

Boethius's problem in reflecting on the Holy Trinity was the same as Augustine's, namely, to reconcile four points: God's unicity, God's simplicity, the real distinction of the Persons, and God's substantial predicability about the Persons. He does this by postulating a divine substance that is identical with God and the divine perfections, and also with the Personal properties (Paternity and so forth). Because this substance is identical with the Personal properties, the Persons stand to it in the *ab* relationship. Because the Persons are substantially God, they stand to the divine substance in the *est* relationship. This ontology takes a step beyond that of Augustine in proposing an answer to the question of what differentiates the Persons from one another. The answer—a mysterious one—is that they are differentiated by the Personal properties, which are all identical with divinity.

Mysterious it may be; but this account can be squared with a *Categories*-type ontology in the same way as Augustine's account was, namely by dropping Definition 1.3 in favor of Definition 2.1 ("A substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything other than itself"), and replacing Rule 1.3 by Rule 2.1 ("If *A* is from something other than itself, it is an accident").

Nothing in this ontology rules out the possibility of something's simultaneously standing in both the *ab* and *est* relationships to the same thing. And

it might seem that the realization of this possibility would require that even though God does not comprise a plurality of entities, at least He must have a plurality of aspects; for that in virtue of which the Persons substantially *are* God (viz. the fact that the same being is both God and the Father, and so on) is not the same as that in virtue of which the Persons are *from* God (viz. the fact that the same being is both God and Paternity, and so on). However, this line of thought is not found in Boethius.

David Bradshaw thinks that Boethius's Trinitarian theory should be regarded as a failure:

> It is an audacious enterprise, and if it ends in failure, perhaps the lesson to be drawn is that the undertaking itself is misguided. Boethius himself probably had a better sense of the risks accompanying his enterprise that did some of his later commentators; as he remarks at the end of *On the Trinity*, "if human nature has failed to reached beyond its limits, whatever my weakness takes away, my prayers will make up."[53]

I do not agree with this assessment. Certainly, as I have said, Boethius's analysis leaves us with a mystery, but his understanding of the relation between faith and reason did not require him to dissolve all mystery here. What he has done, successfully I think, is to build on the Augustinian analysis, extending it on a key point, while remaining within the bounds of logical consistency.

4

Abelard

> I was immediately summoned before the council, and with no preliminary discussion they compelled me with my own hand to cast my book into the fire, and it was burned up. . . . When I arose to profess and explain my faith using my own words, my opponents declared that nothing else was required than that I recite the Athanasian Creed; a thing any boy could do. And that I might not offer as an excuse that I did not know it, as if I were not familiar with its wording from use, they had the text brought to me to read. I read it as best I could amid my sighs, sobs and tears.[1]

In these affecting words, Abelard recalls the humiliating end of the Council of Soissons.

Introduction

Twice in the course of his life, Peter Abelard (1079–1142) had to answer to Church authorities about his theological views. The first occasion was the Council of Soissons in March 1121.

> As chance would have it, I first gave myself to discuss the foundation of our faith by analogies from reason, and composed for my students a theological tractate, On the Unity and Trinity of God. They had kept asking of me rational and philosophical expositions and insisting on what could be understood and not mere declarations, saying that a flow of words is useless if reason does not follow them, that nothing is believed unless it first be understood and that it is ridiculous for a man to proclaim to others what neither he nor his pupils can grasp by their intelligence. Such a man, they said, was branded by the Lord as a blind leader of the blind. When most men saw and read this treatise, they

> were very pleased with it as it appeared to answer all questions alike on the subject. And since these questions seemed especially difficult, the subtlety of their solution appeared the greater.
>
> Then my rivals, especially the two old plotters, Alberic and Lotulf, became greatly aroused and got a council to meet against me. . . .[2]
>
> . . . They persuaded their archbishop, Ralph, in association with Conan, bishop of Praeneste and legate in Gaul at the time, to open a meeting at Soissons which they called a Council. I was asked to come and bring with me the treatise on the Trinity which I had written. I agreed.
>
> But before I arrived, the same two rivals had maligned me among the clergy and people with such success that on the day we came the people almost stoned me and a few of my disciples who accompanied me, saying that I had taught and written that there are three Gods, just as they had been brought to believe of me.[3]

The outcome was a public humiliation for the philosopher.

Later, in 1140, William of Saint-Thierry and Thomas of Morigny drew up compilations of Abelard's supposed theological errors. Saint Bernard of Clairvaux used these documents to compile a list of nineteen heresies with which Abelard could be charged. Bernard met with Abelard privately, and then in the presence of two or three witnesses, asking him to correct his errors. Bernard sent the list of Abelard's supposed errors to Pope Innocent II. In an attempt to rescue his reputation, Abelard persuaded the Bishop of Sens, who was preparing a Church Council, to allow him to appear there with Bernard in order to air the accusations publicly and to defend himself against them. When Bernard arrived in Sens on June 1, he met privately with the bishops. When the Council of Sens met the next day, Bernard and the bishops confronted Abelard with a list of propositions they had agreed the night before to condemn as heresies. Abelard, who had expected to have a public debate with Bernard, refused to be subjected to this summary justice and walked out of the meeting with his followers, saying that he would appeal to the Pope. The Pope, however, was persuaded by Bernard's accusations, and he condemned Abelard's doctrines, imposing perpetual silence on him and excommunicating his followers.[4]

Abelard wrote three treatises on theology: the *Theologia Summi Boni*, the *Theologia Christiana* (incomplete), and the *Theologia Scholarium*. Though a certain development is visible in these works (partly in response to the attacks on his views at the Council of Soissons and the Council of Sens), it is also

evident that his basic philosophy of the Trinity remains consistent throughout. In this chapter we will refer to all three theological tracts and to his masterwork on logic, the *Dialectica*.

What is original about Abelard's analysis of the Trinity is its reduction of the Personal relations to nonrelational attributes of the divinity—attributes of power, wisdom and goodness. It is a bold attempt to construct an alternative to the Augustinian account. Considered simply as theory, the virtues of this approach lie in its minimization of ontological commitments and its integration of the problem of the divine attributes with that of the Personal properties. Considered as philosophical theology, it has the merit of giving an ethical aspect to what otherwise could be mere abstruse ontology. What remains unclear is whether Abelard's aims can be successfully carried through.

Unlike Augustine and Boethius, Abelard devotes considerable attention to the question of what is proper to each of the Persons. In his *Theologia Summi Boni* (which may originally have been titled *De Trinitate*),[5] *Theologia Christiana*, and *Theologia Scholarium*, he bases the distinction between the Persons on differences among what is proper to each (to be unbegotten, to be begotten, or to proceed), and he clarifies the relevant sense of "proper."

Sameness and Difference

Over the course of his career, Abelard's thinking changed concerning various questions on logical theory that happened to have a bearing on theology. John Marenbon argues that in his pretheological writings he had accepted Porphyry's typology of differences as common, proper, and most proper, but later he introduces the distinction between sameness or difference *in essence* and sameness or difference *in definition*.[6]

This later account of sameness and difference, insofar as it applies to the Trinity, goes like this:

> We call something *essentially the same* as another when the essence of each is numerically the same—that is, when the one thing and the other are such that they are numerically the same essence, just as for example a sword is numerically the same as a blade, a substance is numerically the same as a body (or an animal, or a man, or even Socrates), and something white is numerically the same essence as something hard.[7]

It seems that a sufficient condition for essential sameness is that what *A* substantially is, *B* substantially is. This condition is stated in Rule 4.1, where "is essentially the same" is abbreviated as $=_{ess}$:

RULE 4.1. If for all *C* : *A est C* iff *B est C*, then $A =_{ess} B$

Abelard's example of the hard white thing shows that it is possible for one denominative (the hard thing) to be essentially the same as another denominative (the white thing)—since both are substantially just this particular slab of marble—even though they are denominated from different abstracts (hardness and whiteness). This possibility exists within the framework of the *Categories* ontology. Consistent with the definitions and rules governing *ab* and *in*, we can suppose that *A* is from *B* and *C* is from *D* (where *A* is distinct from *B* and *C* is distinct from *D*), and yet whatever *B* is in *D* is in. Provided that what *B* and *D* are in is a substance, and provided that they are distinct accidents, this situation is consistent with those definitions and rules. Abelard thinks that this same possibility is also instantiated in the case of the three Persons of the Trinity, who are essentially the same as one other, each one being substantially God, even though they are denominated from different abstracts.

Another of his examples illustrates a different point:

> Some things are essentially the same even though they are distinguished by their properties. This is because their properties remain so completely unmixed that a property of the one is never participated in by the other, even if the substance of each is completely the same in number. For example, in the case of a particular waxen image, the wax—that is, the matter itself—is numerically the same as what is made from it [namely, the waxen image]. In this case, however, the matter and what is made from it do not share their properties in common, since the matter of the waxen image is not made from matter (that is, the wax itself is not made from wax), just as what is made from the matter in this case is not the matter (that is, the waxen image is not the matter of the waxen image).[8]

The waxen image and the wax from which it was made are not related in the same way as the hard thing and the identical white thing. Abelard identifies a property of the waxen image that is not possessed by the wax from which

it was made, namely the property of having been made from wax. By contrast, there is no property possessed by the hard thing and lacked by the white thing.

He says that the image is essentially the same as its constituent wax. But is this statement defensible? It seems acceptable to say that the image is essentially the same as the wax, but it sounds odd to say that the wax is essentially the same as the image. The wax is essentially the same as it was prior to being made into an image; but it does not sound right to say of the wax prior to its formation as an image that it was essentially the same as the waxen image: that same wax might never have been formed into that image.

I think that Abelard's statement is defensible relative to Rule 4.1. The wax is substantially wax, is a lipid, and so on; and the waxen image is essentially all these things. Furthermore, there is nothing beyond these things that the waxen image is substantially. It is not true, for instance, to say that the waxen image is substantially waxen, any more than it is true to say that a man in slavery is substantially a slave. The slave is not substantially enslaved or an enslaved man, and the waxen image is not substantially waxen or a waxen image. So, according to Rule 4.1, the wax and the waxen image are the same in essence, because whatever one of them substantially is, the other substantially is.

How, then, do we account for the fact that the waxen image has a property that the wax does not have? I think that, having given this defense of Abelard's statement that the wax and the waxen image are essentially the same, we have to say that strictly speaking it is not the waxen image that has a property lacked by the wax. Rather, it is the waxen image *qua* waxen image that has such a property. And this seems to be the approach taken by Abelard in his conception of sameness or difference in definition:

> Things are different in definition that cannot be terminated at the same definition associated with the meaning [of their terms]—that is, they are not mutually requiring of one another, even though each is the same thing as the other, as in the case of a substance and a body, or a white thing and a hard thing. For something is not a body insofar as it is a substance, or a hard thing insofar as it is a white thing, since the one can exist without the other, nor does it require the other in virtue of itself.[9]

Whiteness differs in definition from hardness, and being a substance differs in definition from being a body. Whiteness does not require hardness, and

being a substance does not require being a body (even if being a body does require being a substance). Similarly, being wax differs in definition from being a waxen image. Being wax does not require being a waxen image (even though being a waxen image does require being wax). So, even though the wax is the same in essence as the waxen image, it differs from it in definition. A necessary condition for *A* and *B* to be the same in definition is for them to be from the same things, as stated in Rule 4.2.

RULE 4.2. If $A =_{def} B$, then for all $C : A\ ab\ C$ iff $B\ ab\ C$

Abelard applies these concepts to the samenesses and differences in the Trinity. For example, in *Theologia Summi Boni*, he says the divine Persons are the same as one another in essence but different in definition (that is, in respect of the properties that respectively define them):

> The Persons (i.e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit) are different because of their similarity to things that are different in definition—namely because, while Father, Son and Holy Spirit are completely the same in essence, the *proprium* of the Father insofar as he is Father is one thing, the *proprium* of the Son another, and that of the Holy Spirit a third.[10]

It is not in his essential identity but insofar as the Father is Father that he is distinct in definition from the other Persons.

Based on the distinction between sameness of essence and sameness of property, Abelard distinguishes two senses of identity propositions—an *idem quod* (or *identitas essentiae*) and an *idem qui* (or *identitas proprietatis*) reading. Simo Knuuttila argues that on the *idem quod* reading they mean something like, "That which is A is (extensionally) the same as that which is B," and on the *idem qui* reading they indicate an intensional identity between subject and predicate.[11] He allows that the Father is the Son on the *idem quod* reading but not on the *idem qui* reading.

Given Rules 4.1 and 4.2, we can assert an *idem quod* identity of the waxen image with the wax while denying an *idem qui* identity. By the same token, because each of the Persons is substantially God, but each has its distinctive *proprium*, the Persons are all essentially the same though they differ in definition.

The Personal Properties as Divine Attributes

What are these *propria*?

> . . . the *proprium* of the Father insofar as he is Father is one thing, the *proprium* of the Son another, and that of the Holy Spirit yet another because, since the Father is so called only from being powerful, the Son from being wise i.e. from the power of discernment, the Holy Spirit from being bounteous, the *proprium* of the Father is to have power, of the Son to discern, of the Holy Spirit to be bounteous.[12]

But if these are the *propria* by which he takes the Persons to be distinguished from one another, how can Abelard accommodate the accepted position that the Persons are connected to one another by relations of origin? His solution to this problem is simple. The Father's property of being powerful is the same as the traditionally assigned property of generating the Son, and the Son's and the Holy Spirit's properties of discernment and bounteousness are identical with the traditionally assigned properties of being generated and of proceeding:

> The *proprium* of the Father is also to be from Himself, as we said, and eternally to generate the Son co-eternal with Him, of the Son to be generated from the Father alone, of the Holy Spirit to proceed from both alone.[13]

Two different kinds of problem face this account. On one hand, there are theological questions about how the distinguishing Personal properties can be identified with properties like power and wisdom that seem to attach substantially to God. On the other hand, there are philosophical questions. How can properties like power and wisdom can be identified with relations of origin? And what sort of existence do these properties have?

The notion that the distinguishing properties of the Persons can be reduced to three of the divine attributes was one of the ideas that disturbed Abelard's critics. This can be seen in the accusations Saint Bernard brought against Abelard at Sens. According to the first, second, third, and thirteenth of Bernard's accusations, Abelard asserts,

1. That the Father is full power, the Son a certain power, the Holy Spirit no power.

2. That the Holy Spirit is not of the Father's or the Son's substance.
3. That the Holy Spirit is the World Soul.

. . .

13. That omnipotence, but not also wisdom and benignity, is properly and specially reserved for the Father, who is not from another.[14]

D. E. Luscombe comments on the first of these:

> Abelard always maintained that all the three Persons are each fully powerful and fully wise and fully loving. But there were deep Scriptural and Patristic roots for associating these three attributes with the three Persons respectively.[15]

However, it seems that Abelard himself had some difficulty in articulating exactly what the nature of this association was. At times, for instance, he described God's wisdom as "like a certain portion of the divine omnipotence."[16]

Edward Little points out that Bernard reworked some of the propositions he found in William of St. Thierry's list, for example altering the second proposition, which in William had read *De Spiritu sancto, quod not sit ex substantia Patris et Filii sicut Filius est ex substantia Patris*. The replacement of William's *ex* by *de* turns an orthodox distinction between procession and generation into an unorthodox denial of the substantiality of the Holy Spirit.[17] As Luscombe nicely puts it, "thus Abelard scrapes home to victory by the skin of his teeth, having faulted the draftsman of the *capitulum* over a two-letter word."[18]

The thirteenth proposition Little sees as rightly focusing on a "bold and unusual view" that Abelard was genuinely putting forward[19]—namely, that the attributes of power, wisdom and benignity were the basis for the distinction of the Persons. Little comments, "There is no answer to Bernard's charge to be found in Abelard's writing. It is a substantive issue, and historically Abelard's theology on this point was rejected."[20]

Distinct from the question whether this view found favor with the Church is the question whether it can be maintained consistently with Abelard's other views, especially his acceptance of the doctrine of divine simplicity:

> We confess the unity, or simplicity, or identity of the divine substance in such a way that just as it remains completely devoid of parts, so also

> it remains completely devoid of accidents; nor can it be changed in any way at all, nor can there be anything in it that is not it itself.[21]

Abelard wants to maintain divine simplicity along with the differences between the three *propria* of the divine Persons:

> . . . to make a denial of all forms and parts, or if someone also understands any forms in this, it's certain that they are in no way different things from the substances they are in, and so it is that we say one thing is a *proprium* of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit.[22]

Notice that for Abelard God's simplicity depends on there being no forms present to him, whereas for Boethius it depended on there being nothing intrinsic to God that was not itself God.

The question of how the divine attributes can be the same as one another in reality, and at the same time constitute the basis for a real distinction among the Persons, is one where formal analysis may help; and we will return to it.

The Ontology of the Divine Attributes

In regard to the ontological question, Abelard in some of his logical writings had treated the abstract names of relations as standing for forms.[23] But in the *Theologica Summi Boni* he rejects any such suggestion:

> But when we hear properties mentioned we should not understand this in such a way that we suppose certain forms in God. Rather, we mention properties meaning propria in the way that Aristotle says it is common to all substances not to be in a subject, or not to receive more and less, or to have nothing as a contrary. He does not understand there to be any forms in these generalities that he assigns—generalities that are assigned by negation rather than by affirmation. And to the extent that we say it is a proprium of substance to subsist by itself, namely because this alone is required by its being a substance, and we say the proprium of a formless thing is not to have a form, or we say that the proprium of a simple thing is to lack parts, and by this we understand no forms, in the same way we say that one thing is the proprium of the Father,

> and another of the Son or Holy Spirit, namely because its being the Father requires only that it is powerful, or rather omnipotent, i.e. that it is such that nothing can resist it, and its being the Son requires only that it has discretion in all things, i.e. that nothing can escape its notice, and its being the Holy Spirit requires only that other thing, namely that it is bounteous, as it were inclining toward sustaining and devising nothing disadvantageous but freely to lavish its goods supplied bountifully.
>
> Therefore, we say in this place that one Person differs from another in that they are disjoined by definition, that is, by property or singularity, so that this is a proprium of one and is not a proprium of another. Indeed, God the Father, who is one Person according to that nominal definition, is rightly defined by divine power—God the powerful, and God the Son by divine wisdom, and the Holy Spirit by the divine bounteousness of God. And so the Father is different from (that is, other than) the Son by property or definition, and similarly both from the Holy Spirit.[24]

Abstract and concrete are the same. But this should not lead us to think that we are talking about essences:

> Now if we say that paternity is, this is as if we were to say that something is a father, not that its essence is paternity. Hence it is completely false that paternity is nothing, i.e. that it is not, so long as something is a father, i.e. [so long as something] has it [namely, paternity].[25]

Marenbon comments:

> Abelard, it seems, has given up his earlier position (linked to the semantics of denominatives), according to which "I am a father" is true because there attaches to me a particular fatherhood, which is a thing, a particular accident in the category of relation.[26]

The semantics of denominatives to which Marenbon refers is the same chain of inferences that we mentioned in connection with Boethius's account of the Personal relations: relatives are *from* some being (Rule 1.10); what anything is from is an accident (Rule 1.3); accidents inhere in some being (Definition 1.2).

Marenbon seems to be suggesting that Abelard wants to break the first link in this chain, by denying that relative are from some being. But I do not think that we need suppose Abelard is abandoning any of these principles. Given suitably innocuous senses of "being," "accident" and "in," I think we can take Abelard as asserting that relations are beings, that they are accidents, and that they are in their subjects. In particular, he wants to admit that relatives are beings, but to question what sort of being they are.

It appears that Abelard wants to admit certain facts as holding without admitting the existence of essences or forms as constituents of those facts. The Persons are really distinct from one another because they differ in their properties, but these properties are not essences or forms. However, this does not impugn their status as beings. And, as for the question whether they are accidents, we saw in discussing Augustine that relations can be considered accidents, even in God, provided that the notion of accident is defined by its opposition to essence rather than its implication of change. Finally, as for the question whether they can be "in" anything, it seems clear that any account of the Trinity will have to find some sense of "in" whereby the properties are in the essence.

The main point for Abelard in his *Theologia Christiana* is that the reason why the divine properties are not forms is because they are relations, and relations are never forms. Marenbon points out that in this work Abelard had a change of mind concerning relatives and denominatives.[27] He presents Abelard as asking whether the relational properties (Paternity, Filiation, Procession) belong to God in the way the divine perfections do. If they do, then we should be able truly to say that God is Paternity, just as we can truly say that God is Greatness.[28] Since there is nothing in God that is not God, it seems that we have to agree with the assertion that God is Paternity, or else say that Paternity is nothing. Abelard goes on to say that in relative predications concerning created things we do not take the first of these options:

> There, he says, we neither hold relations to be different things (*res diuersae*) from their subjects, nor do we predicate their names of their subjects—we do not say "Socrates is fatherhood." The fatherhood which Socrates has is, however, not another thing from Socrates, "nor perhaps is it the same thing, since rightly speaking it cannot be called a thing at all: it has no true essence in it which would make it something one in number essentially discrete from whatever is not itself."[29]

Finally, in addition to all the above, Abelard wants the Personal properties to be the same as God, and the same as the Persons:

> I affirm that these properties are not other than God himself or the Persons themselves.[30]

Thus, Abelard also provides an answer here to the question of what it is in virtue of which what is true of one Person is not true of another. The Persons differ by virtue of standing in different relations, and these relations are real, even though they are not essential beings. He dismisses those who hold to the contrary that the Personal properties are distinct both from God and from the Persons:

> In our times some, who are to be counted among true Catholics and who by assiduous study of holy books have attained a Master's chair, have broken out in such insanity as to contend that the properties of the Persons (namely, paternity itself, and filiation and the procession of the Holy Spirit) are other things than God Himself or than the Persons themselves.[31]

In Chapter 5 we will examine the theory of one such, namely Gilbert of Poitiers. In the present chapter we have seen that Abelard in his attempt to provide a rational philosophical context for discussions about the Trinity, distinguishes between essential (numerical) sameness and sameness in properties, and between *idem quod* and *idem qui* statements, that he bases the distinction of the Personal properties on a prior distinction among nonrelational divine attributes, that these attributes while not nothing are neither essences nor forms, and that they are identical both with one another and with God. It seems that it may be impossible to satisfy all these requirements together. On the other hand, Jeffrey Brower judges that Abelard's discussion of the Trinity, even though it is incomplete, "indicates what may very well be the only possible strategy available for preserving a real distinction among the Persons without compromising the absolute simplicity of God."[32] To test this judgment, we now proceed to the formal analysis of Abelard's theories.

Formal Analysis

A formal analysis can be given for each of Abelard's key notions—sameness of essence and sameness of property, *idem quod* and *idem qui* statements.

We have already made use of what is in effect Abelard's notion of sameness of essence, for instance in our semantic matrix for Boethius's understanding of the divine perfections (Figure 3.3) where a single reality corresponds to the terms "God," "divine wisdom" and "divine goodness." And our formalization already allows for a representation of difference of property (when multiple realities correspond to the abstracts of two terms).

Because our formal analysis already encompasses the notions of sameness of essence and sameness of property, it is also capable of expressing Abelard's two types of identity-propositions: *idem quod* and *idem qui*. The former is indeed, as Knuuttila suggested, an expression of extensional identity.[33] "*s* is *t*" expresses an *idem quod* truth just in case "*s*" stands for something, and what "*s*" stands for "*t*" stands for. And it expresses an *idem qui* truth just in case "*s*" stands for something, and what it stands for "*t*" stands for—a kind of intensional identity.

Abelard's understanding of the Trinity in quite different from that of Boethius as concerns the Persons. For Boethius, the relativity of the Persons is a cornerstone of his account. He thinks three hypostases are consistent with one essence precisely because the hypostases are relatives, where distinct relatives may have a single essence. But for Abelard, the relativity of the Persons is not the heart of the matter at all: the Persons are distinct not because they are relative but because they have different *propria*. The meaning of these claims seems to be quite clear.

It might be clear, but Abelard's doctrine of the Trinity seems to be internally inconsistent. He holds that there is just one God, that there are three Persons each of which is substantially the same as God, that the Persons differ from each by their properties and are identical with those properties, that these properties are three of the divine attributes, that the divine attributes are identical with the divine essence, and that the divine essence is simple. But, assuming that there are three distinct Personal properties, that these are the same as three of the divine attributes, and that the divine attributes are identical with the divine essence, then it follows that the divine essence is threefold and not simple. Or, assuming that the divine essence is simple and that all the divine attributes are identical with it, and that the Personal properties are some of those attributes, and that the Personal properties are the same as the Persons, then it follows that neither the properties nor the Persons can be different from one another.

One way out of these difficulties is to suppose, as Alberic and Lotulf suggested, that there are three Gods. Filling in the details, we might suppose that the

divine essence includes three elements corresponding to the three Gods, and that these are the three properties and also the three Persons. This understanding of the semantics of the Trinity is represented in Figure 4.1, where o' stands for "divinely powerful," a' for "divinely wise," b' for "divinely good."

These semantic assumptions are consistent with a tritheistic structure similar to that of Philoponus (Figure 2.12), but they are not consistent with Abelard's monotheism.

Alternatively, we might suppose that there is a single God who has three forms. This view (as we shall see in Chapter 5) was attributed to Abelard by Gilbert of Poitiers, who characterized Triformists as those who,

> opining that God is multi-form, attribute power, wisdom and goodness as diverse to one simple God; so they assert that one and the same God according to power is the Father, according to wisdom is the Son, and according to goodness is the Holy Spirit—which they can do (but through glasses) not so much by argument as by sophistry.[34]

Filling in the details, we can suppose that according to this approach there is one God, whose divinity comprises three elements, which elements are the

		*	∧
d	o', a', b'	o', a', b'	o', a', b'
p	o'	o'	o'
f	a'	a'	a'
s	b'	b'	b'

FIGURE 4.1. Tritheistic semantics of the Persons (Alberic and Lotulf)

		*	∧
d	x	x	y, z, u
p	y	–	y
f	z	–	z
s	u	–	u

FIGURE 4.2. Semantics of the Persons with triform God

Personal properties and the Persons. Let the being that is God be x. Let the being that is the Father, and that is divine power, be y. Let the being that is the Son, and that is divine wisdom, be z. Let the being that is the Holy Spirit, and that is divine goodness, be u. And let divinity be the three beings y, z, u. This understanding of the Trinity is represented in Figure 4.2. (I have assumed that the abstracts of the Persons are the same as the Persons.)

This semantics captures the Persons' difference in definition but it does not capture their essential identity, and for that reason is does not truly represent Abelard's view. Alberic and Lotulf read Abelard as postulating a multiplicity within God. Gilbert reads him as postulating a multiplicity within divinity. An alternative to both these readings suggests itself. Maybe Abelard is conceiving each of the Personal Properties as having two aspects, one in virtue of which a Person is *from* that Property, the other in virtue of which the Property *is* God. In virtue of the first of these aspects, the Persons are differentiated from one another; in virtue of the second, the Properties are essentially the same as God. And perhaps this duality in each of the Properties is what Abelard had in mind in claiming that the Properties are not forms or essences, but are not nothing.

The essential sameness of each Person with God, as just described, is not entailed by Rule 4.1. To remedy this lack, we can adopt the following rule:

RULE 4.3. If *A est B*, then $A =_{ess} B$

We can represent Abelard's conception of Trinitarian ontology as in Figure 4.3. The fact that the Persons differ in definition is here shown in the different Properties they are from. The essential sameness of the Persons with God is shown by the *est* relationships between the Persons and God (Rule 4.1). The essential sameness of the Properties with God is shown by the *est* relationships between the Properties and God (Rule 4.3). The dual aspect of the Properties is shown by the fact that each of them stands in the converse of an *ab* relationship to a Person, at the same time standing in an *est* relationship to God.

This structure offers a nonrelational way of conceiving of the Trinity that appears to dispel the mystery that Boethius's structure had left. Here we are given three distinct nonrelational Properties in virtue of which the Persons are distinguished from one another. But now another mystery presents itself. How can these three Properties be distinguished among themselves, when




FIGURE 4.3. Ontology of the Persons (Abelard)

they are the same in essence (seeing that they are all substantially God)? It's true that the Properties differ from one another in being abstracted from different Persons; but this cannot be the *ground* of their difference if the distinction among the Persons is supposed to be grounded in the distinction of the Properties.

5

Gilbert of Poitiers

When Bishop Gilbert II of Poitiers died in his native city on September 4, 1154, the dean of the Cathedral Chapter, Master Laurence, wrote an encomium or eulogy, known as *Planctus*, in which he extols the learning, the virtues, and the services of the deceased in expressions of rare warmth and profound grief. In deep sorrow he addresses the Church Universal and exclaims:

> "Behold, a great scholar has passed away, a great shepherd of the Church, Gislebert, the jewel among our bishops, the leader and spiritual guide of our souls."[1]

Introduction

Christophe Erismann remarks,

> the height of the influence of Boethius's theological treatises was reached during the twelfth century, when they were often commented upon and became the centre of philosophical questioning. . . .
>
> Medieval thinkers did not seek faithfulness to Boethius' teaching, the coherence of which remains difficult to ascertain, but drew from the *Opuscula sacra* the concepts and theses they needed to expound their own thought.[2]

These remarks are especially true of the commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers. Gilbert wrote detailed commentaries on all of Boethius's *Opuscula sacra*, which appear to contain an original ontological system. However, because the commentaries closely follow the order of Boethius's text it is very difficult to disentangle the elements of Gilbert's system and to reassemble them in proper systematic order. That work of disentanglement and reassembly is what will be attempted in this chapter, and we shall see that his ideas are strikingly

original from both a theological and a philosophical perspective. Theologically, Gilbert was accused of multiplying entities within the Godhead. Philosophically, he seems to have thrown out virtually everything in the *Categories* ontology and replaced it with a new theory of his own. This new ontology seems to have been specially crafted to suit the unique blend of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism that characterizes the Boethian tracts on which Gilbert is commenting.

Gilbert's commentary on *OS* I was the subject of an investigation at the Council of Rheims in 1148. There, Pope Eugene III convened a panel of experts, including Bernard of Clairvaux and the future Bishop of Paris Peter Lombard, to advise him on whether Gilbert had endorsed the propositions

1. That the divine nature, which is called the divinity, is not God but the form by which God is, just as humanity is not man but the form by which man is.
2. That when Father, Son and Holy Spirit are said to be one, they are understood to be one only by divinity; but this cannot be converted, so that one God or one substance or one something may be said to be Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
3. That the three Persons are three by three unities and three distinct properties which are not those Persons but are three distinct eternal things numerically different from one another and from the divine substance.[3]

In opposition to these propositions, Bernard of Clairvaux compiled a "confession of faith" that, insofar as it concerns the Trinity, stated,

1. We believe that the simple essence of divinity is God, and that it cannot be denied in any orthodox way that divinity is God and God divinity. And if it is said that God is wise by wisdom, great by greatness, eternal by eternity, one by unity, God by divinity and so on, we believe that he is wise only by that wisdom which is God Himself, great only by that greatness which is God Himself, eternal only by that eternity which is God Himself, one only by that unity which is God Himself, divine only by that divinity which is God Himself; that is, that He in His own essence is wise, great, eternal, indivisible God.
2. When we speak of three persons, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, we understand them to be one God and one divine substance; and conversely,

when we speak of one God or one divine substance we profess that one God and one divine substance is three persons.

3. We believe that only God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit is eternal, and that no things whatsoever, whether they are called relations or properties, singularities or unities or anything of the kind exist and have existed eternally in God, unless they are God.[4]

The Council censured Gilbert's teachings, and he was required by Pope Eugene III to change his commentary on Boethius in any way that was needed in order to make it consistent with Bernard's declaration of faith. The Pope left it to Gilbert to determine whether and to what extent such changes were needed. John of Salisbury tells us that Gilbert saw his commentary as not requiring any revision.[5] Gilbert, however, did add a new prologue (which we will discuss later in this chapter).

General Ontology

While agreeing with him on many points, Gilbert goes beyond Boethius in three main ways. He develops a theory of abstraction that allows him to account for the distinctness of the Persons; he introduces an important modification into Boethius's analysis of divine simplicity; and he deepens the notion of substantial predication.

Gilbert drew a distinction between what-is (*quod est*) and that-by-which it is (*quo est*)—a distinction based on what Boethius says in *OS* III about *esse* and *quod est*. Erismann summarizes it neatly: "According to Gilbert, everything is what it is (*quod est*) by virtue of something which makes it so (*quo est*)."[6] And Marenbon emphasizes the interdependence of *quo est* and *quod est* propositions: "as their meanings suggest, *quo est*s and *quod est*s have a correlative, causal relationship. There can be no *quod est*s without the *quo est*s which make them what they are . . . and no *quo est*s exist in act apart from a *quod est*."[7]

The distinction resembles the *Categories* distinction between an abstract and its corresponding concrete term, but it applies far beyond the bounds envisaged in Aristotle's little book. For example, whereas the *Categories* would not countenance any abstract entity from which a categorial being—a substance or an accident—was concreted, Gilbert was happy to do so. Thus according to him, the *quod est* man is somehow caused by a *quo est* humanity, and a *quale*

such as someone's rationality is caused by a quality rationality. Commenting on the first of Boethius's "common conceptions," Gilbert writes,

> So he says BEING, i.e. the subsistence which is in a subsistent, IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT-IS, i.e. the subsistent in which the subsistence is: for example, corporality and body, humanity and man.[8]

Notice here that Gilbert takes multiple subsistences to be in the subsistent man—the man's corporality as well as his humanity—and he also believes that there is an identifying subsistence in each individual man such as Cicero or Plato.

In his commentary on Boethius's statement that among nondivine things the attribute differs from its subject, Gilbert rejects the Aristotelian view that a secondary substance can be predicated:

> It is thus that a secondary substance is said to be predicated of a species. For this should not be understood to mean that something is predicated of that which is a species, but rather of a subsistent in which there is a special subsistence; nor is it about that which is a secondary substance that is only a subsistent (which cannot in any way be predicated) but a subsistence that is in it.[9]

There is no room in Gilbert's ontology for universals in any sense in which they are not singulars. Instead of the secondary substance *man,* there are so many singular humanities (just as many as there are individual men).

And commenting on Boethius's statement that things other than the divine substance "are not that which they are," he writes:

> Someone's rationality is called in general a quality, and in particular a rationality, because it makes him to be how he is—just as all other qualities make those things in which they are to be how they are, namely rational, just as other rationalities make those things in which they are to be rational.[10]

Substances include both subsistents and subsistences. Commenting on the passage where Boethius contrasts the last six categories (the extrinsic accidents) with Substance, Quantity and Quality, Gilbert writes:

> For not only a subsistent but also a subsistence is called "substance" in that both stand under accidents, though for different reasons.[11]

The two different relationships between accidents and substances to which he here refers come about as follows. He says that an accident "accompanies" (*adest*) a subsistence, but the subsistence is "in" the subsistent. And putting these two relationships together, he says that the accident is in the subsistent. He can do this because when he says that subsistences are *in* subsistents he does not mean "in" to have the same sense it has when accidents are said to be in a subject. The relation between a subsistence and a subsistent is a particular case of the converse of the relation between a concrete being and that from which it is concreted—namely, the *ab* relation. So when he says the subsistence is "in" the subsistent, this just means that the subsistent is from the subsistence. Let us mark this sense of "in" with a star.

DEFINITION 5.1. *A in* * *B* iff *B ab A*

Using this notion, we can see that Gilbert wants to break down the Aristotelian formula "Color is in a body" into a two-step relationship whereby color stands in one relation to corporality, and corporality stands in a different relation to body—the product of these two relations being the Aristotelian relation of inherence in a subject.

DEFINITION 5.2. *A in B* iff for some *C*: *A adest C* and *C in* B*

Combined with Definition 5.1, this implies that *A in B* if and only if for some *C*: *A adest C* and *B ab C*. Gilbert offers this analysis in his commentary on Boethius's statement that the divine substance is "beyond substance":

> And we say that color and line follow corporality, rather than corporality following color and line. For they don't cause corporality; it causes them. It is the very being of a body; but they *accompany* it in a body. So it exists at first, after which it is a body (for it is indeed their substance). They are accidents first of corporality, and through it of body. For they stand under it—both corporality (which they accompany) and body (in which they inhere).[12]

For Gilbert, what-is is never predicated of anything; only Being and what accompanies it are predicable, and then only of what-is.[13] Whereas in Aristotle's scheme the *in* relation divided accidents from substances, and the *ab* relation divided denominatives from both substances and accidents, in Gilbert's scheme the *adest* relation divides accidents from substances, and the *in** relations (the converse of the *ab* relation) divides *quod est*s from *quo est*s. This fourfold division is shown in Figure 5.1. However, just as Aristotle in the *Categories* placed relatives outside his fourfold typology of beings, Gilbert seems also to regard relatives as "unities" that do not belong to any of his main ontological types.

Later in the chapter we will give a semantic analysis of these ideas.

God's Divinity

The first of the charges that Gilbert faced at Rheims concerned God's divinity. In line with his widened application of the relation of concretion, Gilbert thinks that God must be from divinity, and that the Persons of the Trinity (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) must be from Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration.




FIGURE 5.1. Basic ontology (Gilbert)

Gilbert's position on these abstract entities was different from Abelard's. He showed no reluctance to accord them full ontological status.

In accord with the doctrine of the *Categories*, Gilbert thinks that the abstract must be distinct from the concrete. It follows that divinity is distinct from God, Paternity from the Father, and so on. *This* was what the experts at Rheims thought was in conflict with accepted Church doctrine. It seemed to them that Gilbert's ontology postulates eternal entities in the Godhead beyond what should be admitted there. Gilbert's ideas conflict, or so the theologians at Rheims believed, with the doctrine of divine simplicity. The experts believed that Church doctrine required divinity to *be* God, Paternity to *be* the Father, and so on. And this belief was to become enshrined in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, thus setting a philosophical puzzle for subsequent theologians to solve. They had to find a philosophically acceptable way of denying any distinction between God and divinity.

Now, Gilbert holds that the essence by which God is must be utterly simple and devoid of any forms or further essences:

> For that by which He is—the essence (which in Greek is called *ousia*)—cannot be non-simple. Nor can something other in it accompany the same essence, by which it is. For God would not be simple if His essence were established from several essences, or if forms accompanied the same in it, of which either God Himself truly was (or His essence were with reason said to be) the subjected matter.[14]

Divinity may be simple, but it is also clear that Gilbert takes Divinity to be distinct from God. His understanding of divine simplicity differs from that of Boethius, who takes divine simplicity to imply that God *is* the perfections that He has. Of the divine substance, Boethius said that it "*est id quod est*"; and he contrasts God with nondivine things, where the attribute differs from its subject, which depends for its being on something other than itself.[15] Subject and attribute are divided in nondivine things, but conjoined and united in God.[16] But in line with Gilbert's general ontology, divinity must be in God in the way that subsistences are in subsistents.

So Gilbert endorses the horizontal but not the vertical integration of the divine perfections. He holds that divinity is the same as divine greatness, divine goodness, and so forth; but in commenting on Boethius's analysis of divine simplicity,[17] he denies that God is divinity, or is the divine essence, except in the following sense:

> Whence also there is a linguistic usage such that it may be said of God not only that He is but also that He is the essence; and rightly indeed. For if it is said of someone who is not only wise but also coloured and great and many other things of this sort, from an abundance of wisdom before all others, "Howsoever great you are, you are all wisdom"—as if there is nothing other that confers being on him except wisdom alone—much more properly "the essence" is said of God, on whom different things do not confer His being; and the same for other names like "God is his own essence, his own wisdom, his own strength" and others like this.[18]

This passage does allow that we may rightly say that God is his own essence; but it describes that as a manner of speaking. For Gilbert, divine simplicity consists in two facts: first, that everything *by* which God is, is divinity (the divine essence), and second, that everything *whence* divinity is, is the fact of God's being. Even though God is not the same as Divinity, there is nothing other than Divinity by which God is, and Divinity is only because God is from it.[19]

At the opening of his second prologue to his commentary on *De Trinitate* (written after his return from Rheims),[20] he observes that some principles apply universally, others are only of limited application. As a universally valid principle, he cites the rule that whatever is in something is necessarily different from that which it is in.[21] In Chapter 1 we saw that this result follows from Definition 1.2, Rule 1.2, and Definition 1.3. It is also no doubt related to Boethius's second "common conception," which states that, while something may participate in Being, Being cannot participate in anything.

Gilbert's concern to distinguish those principles that have universal validity from those that apply only to the created world is a mark of his penetration as a philosopher. At the same time, it seems clear that the Rheims Council was right to question the orthodoxy of his distinction between God and the divine nature.

According to John of Salisbury, Gilbert saw this charge as being directed against those who deny God's simplicity; Gilbert, however, does not deny divine simplicity, since he holds that God has no parts, and is not subject to any substantial or accidental forms.[22] For example, in commenting on Boethius's definition of simplicity, Gilbert states:

> And so it seems to be rightly said that FOR EVERY SIMPLE, ITS BEING IS ONE AND THE SAME AS WHAT-IT-IS. That is: if someone says of what is truly simple that it "is," and again says that it "is something," no one should understand that the second sentence predicates of it something differing by any property from what the first predicated.[23]

This is Gilbert's exposition of Boethius's Rule 7 ("*Omne simplex* . . .") quoted in Chapter 3. Marenbon calls this the "perfect unity of *Deus* and *divinitas*,"[24] but it seems a little less than perfect, since it does allow a distinction between the two. To me it seems that if John's account is reliable, Gilbert failed to address the first of Bernard's charges. What is affirmed by the first proposition, as I read it, is not just divine simplicity, but the particular version of divine simplicity that involves vertical as well as horizontal integration of the divine attributes. Thus, Gilbert's doctrine (which affirms only horizontal integration) is not consistent with Bernard's demand for both vertical and horizontal integration.

The Divinity of the Persons

The second of the three charges brought against Gilbert at Rheims had to do with the consubstantiality of the three Persons. Gilbert interpreted the charge as being directed against "those who, out of consideration of the Persons, divide the unity of the divine substance, or, in contemplating one simple and singular nature, no less insanely confuse the Persons of the Trinity."[25] He portrays himself as one of those who steer a path "between the Scylla of those who divide and the Charybdis of those who confound."[26] This self-portrayal seems fair.

Gilbert argues that divinity and the perfections are nominally distinct but really identical, and are said substantially of God and the Persons. He adopts Boethius's criterion for substantial predication—substitutivity of terms that are substantially identical. But he observes that the criterion provides only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for substantial predication. He shows this by reference to the predicates "principle" and "maker," which apply equally to all three Persons, but are not substantial predicates.[27] This, however, does not affect Boethius's conclusion that the Persons are not predicated of God substantially.

Taking up Boethius's distinction between enumeration and repetition, Gilbert makes the point that in the Trinity there is an enumeration of the Persons but a repetition of the substantial name 'God':

> When the words "God, God, God" are used, applying in turn to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, then those which are God are enumerated, that by which they are God is repeated.[28]

Now, the substantial unity of the Persons seems to run counter to a principle that is universal in the natural world, namely that things which are really distinct are substantially distinct:

> Just as the *properties* of numerically different things are different, so also the *subsistences* are numerically different.[29]

He gives several alternative formulations of the principle:

> A subsistence is not singular unless it makes a subsistent one in number, as it's not just Plato's and Cicero's *accidental* properties that are different but also their *substantial* ones by which they are e.g. different bodies or men.[30]
>
> Any singular property that makes Plato to be a body or a man makes nothing else to be the same.[31]

Gilbert takes this principle to apply to all created things. This need not place him in disagreement with Boethius's view that created individuals differ from one another in their accidents. Gilbert's wording is careful: Plato and Cicero differ not only in their accidents but also in what they substantially are.

His main point, however, is not that the principle applies to everything in the natural world, but that it applies *only* there. It does not apply to God. Indeed, Gilbert argues that the errors of both Arius and Sabellius, as well as those of several other heretics, can be traced back to their illegitimate transference of this principle from the natural to the supernatural world.[32] According to him, the Arians argued that if Father and Son were distinct individuals then they must be distinguished from each other by having two distinct substantial features, and therefore either there is more than one divine essence or Father and Son are not both divine. The Sabellians, in turn, argued that if the three Persons are one God then they cannot have any distinguishing substantial features.

Gilbert conceives all of these heresies as deviations from the orthodox position of three Persons in one God, and he sees them all as motivated by a

belief that distinct individuals must have distinct individual essences—a belief that implies that if the Persons are different subsistences then there must be a substantial property by which they differ. But it is precisely on this point, according to him, that the supernatural world differs from the natural: there, different individuals can be what they are by virtue of one substantial property, as the three distinct Persons are what they are by virtue of a single subsistence, deity.

The Personal Properties

Bernard's third charge concerned Gilbert's beliefs about whether the Persons are the same as the properties. Gilbert interpreted the charge as being directed against those who think that there are eternally existing things extrinsic to God. Bernard's third charge concerns the proposition that the properties *are* the Persons, but Gilbert interprets the charge as being about the question whether the properties are *extrinsic* to the Persons. Thus, if the dispute were to be judged purely on the logic of the rival arguments, Gilbert's response should be judged as inadequate.

In any case, Gilbert does not think that the properties are eternally existing things extrinsic to God, though he does maintain that "there are certain everlasting principles, which have had no beginning and will have no end, and are so much an essential part of truth that even if the whole world perished they would remain."[33] He instances the truth that if a man exists a substance exists; this, he says, is knowable and would still be something even if the things did not exist. Similarly, he says that there are properties which are had by the divine Persons eternally—although we should not imagine that the Persons have these properties in the way that "colour is present in a body or greed or justice in a mind, so God is determined by accidents or substantial forms which are the cause of His existence, so that he may justly be held not to be the cause of all things."[34]

Like Boethius, Gilbert recognizes that the Persons are differentiated by their Properties. Commenting on Boethius's thesis that being a Trinity is not predicated substantially of God, Gilbert states that the three Properties (paternity, filiation, and connection) are distinct from one another, and this fact explains the differences between the three Persons:

> Seeing then that paternity and filiation and connexion are different, the unities that they accompany also have to be different from one another.[35]

The Persons are here referred to as "unities."

He also argues that the Properties cannot be substances, because they are not predicated equally of all three Persons.[36] His view is that the Persons are what they are by reason of the divinity in them:

> But theological Persons cannot differ from one another by a mutual opposition of essences, since they are one by the singularity of that by which they are, and they are what they are by its simplicity. But of these which were mentioned, they are proved, and indeed are, other, by a mutual opposition of things externally attached.[37]

In maintaining that the Persons are distinguished by their properties and that the Properties accompany (*assunt*) the Persons, he emphasizes that the Persons, even though they are "unities," cannot be substances because they accompany the Properties, whereas a substance cannot accompany an accident. This comes in his comments on Boethius's list of predicates holding substantially of God:[38]

> Even if another substance or an accident may accompany a substance (as life and color accompany corporality) still a substance can't accompany an accident. And because of this, the unities that accompany Paternity and Filiation and Connexion (not only these three predicates, but also those of which they are predicated) could in no way be substances.[39]

That Gilbert does not think the Father is identical with Paternity is clear from the prologue to his commentary on Boethius's *OS* II, where he writes:

> But some people of little understanding, hearing that God is simple, take Him and any of the diversity of names said of Him (such as "God," "one," "eternal," "Person," "principle," "author," "father," "Son," "Connection" and others like this) to be of the same nature and *ratio*, so that God is both the essence by which He is said to be and the unity by which he is said to be one and the eternity by which He is said to be eternal and similarly for the others, and likewise the Father himself is paternity and the one unity and the eternal eternity and conversely, and in the same way for all the other things that for whatever reason are predicated of Him; and because of all this, the same Boethius writes

to Deacon John the Roman particularly about what is predicated by the names "Father," "Son" and "Holy Spirit."[40]

Formal Analysis

Gilbert retains some of the elements of Boethius's account. At the same time, he introduces new elements, and it is these that account for the censures that befell his ideas in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

A formal representation of Gilbert's understanding of the divine perfections is shown in Figure 5.2.

The semantic analysis of the terms "God," "(divinely) wise" and "(divinely) good" is all the same. They all refer, and refer substantially, to the being that is God (x in the matrix). And they all have one and the same abstract (t in the matrix), but this abstract is not identical with God.

The principle that Gilbert says holds only in the natural world can be understood as stating that if everything that A substantially is, B substantially is, and vice versa, then A is the same as B:

RULE 5.1. If for all C : A *est* C iff B *est* C, then $A = B$

This rule does seem to be assumed in the Arian and Sabellian heresies as outlined earlier. But once the assumption is dropped, the possibility opens up that two distinct items do not differ in respect of what they substantially are. This possibility does not seem to be excluded by the ontology of *est*. But Gilbert thinks there are reasons for believing that it is realized in the Trinity.[41]

Gilbert's semantics of God and the Persons can be represented by the following matrix (Figure 5.3), in which the letter t stands for the singular being from which God is concreted, and the letters u, v, w stand for the properties that distinguish the Persons one from another.[42]

		$*$	$\wedge$
d	x	x	t
a'	x	x	t
b'	x	x	t

FIGURE 5.2. Semantics of the divine perfections (Gilbert)

		*	∧
d	*x*	*x*	*t*
p	*x*	–	*u*
f	*x*	–	*v*
s	*x*	–	*w*

FIGURE 5.3. Semantics of the Persons (Gilbert)

In Figure 5.3, each of the Persons is represented as having an abstract that makes that Person the Person it is. Divinity is represented as being different from God, and the properties different from the Persons.

Gilbert's ontology of the Trinity is shown in Figure 5.4, where subsistences are connected to subsistents by arrows marked "*in**." In addition—and this is also shown in our semantic matrix—the properties are shown as standing to the Persons in the *adest* relationship.

Figure 5.4 should be compared with Figure 3.5 and Figure 4.3, which respectively show the ontologies advocated by Boethius and Abelard. Gilbert's ontology is less sparse than those of his predecessors: unlike them, he assumes that Divinity is a being distinct from God and the Personal properties are beings




FIGURE 5.4. Ontology of the Trinity (Gilbert)

distinct from both God and the Persons. His ontology is also more complex, insofar as he additionally makes use of *adest* relationships. However, by introducing these extra elements Gilbert is able to demonstrate the compatibility of the four points whose consistency Augustine had set out to demonstrate, given his modification to Boethius's notion of simplicity. According to his ontology there is just one God. There are three Persons who are substantially God, and who are the Persons they are by virtue of being from three distinct properties (that is, by virtue of having the three Personal properties stand to them in the *in** relationship). These facts do not compromise divine simplicity because they do not import any essence other than the divine essence, and the properties are not forms. Moreover, by postulating the properties as *accompanying* the Persons, he manages (unlike Abelard) to provide a genuine ground for the distinction of the Persons.

Whereas the *Categories* ontology (whether in its unmodified or modified versions) was based on the relations *in* and *ab*, Gilbert's is based on the *in** and *adest* relationships. He also makes use of the *ad* relationship. His predecessors divided beings into substances, accidents, and the beings from which accidents are abstracted. By contrast, Gilbert's division is into substances, accidents, and beings that are neither substances nor accidents but that have accidents accompanying them. Relatives appear to have this status for Gilbert. There are formal differences between Gilbert's scheme and the earlier one, for example, his basic entities (subsistents) have something abstracted from them (subsistences), where in the modified *Categories* scheme nothing is abstracted from substances.

Gilbert's ontology seems to be based on the following definitions and rules.

Definition 5.3. *acc*(*A*) iff for some *B* : *A adest B*
Definition 5.4. *subst*(*A*) iff not *acc*(*A*) and for no *B:* both *A adest B* and *A in* B*
Definition 5.5. *quo*(*A*) iff for some *B*: *A in* B*
Definition 5.6. *quod*(*A*) iff for no *B*: *A in* B*

Rule 5.2. If *A in* B*, then *quod*(*B*)
Rule 5.3. If *A ad B*, then not *subst*(*A*) and not *acc*(*A*)

Definition 5.7 *subsistent*(*A*) iff *subst*(*A*) and *quod*(*A*)

I have deliberately formulated these rules and definitions in such a way that they do not entail that what has something standing in the relationship *in** or in the relationship *adest* toward it, must be a substance or accident. The reason for this is that Gilbert wants the properties to stand in both those relationships to the Persons, as can be seen in Figure 5.4; and he appears to want the Persons, because they are relatives, to be neither substances nor accidents.

It follows from Definitions 5.5 and 5.6 together with Rule 5.2 that *in** is irreflexive, because *A in* A* is self-contradictory:

$$quo(A) \xleftarrow{\text{Definition 5.5}} A\ in^{*}\ A \xrightarrow{\text{Rule 5.2}} quod(A) \xrightarrow{\text{Definition 5.5, Definition 5.6}} \neg quo(A).$$

Everything in the structure depicted in Figure 5.4 that is either a substance or an accident is either a *quo* est or a *quod est*, as required by the general ontology summarized in Figure 5.1. God and divinity accompany nothing, and do not stand simultaneously in the relationships *adest* and *in** to anything, and so are substances (Definition 5.4). But only God is a subsistent, because in addition to being a substance He is a *quod est* (Definition 5.7). Divinity is in* God, and so is a *quo est* (Definition 5.5). Divinity is not identical with God. The properties accompany the Persons, and so they are accidents (Definition 5.3); they are in* the Persons and so they are *quo est*s (Definition 5.5). The Persons are not in* anything and so they are *quod est*s (Definition 5.6); but since the Persons are relatives, they are neither substances nor accidents.

6

Lombard

> Wishing to cast down the assembly of such people, which is hateful to God, and to stop up their mouths, so that they may not be able to spread the poison of their own malice to others, and in order to put the light of truth on the lamp-stand, we have, with God's aid, put together with much labor and sweat a volume from the witnesses of truth established for all eternity, and divided it in four books. Here you will find the precedents and teachings of our ancestors. Here, by the sincere profession of the Lord's faith, we have denounced the falsehood of a poisonous doctrine.[1]

These dramatic and emotion-charged words come from the prologue to Peter of Lombard's *Sentences*, a work dating from the 1150s[2] and one of the most important works in the history of Trinitarian writing, though not one of the most philosophically subtle.

Introduction

John of Salisbury says that many people attacked Gilbert of Poitiers at Rheims, and he names as the fiercest assailants Suger, abbot of Saint Denis; Calo and Arnold ("straight face"), canons of Poitiers; Peter Lombard; and Robert of Melun.[3] Peter later rose to the position of Bishop of Paris. Shortly after the Council of Rheims he completed his *Sentences*, a four-volume compilation of excerpts from Holy Scripture and the writings of the Church Fathers interspersed with theological interpretation and polemic. Giulio Silano compares the *Sentences* to a legal casebook,[4] a comparison that captures its authoritative tone as well as its piecemeal methodology. Not long after it appeared, it had become a standard reference work for budding theologians and had started spawning a steady stream of commentaries. Its major importance lies not in the originality of its philosophical theories but in the research agenda it sets for subsequent philo-

sophical theology. In effect, what Book I of the *Sentences* does is to give a precise delimitation of what has to be preserved in any philosophical interpretation of the Trinity.

In the work's prologue, the author expresses two aims, the first of which is to refute the erroneous views of those whom Augustine calls "carnal and brutish men."[5] The second and related aim, as shown by the author's appeal to God's aid and eternal truth, is to claim an authoritative status in the intellectual life of the Church. How quickly it gained this status is shown by the references to the Lombard in the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).

The Council had been asked to adjudicate between the Lombard's expressed views on the Trinity and those of Joachim of Fiore. The Council emphatically endorsed the Lombard's doctrine, affirming that

> This Holy Trinity in its common essence undivided and in personal properties divided, through Moses, the holy prophets, and other servants gave to the human race at the most opportune intervals of time the doctrine of salvation.

Turning to the question of Joachim's attack on Peter, the Council resolved to

> condemn . . . and reprobate the book or tract which Abott Joachim published against Master Peter Lombard concerning the unity or essence of the Trinity, calling him heretical and insane because he said in his *Sentences* that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are some supreme entity in which there is no begetting, no begotten, and no proceeding. Whence he asserts that he (Peter Lombard) attributed to God not so much a trinity as a quaternity, namely, three Persons and that common essence as a fourth, clearly protesting that there is no entity that is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, neither is it essence or substance or nature, though he concedes that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one essence, one substance, and one nature. But he says that such a unity is not a true and proper (propriam) unity, but rather a collective one or one by way of similitude.

Rejecting Joachim's views, the Councilors declared:

> But we, with the approval of the holy and general council, believe and confess with Peter (Lombard) that there is one supreme entity, incom-

> prehensible and ineffable, which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, together (simul) three persons and each one of them singly. And thus in God there is only trinity, not quaternity, because each of the three persons is that entity, namely, substance, essence, or divine nature, which alone is the principle of the universe and besides which there is no other.[6]

Silano aptly comments, "With such a seal of approval, the work was henceforth unassailable."[7]

Divinity

Peter Lombard's views on divinity, the Persons, and the properties are essentially the same as those Bernard advocated at Rheims. He identifies "the simple essence of divinity" with God. He identifies the Persons with God. He denies the existence of "relations or properties, singularities or unities or anything of the kind" existing in God but distinct from God.

Referring to Augustine's analysis of the divine perfections as the divine essence under another name, Lombard seems to propose an understanding of divine simplicity that entails that *all* names truly predicable of God must have the same signification:

> Here it is to be diligently noted why, although Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, yet he says that God is called in many ways.—But he does not say this because of a diversity of accidents or parts, but due to the diversity and multitude of names which are used about God. Although the names are manifold, yet they signify one thing, namely the divine nature.[8]

Lombard endorses a general principle:

> The simplicity and purity of this essence is such that there is nothing in it which is not itself, and the one who possesses and what is possessed is the same.[9]

Here, among his ecclesiastical authorities, he includes Boethius's statement:

> That is genuinely one in which there is no number, nothing other than that which it is. And it cannot be made a subject; for it is a form, and forms cannot be subjects.[10]

The view that all the divine names signify God and nothing else would become a disputed question in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as we shall see in later chapters.

The Attributes

Peter Lombard reiterates the Augustinian thesis that the divine attributes are identical with God. He applies this thesis to the case of the attributes that Abelard had singled out for special association with the three Persons, arguing that these attributes are no different from others in applying equally to the three Persons. While that argument may count against some of what Abelard had said, the Lombard also finds points of agreement with Abelard. As Luscombe observes, "the Lombard repeatedly uses Abelard's Trinitarian thought and in particular he exploits Abelard's rich documentation."[11]

Here, for instance, is the Lombard's version of Abelard's argument that the highest perfection involves power, wisdom, and goodness in the highest degree:

> From the above, it is established that, like essence, so also power, wisdom, goodness are said of God according to substance. Moreover those things that are said of God according to substance are equally suitable for all three persons. For the power, wisdom, goodness of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one; and these three are the same power, the same wisdom, the same goodness. From this, is becomes clear that in the Trinity is the highest perfection. For if power, or wisdom, or goodness were to be lacking there, it would not be the highest good; but because there is perfect power, infinite wisdom, unbounded goodness there, rightly do we assert and believe it to be the highest good. And although in God power, wisdom, goodness is entirely one and the same thing, yet in sacred Scripture these names are frequently referred to the persons distinctly, so that power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. It is not unprofitable to ask why this is done.[12]

In explanation of these associations, he conjectures that the Scriptures apply the term "power," especially to the Father and the Son, in order to neutralize any suggestion that the power of the divine Father, like that of a human father, declines with the passage of time.

The Persons

With regard to the relativity of the names signifying the Persons, the Lombard endorses the central plank of the Augustinian program as further developed by Boethius, determining,

> It is therefore to be known that those names which properly pertain to the several persons are used of them in relation to each other, as Father and Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit; but those which signify the unity of essence are used in an absolute sense. And those which are used in an absolute sense are particularly used according to substance and are said of all the persons jointly, and of each of them singly, and on the whole are taken singularly, not plurally, such as God, good, powerful, great, and suchlike. But those which are used relatively are not used according to substance.[13]

Then he launches an attack on certain unnamed madmen:

> To what has been said above must be added that some men of perverse sense have fallen into such insanity as to say that God's nature and person or hypostasis are not the same, saying that Father and Son cannot be the same essence without confusion of persons. For if, they say, the same essence which is the Father is also the Son, then the same is father and son to himself. If you say that this thing is the Father, then seek another which you call the Son. But if you have not sought another, and have said it is the same, then the same one generated and was generated. From these arguments and others like them, they distinguish between nature and person so that they do not accept the one and simple nature of the deity as being three persons.[14]

But the identity of the Persons with the divine essence also involves a subtlety that the Lombard notes:

> Yet we do not deny that a distinction is to be drawn according to the mode of understanding when we say hypostasis and when we say essence, because what is common to the three is signified in the latter, but not in the former. And yet hypostasis is essence, and vice versa.

> And so let us profess that the three persons are one and the same according to essence, but differing in properties.[15]

This adds another item to the research agenda that the Lombard bequeaths, namely to explain the nature of this "mode of understanding" by which the Persons are distinguished from the essence.

The Properties

Peter Lombard asserts that the properties are in the Persons and are the Persons and are the divine essence. Against the thesis that the properties are the Persons, he considers an objection:

> But some deny this, admitting that the properties are in the persons, but not that they are the persons themselves. They say that the properties are in the persons or in the divine essence in such a way that they are internally there as those thing are which are said of God according to substance, such as goodness, justice, but that the properties are added from the outside. And they seek to prove this with reasons.
>
> For if the persons are the properties, they say, then the persons are not differentiated by them.[16]

He considers an objection against the thesis that the properties are the divine essence:

> But the malice of the heretics, "excited by the prompting of diabolical deceitfulness" [Hilary, *De Trinitate* 2.5] does not stop there, but "in a question of such great import" [*ibid.*] adds: If fatherhood and sonship are in God or in the divine essence, then the same thing is father and son to itself. For insofar as it is fatherhood, it is Father; and insofar as sonship, it is Son. And so, if one and the same thing has fatherhood and sonship in itself, it both generates and is generated.[17]

He replies to this argument, suggesting that since the Personal properties are what distinguish one Person from another and they do not stand in this relationship to the essence, they are allied to the Persons more closely than they are to the essence:

> Resisting their boldness and making provision for their ignorance, we will dare to say something on this matter. Fatherhood and sonship are not said to be deep within the divine substance as they are in the hypostases themselves, in which they exist in such a way as to differentiate them, as John of Damascus says: "Characteristic traits (that is, determining properties) pertain to the hypostasis, not to nature: indeed, they determine the hypostasis" [John of Damascus, *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3.6], and not the nature. And so, although fatherhood and sonship are the divine essence, since they do not determine it, it cannot be said that the divine essence both generates and is generated, or that the same thing is father and son to itself. For a property determines the person in such a way that by this property a hypostasis is the begetter, and by that property another hypostasis is begotten; and so it is not the same one who generates and is generated, but one generates another.[18]

These ideas will play an important part in the thinking of the thirteenth-century theologians.

The doctrine of the *Sentences* is that the divine properties are in the Persons and are the Persons:

> And so, since the properties themselves by which the persons themselves are determined and differ were from eternity, how could they be if they were not in the persons? and how could they be in them, and not be the persons themselves, without there being multiplicity there?[19]

Of course, to speak of the properties as "in" the Persons from eternity is clearly not to think of them as changeable accidents of the Persons. Neither is the Lombard following the usage of the *Categories* when he writes about comparing one thing to another "as informing it or denominating it." These are questions to which we will return.

According to the *Sentences* the properties are identical not only with the Persons but also with the divine essence:

> And so let us profess both that the properties are in the three persons and that they are the persons themselves and the divine essence.[20]

The Lombard raises the question how it can be that the properties are in the divine essence without determining the essence, seeing that they determine

the persons by being "in" them (in the appropriate sense). His answer, following Hilary, is "I do not know and I do not ask":[21]

> Generation is one property or notion, and birth is another, and procession is another; these things by other names, are called fatherhood and sonship. These properties are designated by those names of the persons, namely Father, Son, Holy Spirit, which are relative and are used in relation to each other because they denote relations. They are not accidental to God, but are immutably in the persons themselves from eternity, so that these titles are not relative, but are the very relations or notions in the things themselves, namely in the persons.[22]

In reference to the identification of the properties with generation, its converse, and procession (an identification which the Lombard attributes to Augustine but actually comes from Fulgentius of Ruspe),[23] the Lombard makes a distinction between the Persons and their properties:

> And yet it does not seem to us that it is entirely the same to say that something is the Father and has generated a Son, or that something is the Son and has a Father, or that it is the Holy Spirit and proceeds from both. Otherwise father would not be the name of a hypostasis, that is, of a person, but only the name of a property; similarly with Son and Holy Spirit; and so the three persons would not be signified by the three names.
>
> And so we say that the name Father does not denote only a relation, but also a hypostasis, that is, it signifies a subsistence; and so also [in the case of] Son and Holy Spirit.
>
> But the terms of the relations, namely fatherhood, sonship, procession, or to generate, to be generated, to proceed, signify only the relations themselves and not the hypostases, or having a Son and having a Father.
>
> As, for example, when we say, "the Father is God," by the name Father, we both note the relation and signify the divine hypostasis, so that the meaning is as follows: the Father, that is, he who generated, namely, the hypostasis which has a Son, is God or the divine essence. Similarly, "the Son," that is, the hypostasis which is generated or which has a Father, "is God." So also "the Holy Spirit," that is, the hypostasis proceeding from both, or he who proceeds, "is God." But when we posit

> the names of relations in predicates, we signify only the notions themselves, not the hypostases, as when we say "God generated," that is, has a Son, and "God is generated," that is, has a Father; and then it must be understood that in the subjects those things which are determined by those properties are the hypostases only, and not the essence.[24]

Formal Analysis

In contrast to Gilbert's way of understanding the names of the divine perfections differing in the concrete and the abstract the Lombard takes them to stand for a single being which is what it is essentially, and whose abstract is the same as it. Let this being be x. x is also the being that is God. This understanding of the divine names and the name of the divine perfections is shown in Figure 6.1.

The Lombard transforms Gilbert's semantics of the Personal names in a similar way (Figure 6.2).

The ontology of Bernard's credo, as reiterated by the Lombard, is similar to that of Augustine. Figure 6.3, which represents the Lombard's implied ontology of the Trinity, shows that it is not only God and Divinity and the divine perfections that are merged, but also the Personal relations. This structure differs from the one adopted by Augustine only in identifying the Personal properties with God.

		$*$	$\wedge$
d	x	x	x
a'	x	x	x
b'	x	x	x

FIGURE 6.1. Semantics of the divine perfections (Lombard)

		$*$	$\wedge$
d	x	x	x
p	x	–	x
f	x	–	x
s	x	–	x

FIGURE 6.2. Semantics of the Persons (Lombard)




FIGURE 6.3. Ontology of the Trinity (Lombard)

Among the legacy that this structure bequeathed to the Lombard's successors is the question of how, in the Lombard's thinking, the Personal relations can distinguish Person from Person—seeing that they are identified with divinity, and divinity is identified with the one God.

The Lombard's theory requires the same modifications to the *Categories* ontology as are required by Augustine's theory. The consistency of the one theory can be demonstrated in the same way as that of the other.

It was not the purpose of the *Sentences* to contribute to Augustine's project of constructing a philosophical model of the Trinity. Its purpose, rather, was to codify the theological data with which all orthodox thinking about the Trinity must conform. The work does this in ways that are hospitable to some efforts at philosophical modeling and inhospitable to others. In assembling the theological authorities in the way it does, it set a major problem for anyone who wanted to pursue the Augustinian project. The problem is, given that the theological sources pointed toward identifying the Persons, their properties and the Essence, what philosophical reasons, if any, could be adduced to show that such identifications represent a logical possibility?

7

Bonaventure

> By the Savior's helping grace, on account of which one has arrived at the completion of the First (Book) of the Sentences, with the intervening insistence of the Fathers, one is bound to undertake the second. But just as in the First Book I adhered to the considerations and common opinions of the masters (of theology), and most of all (to those) of our master and father of good memory, Friar Alexander (of Hales), so in the following books I will not retreat from their footprints. For I do not intend to defend new opinions, but to explain in detail the common and approved ones. Nor may anyone appraise, that I want to be the craftsman [*fabricator*] of a new writing; for this I think and admit, that I am a poor and feeble compiler.[1]

Here, at the start of his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*, Bonaventure reflects on his commentary on the first book. With great humility, he portrays himself as a mere compiler.

Introduction

Three mid-thirteenth-century theologians responded in similar but interestingly different ways to the agenda of Trinitarian problems set by Peter Lombard. These were Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. All three accepted that there must be real relations in God, by which the Persons are distinguished from one another.

Giovanni di Fidanza, later known as Bonaventure, rose to high offices in the Church, serving from 1257 as Minister General of the Franciscan Order and from 1273 as Cardinal. He died in July 1274 while attending the Council of Lyon.

Given the authoritative status of the *Sentences*, it is not surprising that Bonaventure accepts the identification of God with divinity, and of the Persons

with the Properties. What is of some interest for historians of philosophy is the philosophical underpinning that he supplies for these theologically motivated doctrines. The identification of God with divinity depends, in Bonaventure's thought, on a certain account of the role of abstraction in the language of the divine. The identification of the Father with Paternity also depends on this; but in addition, it depends on an account of the ontology of relations in the divine realm.

God and Divinity

Augustine had applied the term "substance" to God, only with some reluctance.[2] The *Sentences* reiterates Augustine's position.[3] Bonaventure poses the more general question of whether God is in any determinate genus (substance being one of highest genera). Among the arguments he considers in favor of an affirmative answer, we find the following:

> Again, what has a univocal and essential superior has being in a determinate genus. But God has a superior—namely, substance—which is said of God and of creatures both essentially and univocally (namely, according to the concept of a *per se* existent). Therefore etc.[4]

In reply, Bonaventure argues that the *Categories* notion of a being that is per se in the sense of not being in any subject does not fully capture the sense in which God is a substance

> For God is a *per se* being because He needs nothing; a creature is a *per se* being because it is not in another as in a subject, but it still needs another for its conservation.[5]

Thus, having examined the possibility that the term "substance" applies univocally to God and creatures, Bonaventure rejects this view in favor of the Augustinian view that when this term is applied to God it is used in a sense such that it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for something's being a substance that it not inhere in any subject.

Augustine had identified God the divine substance with divinity.[6] The *Sentences* reaffirms this identity.[7] In his philosophical reflections on this doctrine (where he considers the question whether it is appropriate to use the name

"essence" in theology), Bonaventure appeals, as had Gilbert, to a distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*:

> Since *quod est* as well as *quo est* are found among lower things, by reason of which we have both concrete and abstract signification (as when we say *man* and *humanity*), this is also our understanding in the divine realm, although we do not there understand these two to be different. Accordingly, we signify abstractly by the name *Deity* and concretely by the name *God*. And thereby we give Him a name by which we signify *quo est* (and this is the essence), as well as *quod est* (and this is the substance).[8]

While showing this continuity with Gilbert's conceptual scheme, Bonaventure departs from Gilbert's doctrines (and remains in conformity with that of the *Sentences*) by identifying *quo est* and *quod est* in the divine, allowing there only a conceptual distinction [*secundum rationem intelligendi*]:

> And seeing that in God both *quo est* and *quod est*, and *distinguishable* and *distinct from one another*, are the same in reality, the Saints use *substance* and *essence* for the same thing; similarly too, the Greeks use the name *hypostasis* for an actually distinct suppositum. Hence in divine names the distinction between *quo* and *quod est*, and between *distinguishable* and *distinct* doesn't make for any diversity, except conceptually.[9]

Among created things, a *quod est* stands to its *quo est* as denominative to denominating. Bonaventure accepts the transfer of this Aristotelian terminology to things divine. However, he decouples the language of denomination from that of priority and posteriority, thus avoiding the charge that if God is denominated from divinity then something is posited as prior to God. Here is what he says about Augustine's statement that we can say that the three Persons "are" one essence, or that they are "of" one essence, but not that they are "from" one essence:[10]

> To compare one thing to another as informing it or denominating it, is not thereby to posit a diversity or distinction between them; for, Deity is compared in this way to God. To compare things as a principle and

> that of which it is the principle, is a different sort [of comparison]: this *is* to import a distinction.[11]

To say "from," according to him, is to invoke the relationship that something has to its cause or principle.

Bonaventure distinguishes two sorts of abstraction:

> It is to be said that there are two ways in which something may be abstracted from something. In one way there is the abstraction that has its source in the nature of the thing; and it is in this way that the universal is abstracted from the particular, and form from matter—in both of which cases there is composition and diversity. In the other way there is the abstraction that has its origin in our understanding. For, our understanding when it understands something complete of necessity understands in two ways, or under a double concept, namely by way of *quod est* and of *quo*. For, whenever it understands something it always considers it as intelligible through some concept, by means of which it also grasps it. And thus our understanding is analyzable into an understanding of the *quod est* and of the *quo*, because there was composition in relation to it.[12]

The philosophical foundation that Bonaventure provides for the identification of God and divinity rests on a distinction between two sorts of abstraction, one originating in things themselves, the other in our understandings of them. Like Gilbert of Poitiers he accepts a universal distinction of *quod est* and *quo est*. Abstraction is always of *quo est* from *quod est*. In our understanding of things divine, we abstract divinity from God. The latter name may be considered a denominative from divinity, but this does not imply that divinity is prior to God. On the contrary, there is no real difference between abstract and concrete here. The distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* in the divine is the same as that between substance and essence.

The Properties and the Persons

As we saw in Chapter 6, the doctrine of the *Sentences* is that the divine properties are in the Persons and are the Persons. In his discussion of the question whether a property is a Person, Bonaventure outlines three positions that have been held, the first being that of Gilbert as Bonaventure understands it:

> It is to be said that there have been three opinions about the comparison of property to Person. The first position was that the properties are not the Persons and are not in the Persons but, as relations, accompany the Persons. And the reason that moves these [people] was the plurality of the Persons and the divine simplicity. For, because the Persons are many, there are many properties that are truly different. And because they are different, if they were in the Person they would remove its simplicity. And since this cannot be removed from the divine, they supposed the properties to accompany the Persons not to be them. And this seems to be consonant with the nature of Relation, which doesn't seem to be in a substance, nor to predicate anything in a subject, but to designate a respect towards another. And this position, even though it was in a way reasonable, cannot stand because it posited that relations in the divine [order] are neither God nor creature. Hence even if in its beginning it contained a small error, it led to a large one. Accordingly, it was retracted at the Council of Rheims, and Master Gilbert retracted it with his own mouth.[13]

According to him, Gilbert's view was that there exist properties differentiating the Persons, and these properties are therefore different from one another, but precisely because of this difference, the properties cannot inhere in the Persons, because if they did that would compromise the Persons' simplicity. Since they cannot be the Persons they must therefore be said to *accompany* (*assistere*) the Persons; and this view accords with the nature of relations, which is not to inhere but rather to stand towards another. But Bonaventure's grasp of Gilbert's theories, and of what happened at Rheims, is imperfect. The reason why Gilbert thought the properties accompany the Persons has to do with his general understanding of the *adest* relationship and is not peculiar to relational predications. And Gilbert acknowledged that there was a sense ("in*") whereby the properties are in the Persons.

The second historical position reported by Bonaventure is that of Praepositinus:

> And so there was a second opinion, much different from the former, namely that the properties absolutely are the Persons, nor do they differ except in manner of speaking; and there are only three properties, just as there are three Persons. This position is also grounded on the divine

simplicity. For, because the Persons are most simple, they are distinguished from one another, and they are their own Properties nor do they have any difference in reality but only in manner of speaking. This was the position of Master Praepositinus, and it is more justifiable than the previous one. All the same, it has been disproved above in Distinction 26, because one Person has many relations, which are genuine relations; and many Persons have one Property; and one Person stands in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, even in reality. From which it follows necessarily that a Property differs in some way really from a Person, and not just in manner of speaking as Master Praepositinus said.[14]

Finally, Bonaventure states the Lombard's opinion, which he says the masters of his day hold in common:

And on account of this it is to be understood that both the aforesaid positions speak the truth, and in some way fall short. For firstly, those who said that the Properties differ in some way from the Persons spoke the truth, but went wrong in saying that they differ without qualification. Next, those who said that the Properties are the Persons spoke the truth, but they went too far in saying that in no way did they differ from the Persons. Accordingly, these two positions may be fused into one true and common position (which Masters now hold in common): that the Properties are the Persons and are in the Persons, and yet differ in some way from the Persons.[15]

He presents the *Sentences* doctrine that the relational properties are the Persons and are in the Persons, as a compromise between the extreme positions of Gilbert and Praepositinus, and he argues for its correctness:

And it is clear that this position is acceptable if one examines the nature of the properties. For, it was said above, when it was asked what was a property in the divine [order], that it was a relation. It was also said that a relation, by reason of the comparison it has to the subject crosses over into substance in the divine [order], and so it is predicated entirely truly of its subject, in such a way that the Father is Paternity. But by reason of the comparison that it has to the object it remains most

> truly in the divine [order], and has in a certain way a difference from the Person. Nor does it produce any composition in this regard, but a distinction in respect to that *of* which it is. For composition is accompanied by comparison of the Property to the subject, distinction in respect of the object. And from this it is clear that the property is the Person and is in the Person, because it is the same by essence or manner of being, but differs as to its manner of being related.[16]

Relying on the dual nature of all relations as inhering in a subject while pointing toward an object, he postulates that on the side of the subject relational terms stand for substances in divine language, but on the side of the predicate they retain their relational nature. On this hypothesis, he argues, the divine relation of Paternity in its first aspect must be identical with the Father. But under its other aspect, Paternity is distinct from the Father because it is distinct from Filiation, the former pointing toward a Son while the latter points to a Father. By this reasoning he is able to construct a philosophical interpretation of the *Sentences* doctrine that the relational properties are the Persons but are also in some way distinct from them:

> And so the common opinion now holds that in the divine [order] the properties of the Persons are really different from one another, and because of this they are really different in some way from the Persons.[17]

He expands on the character of this difference:

> For, the property genuinely determines and distinguishes because there is a small difference between property and Person belonging to the mode of relating; but this does not stand in the way of predication, because that mode does not add another essence.[18]

The difference that there is between property and Person, small as it is, does not amount to a difference of essence, and so it does not stop the property's being predicable of the Person.

Bonaventure is sure that the properties are the divine essence. If Paternity is the Father, and the Father is the essence, then Paternity must be the essence. He considers the following objection to this position:

> It's not the case that that by which the Father is, is the same as that by which God is. But the Father is by Paternity and God is by divinity. Therefore Paternity is not divinity.

His solution is that even though God can be said to be denominated from divinity, and the Persons from the properties, denomination does not indicate any difference of essence, only a difference of mode.[19]

Bonaventure's philosophical position on the Persons and properties presupposes the application of the Aristotelian category of relatives to the Divine Persons, as advocated by Augustine and restated in the *Sentences*.[20] He elaborates on this appropriation of Aristotelian ontology in his discussion of a question about the nature of the Personal properties. Here he distinguishes between a relation's accidental being "in" a subject and its relational being "toward" an object:

> To understand this, note that Relation agrees with the other genera in some things and disagrees in others. It agrees in this, that it is a category and a genus of being, and in this, that it is an accident. It disagrees in this, that unlike the other genera it holds in respect not only of a subject but also of an object toward which it stands and on which it depends. As for the former conditions, it is impossible for Relation (or for the other genera) to remain in the divine, on account of the utmost simplicity [there]. For, in God Relation is not a category or an accident but a substance. As for the conditions relating to the object, it is necessary for it to remain in some manner, namely because of what it stands toward (and this is on account of a genuine distinction which is in the divine, and a genuine origin and standing-toward). And it is necessary for it in a certain manner not to remain, namely as concerns dependence and on account of the pervasive absoluteness that is in the divine.[21]

This double-aspect analysis of relations as being-in a subject and being-toward an object, when translated to the divine realm, requires that on the side of the subject relations are substances. Since divine simplicity excludes the possibility of there being more than one divine substance, there can in reality be only a single divine relation on the side of the subject. The divine relations, therefore, if they are to be distinct from one another, can be distinguished only by their being-toward different objects:

> A relation by reason of comparison to a subject crosses over into Substance, and so the property is the divine substance. However, by reason of comparison to the terminus or object it remains; and in this regard it is distinctive and it differs from the Essence, not because it indicates another essence but another manner of standing, which by comparison to the Essence or the Person indicates a mode, adding nothing, but in comparison to the correlative truly indicates a thing and a distinction.[22]

In dealing with the question whether all of the divine names are said according to substance, he says that the "true" and "real" distinction among the Persons is a distinction both in our understanding and in the things themselves:

> To the objection "Is this diversity . . . in the thing or in our understanding?" it is to be said that it concerns the way something *stands* [*modum se habendi*] which is not only in our understanding but also in the thing.[23]

Bonaventure recognizes three types of rational distinction (or, as one might translate it, things differ in three ways regarding the kind of account that must be given of them):

> To that which is objected from the Damascene, that they differ only in the account that must be given of them, it is to be said that there are three ways in which a different account may have to be given—in one way on the side of our apprehension (as with goodness and greatness in God), different accounts may have to be given in another way according to a difference of attribution because some mode may be posited about one or attributed to one, which is not attributed to the other (and in this way different accounts have to be given of essence and person and notion), and different accounts may have to be given in a third way according to a plurality of distinction, which does not lead to a diversity in essence or nature but only leads to a difference such that one is not said of the other (and in this way a different account has to given of one person or property than is given of another person or property). And the first difference is the least because nothing in it is reflected in reality, as is reflected in the others. So the Damascene

> does not mean to divide reality and account except according as reality is taken to mean nature; nor even so does he wholly divide them but as it were denominates from the principal. For in creatures there is not only a rational community but also a natural one. For Peter and Paul agree not only in the account that must be given of them but also in a common nature.[24]

Hester Goodenough Gelber neatly summarizes the passage:

> Difference may exist in the apprehension of something, and this is the way the divine attributes differ. Their difference is minimal because no real external distinction corresponds to them. Second, difference may be one of attribution, because some mode is attributed to one and not to the other. The divine essence and persons differ according to attributed mode. Third, difference may arise because of a plurality of distinction, and that occurs when there is no essential diversity but when one still cannot predicate one about the other. The divine persons differ from one another, according to a plurality of distinction.[25]

Bonaventure's stance on these point marks an important advance in the understanding of the way relative predications work in theological contexts.

The Properties' Inherence in the Essence

According to the *Sentences*, the properties are identical not only with the Persons but also with the divine essence.[26] Whereas the Lombard "does not know" and "does not ask" how it can be that the properties are in the divine essence without determining the essence,[27] Bonaventure dares to philosophize, stating,

> the relativities and relations strictly speaking are in the Persons, not in the essence; because the Persons are relative and are differentiated according to them. Yet they are not in the essence, because it is not relative nor is it differentiated. Still, they are in the divine essence speaking generally and loosely, as everything that *is* the divine essence—or everything that is in the essence or the Person—may be said to be in the divine essence.[28]

Thereby Bonaventure articulates a sense in which the properties are in the essence different from that by which they are in the Persons. They are properly speaking in the Persons, and are the source of the Persons' distinction from one another. He seems to mean—though he does not actually say—that the properties are "in" the Persons simply because the Persons are denominated from them. The properties, however, are in the essence speaking commonly and improperly, and only because they are the essence or are in the Persons.

Bonaventure's account of the Trinity constructs a philosophical underpinning for the Lombard's doctrine that the properties are in the Persons and are the Persons. Among its other interesting features, it provides an argument for allowing something to be denominated from itself, and it describes a two-step relationship connecting the properties with the essence.

Formal Analysis

According to Bonaventure, denomination and abstraction are neither reflexive nor irreflexive; that is, they do not require that everything is denominated/abstracted from itself, but at the same time they allow for the possibility that something may be denominated/abstracted from itself. He thinks this possibility is realized in the case of God, under the proviso that the abstraction in question has its source not in the things themselves but in our own understanding. In Gilbert's ontology, the *ab* relationship could be regarded as being irreflexive without getting in the way of any assertions regarding the abstractions that he recognizes. This is because in every case where he recognizes an entity and its corresponding abstract, the two are distinct. However, in Bonaventure's ontology this is not so. In his ontology, if there is to be such a being as divinity then God will stand in the relation *ab* to it. Hence, we cannot regard *ab* as an irreflexive relation at the same time as asserting that God is divinity: this would lead to the contradiction that there is something (viz. God, or divinity) that stands in the relation *ab* to itself, while nothing stands in that relation to itself. Bonaventure seems to think that abstraction deriving from the things themselves, abstraction *secundum rem* (which he sometimes calls "real" or "true" abstraction[29])—unlike the abstraction that links divinity with God—is irreflexive.

The semantics assumed by Bonaventure for the divine perfections is the same as that used by Boethius (Figure 3.3). However, in response to the questions set by the Lombard, he has a new way of understanding the semantics of the

properties as being substantially the same as the Persons, but differing from them because of their manner of being related. The properties are related as relative opposites (Paternity to Filiation, Spiration to Paternity and Filiation). This understanding of the semantics of the Persons and properties is shown in Figure 7.1, where relative opposites are grouped together.

		*	∧
d	*x*	*x*	*x*
p	*x*		*x*
f	*x*		*x*
s	*x*		*x*

FIGURE 7.1. Semantics of the Persons (Bonaventure)

Divinity is just one being, *x*, and that being is God. It is that which each Person substantially is. It is also each of the Personal properties, and so each of the Persons stands in the relationship *ab* to it. Thus, each Person is the same as that from which that Person is concreted. In this sense the properties are the Persons. The properties are "in" the Persons, by reason of the fact that the Persons are concreted from the properties (Definition 5.1). The properties differ from the Persons in that they are connected as relative opposites.

DEFINITION 7.1. *A opp B* iff for some *C,D* : *C ab A* and *D ab B* and *C ad D*.

Then, in order to capture the sense in which the properties are in the essence, we could define a further sense of "in" (*in***):

DEFINITION 7.1. *A in** B* iff for some *C* : *A in* C* and *C est B*

Now we can map Bonaventure's ontology of the Trinity as in Figure 7.2.

Bonaventure thinks that God is denominated from divinity and that God is divinity. As we saw when discussing Augustine, this sort of reflexivity can be accommodated within a modified *Categories* ontology in which the notion of substance conforms to Definition 2.1 ("substances are nonaccidents that are not from anything other than themselves"), and what is from something other than itself is an accident (Rule 2.1). Bonaventure's ontology must also have these features.




FIGURE 7.2. Ontology of the Trinity (Bonaventure)

Bonaventure's notion that a relation is a substance is inconsistent with Aristotelian principles about substances and relations. Rule 1.10 states that a relative must be from something (and what a relative is from, we know, is a relation); Rule 1.3 states that what something is from is an accident; Definition 1.3 implies that no accident is a substance. Therefore, no relation is a substance. Robert Kilwardby discusses this difficulty in his *Sentences* commentary,[30] arguing that a relation can consistently be said to be a substance provided that it is taken purely in its relational aspect, removing its accidental aspect (sc. as inhering in a subject). He points to the examples of pure matter in its relation to form, and of creatures in relation to the Creator. Whatever the merits of Kilwardby's argument, Bonaventure can maintain that some relations are substances within a modified *Categories* ontology, provided that the ontology lacks Rule 1.3. But, as we have just seen, Bonaventure's ontology has Rule 2.1 in place of Rule 1.3, and this means that the preceding proof that a relation cannot be a substance is not available. The Persons are from the divine relations, and in this modified categorial ontology nothing precludes the divine relations *being* the divine substance while retaining their relational oppositions.

So, while the *Categories* ontology does not allow that a relation can be a substance, a modified ontology that substitutes Rule 2.1 for Rule 1.3 allows

for this possibility. Since that substitution is made in the ontologies of Augustine and Boethius, the possibility already existed in earlier ontologies that a relation can be a substance, even if it was not explicitly recognized there. In any event, this possibility plays a crucial role in the thought of Bonaventure, Albert and Thomas.

Bonaventure's endorsement of the Lombard's formula that the properties are the Persons and are in the Persons raises the question how something can be in itself. After all, Gilbert thought that it was a universally valid principle that what is in something is different from what it is in. But a solution to this problem is readily available to Bonaventure (though not to Gilbert), namely by making use of the sense of "in" as *in**, as the converse of *ab* (Definition 5.1). Since Bonaventure allows truths of the form *A ab A* he can also allow truths of the form *A in* A*.

In Bonaventure's ontology of the Trinity there are four items: God (that is, divinity, divine greatness, divine goodness, and the substance of the Persons and Personal relations), and the three Persons. The latter are assumed to be different from one another and from God. There are four ontological relationships: concretion (*ab*), substantial predication (*est*), correlation (*ad*), and relative opposition (opp). I omit mention of *in** and *in***, which are definable via *ab* and *est*. Each of the Persons is concreted from its property, and God is concreted from divinity, but God is not concreted from any of the Persons. Each of the Persons is substantially God, but God is not substantially anything. The Father is relative to the Son, and the Son to the Father; the Spirit is relative to the Father and Son, and they are relative to the Spirit. Paternity is relatively opposed to Filiation, as is Spiration to its relative opposite, Procession.

8

Albert

He who is nearest on my right was both
my brother and my teacher: from Cologne,
Albert, and I am Thomas of Aquino.[1]

So writes Dante in his *Paradiso*, placing Albert alongside Thomas among the theologians and Fathers of the Church in paradise.

Introduction

Albert, like Bonaventure, rose to high Church offices, being Provincial of the Dominicans in Germany from 1254 to 1257 and Bishop of Regensburg from 1260 until 1262. He died in 1280. As a philosopher, Albert was an exceptionally prolific commentator on Aristotle. Unlike Bonaventure and Thomas, he wrote a commentary on the *Categories*, and his theological writings were colored by his knowledge of Aristotle's logic to an extent that we do not see in his contemporaries. It is appropriate, therefore, that we read his *Sentences* commentary in the light of what he writes about the *Categories*.

His views also need to be considered in comparison with those of Bonaventure. As we saw in the previous chapter, the fundamental points in Bonaventure's Trinitarian ontology are:

1. In the divine as elsewhere we can distinguish *quo est* from *quod est*, and the *quod est* is a denominative from the denominating *quo est*; but in the divine the *ab* relationship is nonreflexive (rather than being irreflexive as it is in the created realm) and abstractions are not really distinct from that which they are abstracted from, though there is a distinction in our mode of understanding.
2. God is a substance, not in the sense of being a substrate of properties, but in the sense of being per se and not needing anything,

3. The Persons are distinct from one another, and theirs is a distinction both in our understanding and in the things themselves.
4. There are relations in the divine. As regards what they are by essence, these relations are the same substance as God; but as regards the respects in which they stand to one another, they are interrelated as relational opposites. In the first of these respects they are the same as the Persons, but in the second respect they differ from the Persons.
5. The properties are in the Persons only in the sense that they are predicated of them; they are in the divine essence in a different sense.

Albert accepted the last four of these points in slightly different versions. But he seems to be in direct conflict with Bonaventure on the first point.

The Divine Substance

Albert holds, with Bonaventure, that God is a substance. But the content he gives to the notion of the divine substance differs from that given by Bonaventure. Both Bonaventure and Albert note that God is not a substance by virtue of possessing the feature that the *Categories* takes to be most characteristic of substances—namely, standing under changeable accidents. But whereas Bonaventure thinks God's substantiality amounts to His not needing anything outside Himself, Albert holds that it is due to God's being *non per alterum*. Albert clarifies this notion by opposing it to two of the ontological relationships that structure Aristotle's *Categories*, namely the *ab* and *in* relationships, where denominatives have their being from others, and accidents have their being in others. He attributes this sense of "substance" to Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius:

> And when [God or the divine essence is called] "substance" it is so called not from an act of standing under second substances or accidents, but [because] it is a being not through another [*per alterum*]—which contrasts with beings from another [*ab alio*] and beings in another. And this [type of] substance Boethius and Dionysius call being "beyond every substance" because these are the cause of all substances and they imitate it.[2]

Albert is perhaps here drawing on the work of some of the early thirteenth-century masters in the Paris Faculty of Arts. John Pagus, for instance, uses a

concept of per se being, and he defines it by opposition with being-in and being-from. Like Albert, he applies this concept to the First Cause, but, unlike Albert, he does not apply it to substance:

> To this last it is to be said that in one sense a being is said to be *per* se because it is neither in nor from another (and the First Cause is a *per se* being in this way); in a second sense [a being] is so called because it is not in another but is from another, like substance.[3]

Abstraction and Denomination

In Albert's view, God's substantiality rests in part on the fact that God is not "from" anything. This claim might mean that God rests on no cause or principle. Or it might mean that there is no such thing as divinity, from which God derives as a denominative derives from its corresponding abstract. Whether or not this is what Albert had in mind when he wrote (in the last passage from Albert quoted earlier) that God is not from anything, he did in fact hold that there is no abstraction in the divine order. By contrast, Bonaventure argues that we can say there is abstraction in God, provided we accept reflexive abstraction (where abstract and concrete are in reality the same as each other), and provided we foreswear any idea that the concrete must be posterior to the abstract.

Albert thinks that in the divine realm there is nothing abstract *secundum rem*. In his treatise on the *Categories*, he maintains that there is denomination only where there are accidents. The very word "denominative," he thinks, indicates that there is a difference between denominating and denominated essences. He takes the word to include the preposition "*de*" ("from"), thus indicating that something is named from something else:

> For when we call [something] "de-nominative," by prefixing the preposition ["de"] we indicate a change or difference between the denominating and denominated essences. And so, things that are of the same nature do not receive denominative predication or appellation. Hence man is not called human from humanity, but is essentially called man and animal and rational—and everything that is predicated according to the essence. And because a proprium is also essential (even though it is not of the essence), it is not fitting to call a man "risibility"; but in

> accidents also, according as they are arranged in their genera and species they do not receive the *ratio* of denomination; for whiteness is not called white or colored but is called a color, and so it is with all the others. However, when an alien nature, that is subsequent to the being of another, is understood and signified of the other, as if surrounding or compounded through the association of one nature with something alien, then there is denomination, as when we call a man white or when we call a thing that is white "a white."[4]

Albert's Aristotelianism shows through here. He is reiterating precisely the features of the *ab* relationship that we listed in Chapter 1: its domain excludes its converse domain, no substance or accident is denominated, and only accidents denominate. Where there are not two essences but only one, there cannot be denomination. It follows that in reality there is no denomination in God.[5]

But does this mean that we cannot signify the personal properties by abstract names like "paternity"? He thinks that even where there is just one reality, there may be two distinct understandings of that reality, one of which is signified as being abstracted from the other:

> To the first therefore I say all the being in the divine is from the being of the essence. And though there is no accident in the divine, still a property (insofar as it is in another and is not a *per se* being) is signified as being able to be understood without the other, and in this way to be abstracted.[6]

This possibility exists in the case of concepts (like Paternity, Filiation, Relation, property) that pertain to the notions, because in conceiving of Paternity as a property we think of it not as per se but as being in the Father, and thus we are able to understand it independently of, and as abstracted from, our understanding of the Father. We think of the personal properties as distinguishing the Persons, and of the Persons as distinguished by the properties, and thereby we attribute incompatible features to the Persons and their properties.[7]

This is how it is with concepts pertaining to the notion of Paternity and the like. But Albert does not think that things are like this with concepts (like essence, Wisdom, Godhead, divinity, Substance) that pertain to the essence or substance:

> But it is not thus with substantials, because substantial being is from those [things] and thus they cannot be abstracted like denominatives, because were they to be abstracted the subject would not remain.[8]

Divinity is not abstracted from God even in the sense in which Paternity is abstracted from the Father, because we do not conceive of divinity as a property of God, and we cannot conceive of it without conceiving of God.

Albert denies that there is any abstraction *secundum rem* in the divine, but he allows that there can be abstraction according to the manner of attribution or understanding in regard to God's properties though not in regard to His substantial predicates. On one hand, a property like Paternity can be abstracted, not so as to be a distinct being from God, but so that it is signified as being able to be understood without our understanding God; but on the other hand, divinity (being substantial) cannot be abstracted from God even in that sense.

Absent from this treatment is Bonaventure's distinction between two types of abstraction—one type that has its source in the nature of the thing, and another that has its origin in our understanding. That distinction opened up the possibility that a *quod est* might in reality be identical with its *quo est* and thus that there might be instances in which a being stands in the *ab* relationship to itself. Albert's view differs from that of Bonaventure in making the *ab* relationship irreflexive, thus denying that God stands in that relationship to Himself. In taking this stance he departs from the Augustinian tradition in which God is thought of as denominated from something which is identical with Him, and by the same token he remains truer to the ontology of the *Categories* in which denomination is irreflexive.

The points of difference and similarity between Bonaventure and Albert can be summarized like this. They both distinguish a broader concept of abstraction and concretion (according to which an abstract being may or may not be identical with its concrete correlative, and thus the relationship between them is nonreflexive) from a narrower concept (according to which the abstract is never identical with the concrete, and the relationship between them is irreflexive). But Albert's more general concept is not the same as Bonaventure's. Whereas Bonaventure defines it just as what arises from our understanding, Albert specifies a particular way in which something arises from our understanding, such that it can be understood without its correlative. This is why Bonaventure includes God and divinity under the more general concept, whereas Albert does not: the notion of divinity arises from our understanding but not




FIGURE 8.1. Denomination and concretion (Bonaventure and Albert)

in such a way that it can be understood without understanding the notion of God. The other difference between the two doctors is that whereas Bonaventure takes the relationship between what denominates and what is denominated to be the same as the relationship between the abstract and the concrete, Albert draws a distinction here, reserving the title of denomination for his narrower case of abstraction and concretion. This allows him to be true to the logic of denominatives as it is given in Aristotle's *Categories*.

Persons and Relations

In regard to the Persons, Bonaventure says that the distinction between them is in the things themselves as well as in our understanding. By contrast, Albert emphasizes the lack of any real difference anywhere in the divine realm, while allowing that there are differences in the ways in which we refer to Persons and to God, and differences in what we attribute to them:

> It is to be said therefore, and believed without qualification, that on account of the ultimate simplicity of God, in Him being and what-is, and person and essence, do not differ in reality. Yet they differ in manner of referring and attributing.[9]

Though person and essence are the same, they retain those things that are of their proper concept (*ea quae sunt de ratione sua propria*), because the Person is in its nature unshareable and the essence shareable.

On the topic of the divine relations, where Bonaventure distinguished two aspects of a relation (its being-in a subject and its being-toward an object), Albert distinguishes three:

> Briefly (since this will be discussed later) it is to be said that relation has three things in itself, namely the nature of accident, and that it is a certain property (and from this it has inhering-in-only), and it has in itself that it is opposed relatively to another thing (and from this it has being-determined externally, as when it is said "Father of a Son" and "Son of a Father"). As to the first, it changes the manner of predication, because as for that, its manner of predicating is a manner making a concrete composite from an accident and a subject in which it is, and it is predicated denominatively of that; and there cannot be such a predication in God, and so in the divine [order] it loses the nature of accident. But there remains the nature of property insofar as it is property, which is to belong-to-only. And further there remains for it the understanding of relation to another, as has been said. Accordingly, some people said that in the divine [order] relation is in no way in the Person but is the very Person and is that by which the Person is towards another, meaning by this that the nature of accident is lost and thus it does not inhere but it does retain the nature of property and relation. But what Boethius says, that a relation accompanies, is understood as to the latter, namely as to the nature of relation as relation, and not as to the nature of the property which is in the relation. It is clear from this that it does not remove simplicity, because it would only remove it through the nature of accident insofar as it is an accident, which by introducing a different being (i.e. a being of a nature different from the substance) would produce multiple beings and a composition of concretion between them. For a Person does not have any accident but most truly is a substance and a suppositum. And this judgment will be discussed further in Distinction 26.[10]

(This is Albert's idea of brevity.) His introduction of the notion of property is at first sight confusing, since the notion of being-in-only does not seem to be coordinate with the notions of being-in and being-toward, but instead to be included under being-in. Still, he is right when he says that the status of relation as property is not denied either by the opinion (of Praepositinus) that the relations are, but are not in, the Persons, or by Boethius's view that the relations merely accompany the Persons.

Albert's position regarding being-in and being-toward is the common opinion as Bonaventure reports it; but Albert goes beyond Bonaventure's presentation of the common opinion, deriving the special ontological features of relations

from a general account of the nature of each one of the Aristotelian categories, and the Boethian rule that in theological language the categories are as their subjects allow:

> To this it ought to be said that all the most general genera of accidents have two things in themselves, namely that they are accidents, and a differentia by which they are distinguished from one another. For, what makes a quantity a quantity is not that it is an accident, but that it is an internal or external dimension or measure of a substance. Similarly, what makes a quality a quality is not that it is an accident, but that it is a natural or an internally or externally adventitious disposition of a substance. And so on for the others. But because they are accidents, they all bespeak an ordering towards substance. . . . So since being is imperfect in this way, and being in another, all of those things that predicate something as inhering in that of which they predicate it, are excluded from the divine by reason of the genus. And again, it is further to be understood and noted, what Boethius says, that some of the categories predicate something as inhering in that of which they are predicated, some accompany extrinsically and predicate a thing as standing towards that to which they adhere extrinsically (like place and time). . . . Those, however, which accompany another extrinsically, thanks to the nature of an accident in them, are not predicated, but are changed into substance. But by reason of that which they add to the most general [genus], they do not indicate an ordering toward substance and so they remain.[11]

His argument, like that of Bonaventure, is that all the accidental categories have a generic aspect common to all accidents (namely, to be in a substance) and a specific aspect peculiar to them (which, in the case of relations, is to be toward an object). But he considerably amplifies Bonaventure's rather elegant treatment, providing details about Quantity and Quality, and invoking Boethius's principle that what is predicated of God has to be understood as constrained by what can properly be said about God. Given that principle, he argues, the common aspect of all accidents cannot stand in the form in which it applies to this-worldly predications. God has no accidents, and so all predications about him have to be understood as being substantial. However, what is peculiar to relatives, their being toward an object, is not affected by this reasoning because it is not by reason of their being accidents that relatives point toward an object.

Albert thus provides a theoretical underpinning for the common opinion about the divine relations.

Real Relations

Albert holds that the divine relations must be real,

> because when we say the Father is referred to the Son and is referred to the Holy Spirit, if we didn't say that the relation *is* something then the Father would have to stand to the Son and the Holy Spirit in the same way (and this is not true). And similarly, when we say the hypostasis "is made distinct" and the property "makes distinct," we attribute to the hypostasis what we do not attribute to the property; for this concept in a way forces the signification of a property by which the person is not signified. And this can be so only by abstracting.[12]

He represents the Porretans' view of relations as resting on a particular reading of Boethius—a reading that leads to Sabellianism:

> If perhaps it is said that a relation does not mean anything as inhering but rather as accompanying (as Boethius seems to mean, and as the Porretans said)—the Sabellian heresy seems to follow from this. For if a relation means nothing in reality, it seems that it does not constitute a thing in that from which it is. In the divine however, we have nothing that could constitute the Persons, other than the Relations. So it seems that in these things there is nothing in reality that does not produce a distinction of Persons but only a trinity of names, just as Sabellius says.[13]

Thus, he holds that the divine relations cannot be mere extrinsic accompaniments, because

> the relation that in lower things inheres in the relative and makes reference to another, in the divine is relative according to substance and makes it be referred to another. Accordingly it is not merely an extrinsic accompaniment.[14]

For his interpretation of the Lombard's dictum that the properties are in the Persons and are the Persons, he draws on his distinction of understanding and attribution between the properties and the Persons:

> So the solution will be that we may say the properties are in the Persons and are the Persons just as the Master says here: [they are] in the Persons, being different from them in the way they are understood and attributed; but [they are] the Persons, being the same in reality with them and with the essence, because whatever is in God is God.[15]

To be in the Persons, it seems, is just to be understood and attributed in different ways from the ways in which the Persons are understood and attributed. And to be the Persons is, like the Persons, just to be the essence.

As for the properties' inherence in the essence, he makes use of the double-aspect account of divine relations. Considered in comparison to their subject, rather than their object, relations may be said to inhere—but only if we remove from the idea of inherence any implication of diversity, so that what inheres is identical with that in which it inheres:

> But we take inherence for a way of understanding, rather than for a difference in the thing. For with Relation we have to consider the nature of an accident; and according to that, it posits a respect only to a substance that is a subject of other genera, and as to this relation (just as with the other genera) it changes the manner of predication. And so the property is the Person in which it is, and as a consequence is the essence in which the Person is.[16]

Like Bonaventure, he takes the properties to inhere in the essence only by virtue of the fact that they inhere in the Persons. But Albert's understanding of the sense in which the properties are in the Persons cannot be subsumed under Definition 5.1 (*A in* B* if and only if *B ab A*) because for him the properties do not stand to the Persons in the converse of the *ab* relationship, as they do for Bonaventure. This is because Albert holds the Father to be identical with Paternity but does not accept the proposition *The Father ab Paternity* (since he thinks that abstraction occurs only where there are accidents, and there are no accidents in the divine).

Apart from the divergences we have noted in the way the two theologians construe inherence and abstraction, their accounts of the Persons are identical.

Formal Analysis

Albert accepts the existence of abstract entities. The reality of abstract entities in the Godhead is, he thinks, proved by the fact that the relation of the Father




FIGURE 8.2. Ontology of the Trinity (Albert)

to the Son must be different from that of the Son to the Father. This difference holds because Filiation, unlike Paternity, is relatively opposed to Paternity. Notice, however, that the figure shows no instances of the *ab* relationship. This is because Albert thinks there are no such instances in the Godhead.

Like Bonaventure, Albert takes into account the relative opposition of the Personal relations as well as their substantial identity.

The structure displayed in Figure 8.2 contains the same four terms as in Bonaventure's structure. In agreement with Bonaventure, Albert identifies God, divinity, divine greatness and goodness, and the Personal relations. But unlike Bonaventure, Albert uses only three ontological relationships: substantial predication (*est*), correlation (*ad*) and relative opposition (*opp*). Abstraction does not figure here.

9

Aquinas

I, wisdom, have poured out rivers. I, like a brook out of a river of mighty water: I, like a channel of a river, and like an aqueduct, came out of paradise. I said: "I will water my garden of plants and I will water abundantly the fruits of my meadow." Sirach 14:40–42

Among the many opinions coming from different sources as to what true wisdom might be, the Apostle gives one that is singularly firm and true when he says, "Christ, the power of God and wisdom of God, has become for us God-given wisdom" (1 Corinthians 1:24, 30). This does not mean that only the Son is wisdom, since Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one wisdom, just as they are one essence. Rather, wisdom especially belongs to the Son because the works of wisdom in many ways agree with what is proper to the Son. Through the wisdom of God the hidden things of God are made manifest and the works of creatures are produced, and not only produced, but restored and perfected. I mean that perfection whereby a thing is called perfect when it has attained its proper end.[1]

With these eloquent words, Thomas begins his commentary on the *Sentences*. They concisely signal the author's intention to consult "many opinions coming from different sources" and to refute those that will not withstand scrutiny (such as the opinion that "only the Son is wisdom"), all the while respecting both the words of Holy Scripture and the philosophy of Aristotle ("a thing is called perfect when it has attained its proper end").

Introduction

Aquinas died in July 1274 while en route to the Council of Lyon. He treats many of the semantic and ontological questions about the Trinity in ways that had already been developed by Bonaventure and/or Albert. He does so, however,

with an elegance and a sense of system lacking in the work of his predecessors. And his system includes novel elements, including an epistemological account of the divine names.

Divine Simplicity

The "controlling idea at the heart of Aquinas's philosophical theology" (Richard Cross's words) is the idea of divine simplicity.[2] When we attribute being to God, this is on account of God's simplicity:

> In God, therefore, we posit substance and being—substance by reason of subsisting not by reason of sub-standing, but being by reason of simplicity and completeness not by reason of an inherence by which it inheres in another.[3]

Notice that Aquinas here differentiates between being and substance, deducing the latter from subsistence rather than from simplicity. His reasoning takes the form of a pair of syllogisms:

$$\frac{\text{What subsists is substance}\quad\text{God subsists}}{\text{God is substance}}\qquad\frac{\text{What is simple is a being}\quad\text{God is simple}}{\text{God is a being}}$$

Aquinas's treatment of divinity flows out of his understanding of divine simplicity. What is simple, according to his understanding, has two features: it is not the material to any form, and it is not the subject of any accident. Because of the first of these features, abstract and concrete must be identical in the simple:

> We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God."[4]

Here he relies on the argument

$$\frac{\dfrac{\text{What is simple has no forms in it}\quad\text{God is simple}\quad\text{God possesses divinity}}{\text{Divinity is not a form in God}}}{\text{Divinity is the same as God}}$$

A further instance of the central role played by divine simplicity in Aquinas's philosophical theology is provided by his treatment of the divine attributes. As Cross observes, "Aquinas accepts a strong account of divine simplicity, according to which there are no distinctions at all between the divine attributes."[5]

That the divine attributes are nonaccidental is deducible, according to Aquinas, from God's simplicity:

> And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence.[6]

We can exemplify the core of this deduction by the following argument about divine wisdom:

$$\frac{\text{What is simple has no accidents} \quad \text{God is simple} \quad \text{God is wise}}{\text{Wisdom is not an accident of God}}$$

If the wisdom in God is not an accident, Aquinas thinks it can only be the divine essence itself.

Divine simplicity, in Aquinas's account, also entails that the Personal properties are the same as the Persons. This follows from the second feature of divine simplicity, namely that it excludes the composition of accident and subject:

> It is to be said, therefore, to the first that Person and property are the same in reality but differ conceptually. Hence if one is multiplied, the other doesn't have to be multiplied.[7]

The argument is analogous to his reasoning about the identity of the divine perfections with the divine essence:

$$\frac{\text{What is simple has no accidents} \quad \text{The Father is simple} \quad \text{The Father possesses Paternity}}{\text{Paternity is not an accident of the Father}}$$

The Personal Properties

The Personal properties, though the same as the Persons, really differ from each other because of their different relativities:

> It is to be known therefore that a personal property, namely a distinguishing relation, is the same in reality as the divine essence, but differs in concept, just as was stated about the attributes. Now a relation, by its very concept, is referred to something else. So a relation can be considered in two ways in the divine: either by comparison with the essence (and then it is only a concept), or in comparison with that to which it is referred (and then the relation is really distinct from that, by its proper concept of relation). Now the persons are distinguished by the comparison of a relation with its correlative opposite, not by the comparison of the relation with the essence; and so there is a real plurality of persons and not a merely conceptual one.[8]

At the same time, Aquinas holds that

> relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.[9]

In *De Potentia*, Aquinas argues that if there are real relations in God, they must *be* the divine essence. The only alternatives, he argues, are that God has parts, or that the relations are accidents, or that something other than God's substance is eternal.[10] He makes the supposition, for the sake of argument, that earthly relations have their being in the way they stand toward their object, not in the way they inhere in their subject. From this supposition it would follow that relations, in the created world, are not accidents (because it is the nature of an accident to inhere in a subject). Since every reality is either a substance or an accident, it would further follow that relations in the created world are not realities. On the further assumption that these conclusions can be transferred to the divine realm, it would follow that the divine relations are not realities. At best, they could only be beings of reason. Further, since the divine persons are distinguished by the relations they stand in, there is no real, but at best a rational, distinction among the divine persons. This conclusion, of course, is heretical.

The upshot is that when the relational properties are compared to the divine essence they are identical with it and therefore are with one another; but when they are compared to their opposite relations, they are all different from one another.

The apparent contradiction—the properties differ from one another, *and* are identical with one another, depending on what they are compared with—is resolved by the "common opinion" according to which each of the divine relations is *both* substantially the divine essence *and* differentiated from its opposed companion relations by virtue of distinctive relative oppositions.

The Critique of Gilbert

In reporting what happened at the Council of Rheims, Aquinas is more cautious than Bonaventure, stating only that Gilbert "is said" to have renounced his erroneous views, not that he expressly retracted them. On the other hand, he does name Gilbert, whereas Albert had spoken merely about "the Porretans":

> I answer: it is to be stated that Gilbert of Poitiers is said to have been in error about this, but to have revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that relations in divine things accompany, or are externally attached.[11]

Now, Gilbert does indeed say this about the personal properties:

> But theological Persons cannot differ from one another by a mutual opposition of essences, since they are one by the singularity of that by which they are, and they are what they are by its simplicity. But of these which were mentioned, they are proved, and indeed are, other, by a mutual opposition of things externally attached.[12]

And in doing so he makes it clear that he does not consider that the relations can be essences.

In any event, Aquinas replies to Gilbert's position by appealing, as had Albert, to the double nature of each genus of accident, and he argues that Gilbert considered only one of the two aspects of relations:

> To clarify this, we need to bear in mind that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two things to bear in mind. One is the being that belongs to each one of them according as it is an accident. And this, in general for every case, is to inhere in a subject—for the being of an accident is to inhere. The other thing to bear in mind is the proper nature

> of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of Relation, as in Quantity and Quality, even the proper account of the genus is taken according to a comparison to a subject; for Quantity is called the measure of a substance, and Quality is the disposition of a substance. But the proper account of Relation is not taken from a comparison to that in which it is, but according to a comparison to something outside. So if we consider relations as such, we find them to be accompaniments rather than intrinsically attached, even among created things, in a certain way happening to the related thing insofar as it is inclined toward another; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject and has an accidental being in it. But Gilbert of Poitiers considered relation only in the first way.[13]

He thinks Gilbert fell into the error of thinking that relations do not inhere. But Gilbert's actual view was that accidents in general do not inhere, but it is rather subsistences that inhere in subsistents. Aquinas's view, by contrast, is that relations, like all accidents, do inhere in their subjects (assuming they are real relations). He compares them with actions. Just as an action is conceived of as "from" an agent and at the same time is "in" the agent, so a real relation also inheres in a subject even though it is conceived of as directed to another:

> Hence it is to be said that there is nothing to prevent something inhering, which is not signified as inhering—just as an action is not signified as being in the agent but as being from the agent, and yet it is agreed that an action is in the agent. Similarly, although a relative is not signified as inhering, it still has to inhere. This is supposing the relation to be some thing. Of course, supposing it is only something conceptual, then it is not inherent. And just as in created things it has to be an accident, so in God it has to be his substance because whatever is in God is His substance. Therefore in reality the relations are the divine substance; however, they do not have the mode of substance but they have another mode of predication from the things that are predicated substantially of God.[14]

He follows Albert in finding the Sabellian heresy implicit in the Porretans' views:

> Hence, certain people, focusing on relatives' manner of signifying, have stated that they are not inherent in substances, but that as it were they accompany them because they are signified "toward" a certain link between a substance which refers and that to which it refers. Hence some theologians, namely the Porretans, apply this sort of opinion to the divine relations, saying that the relations are not in the Persons, but that as it were they accompany them. And because the divine essence is in the Persons, it will follow that the relations are not the divine essence; and because every accident inheres, it will follow that they are not accidents. And according to these [assumptions] they will solve Augustine's statement that relations are predicated of God neither according to substance nor according to accident.[15]

Aquinas concludes:

> But it follows from this opinion that a relation is not a thing, but is purely conceptual, for every thing is either a substance or an accident. . . . And so Gilbert of Poitiers has to say that the divine relations are merely conceptual, and thus it would follow that the distinction of the Persons will not be real—which is heretical.[16]

What Aquinas seems to overlook is Gilbert's belief that he has found a way in which relations that are not essences could distinguish the Persons from one another.

But this was no mere oversight. Aquinas argues that if we admit that there are real relations in God, we must identify them with the divine essence, on pain of falling into heresy:

> I answer that it is to be said that, given that there are relations in God we necessarily have to say that they are the divine essence, otherwise we would have to say that there is composition in God and that the divine relations are accidents, because every thing that inheres in anything other than its own substance is an accident. It would also follow that some thing that is not the divine substance is eternal; and all these things are heretical.[17]

Aquinas's reasoning contains two independent arguments. First, if there are relations in God and they are not God Himself, they must be accidents of God.

Second, if there are relations in God and they are not God Himself, then some thing other than God is eternal. The first argument assumes that if *A* is in *B*, and *A* is not identical with *B*, then *A* is an accident. This principle holds in the *Categories* ontology, following from Definition 1.2 (which states that an accident is what inheres). The second argument recalls statements in the Lombard, and before him in Bernard.

How fair are these arguments? Gilbert explicitly denies the premise of the first argument stating that the relations are "in" the Persons—but that is because he reserves the word for the relationship between subsistences and subsistents. However, he does hold that the relations stand in the relationship *adest* to the Persons. As for the second argument, Gilbert would probably accept it as it stands, but would also say that it is important to distinguish types of "thing," because only certain types of thing in God will compromise divine simplicity.

The Genesis of the Divine Names

Aquinas offers the following explanation for the fact that we have a multitude of names for God:

> For since our understanding is not sufficient by itself to grasp his essence, it arises, in the cognition [of the divine] from the things around us, where different perfections are found, whose root and origin in every case is the one God, as has been shown. And because we can name something only to the extent that we understand it (for names are signs of understandings), we can name God only from the perfections we find in other things whose origin is in Him. And because these are multiple in those things, we have to bestow many names on God. But if we were to see His essence in itself, we would not need a multitude of names, but we would have a simple acquaintance with him, just as his essence is simple. And this we expect in the day of our glory, according to Zacharias at the end: "In that day there shall be one Lord and his name shall be one."[18]

He rejects any suggestion that the different names by which we name the divine perfections are synonyms:

> I reply that names said of God in this way are not synonyms. Which indeed would be easy to see if we were to say that names of this sort

> are adduced in order to be excluded, or to designate a causal relationship to creatures. For there would then be different accounts of these names according as different things are denied, or different effects connoted. But according to what has been said—that names of this sort signify the divine substance, though imperfectly—it is also clearly apparent according to what has been laid down that different accounts are to be given of them. For the account which a name signifies is a conception of the understanding which the name signifies about a thing. Now, since our understanding knows God from created things, it forms conceptions proportioned to the divine perfections proceeding from God to created things, in order to understand God. Which perfections pre-exist in God in unity and without qualification, but are received in creatures divided and multiplied. So, just as to the different perfections of created things there corresponds one simple principle represented in various and multiple ways by the different perfections in created things, so to various and multiple concepts of our understanding there corresponds one absolutely simple [being] according to this sort of imperfect conceptions of the understanding. And so the names attributed to God are not synonyms even though they signify one thing, because they signify it under many different accounts.[19]

However, this should not be taken to imply the existence of various aspects *in* God; rather, there are various modes of signification:

> So there are two things to consider in the names we attribute to God, namely the perfections they signify (such as goodness and life, and the like), and their manner of signifying. As regards what names of this sort signify, they belong to God properly (more properly than they do to created things), and they are said primarily of Him. But as regards their manner of signifying, they are not properly said of God, for they have a manner of signifying that belongs to created things.[20]

This account is consistent with Augustine's way of understanding the names of the divine perfections. Indeed, so far as concerns what in reality these names stand for, when taken in their appropriate theological sense rather than in their this-worldly signification, Aquinas's account is indistinguishable from Augustine's. Where Aquinas goes beyond Augustine is in his account of *how it comes about* that the single divine essence has a plurality of names. Here his account

is twofold. The divine perfections exist in the created world by virtue of being caused by their perfect analogue in God, and they exist here in an imperfect form. Thus, the names of the perfections in their this-worldly senses signify imperfectly, and in the way in which a cause is signified by its effects, what is signified perfectly by the names of the divine perfections—or rather, what would be signified perfectly by the names of the divine perfections, were those names within our cognitive grasp. This account rests on the assumptions that what is signified perfectly by one name can be signified imperfectly by another, and that there can be several different imperfect ways of signifying what is signified perfectly by a single name. It also assumes that a single cause can have multiple effects, and that a cause can be represented by its effects. All these assumptions appear reasonable when we reformulate them in terms of representation; because we know, from our experience of visual representations that one and the same cause can be represented imperfectly by its effects, and that it can have a multitude of different imperfect representations.

The Relationships Between Person, Property, and Essence

Aquinas takes up the shared idea of Bonaventure and Albert that the properties inhere in the essence by virtue of a sense different from that by which they are in the Persons. Unlike Bonaventure, he does not make it clear that the inherence in the essence is derivative upon the inherence in the Persons. However, he does make explicit what was only implicit in Bonaventure and Albert—namely that the inherence in the Persons holds simply because the properties stand to the Persons as abstract to concrete:

> I reply, saying that the properties are in the essence and in the Persons, but in different ways, because they are in the essence through a real identity and not as in a *suppositum*, but they are in the Persons as in a *suppositum*. But there is a difference due to the fact that something is said to be a *suppositum* of something in two ways: either of the nature by which it is constituted (as humanity is in Socrates)—and in this way the Personal properties are in the Persons—or as that which arises after being is constituted (as whiteness is in Socrates)—and in this way the non-Personal properties like unbegotten-ness and common Spiration are in the Persons according to the understanding, but not in such a way that in reality the *suppositum* is something other than that

> which inheres, but only according to the conceptual distinction between concrete and abstract, as was said in the preceding article.[21]

In that preceding article, having run though the opinions of the Porretans and of Praepositinus in much the same way as Bonaventure and Albert, Aquinas gives his own opinion:

> And so we say that the properties and the Persons are the same in reality, but differ conceptually just as we said about the properties and the Essence. But it is different in that the concept of a property and of the essence differ like the concept of different genera, as was said; but the concept of a property and a Person differ like the concept of the abstract and the concrete taken in the same genus. Yet, in the concrete there are two things to consider among created things, namely composition and perfection; because what signifies concretely signifies as an existent by itself, like "man" or "white." Similarly there are two [aspects] in the concept of the abstract, namely simplicity and imperfection; because what is signified in the abstract is signified by way of Form, to which it does not belong to function or to subsist in itself but in another. Hence it is clear that, as also with the other things that are said of God, neither concept wholly agrees with the divine. From which it may be proved that nothing is properly said of God—not the abstract on account of [its] imperfection, nor the concrete because of [its] composition (*Book of Causes*, Proposition 6). But in a certain respect both are truly said—the concrete on account of perfection, and the abstract on account of simplicity.[22]

Gelber summarizes this passage:

> He asserted that the essence, properties and persons do not differ when it comes to their *esse*, for they are all one thing. However, like the essence and the attributes, they have different *rationes*. The personal properties differ from the essence in a different way, however, than they differ from the persons, and the essential attributes differ from the essence in still a third fashion. The *ratio* of property and the *ratio* of essence differ like the *rationes* of diverse genera, because the categories of relation and substance are applicable to God. The *ratio* of property

> and the *ratio* of person differ as the *rationes* of abstract and concrete within the same genus, and the essential attributes differ from the essence as the *ratio* of species from the *ratione* of its genus. Thus there is a greater rational distinction between the *rationes* of essence and of the properties or relations than exists between the *rationes* of the persons and of their personal properties or between the *rationes* of the essence and the essential properties.[23]

(I have translated *rationes* "concepts.") The various types of rational difference are displayed in Figure 9.1.




FIGURE 9.1. Division of conceptual differences (Aquinas)

Aquinas's philosophical theology of the Trinity possesses much power and beauty; but his successors were not always satisfied with his approach, as Gelber notes:

> It was difficult for Aquinas' followers to accept his contention that the mind could grasp distinct *rationes* about one and the same object without those *rationes* or something that corresponded to them being distinct in some way in God Himself or without a comparison to the created order where those *rationes* or what corresponded to them existed apart from one another. Furthermore, Aquinas' view that the divine relations, only rationally distinct from the essence, could give rise to the real distinction of the persons, was also a point of difficulty for those who came after him.[24]

Formal Analysis

Parts of Aquinas's theory of the Trinity are familiar from the work of Bonaventure and Albert. Abstraction plays a role in Aquinas's ontology of the Trinity

similar to that which it plays in Bonaventure's, although in Aquinas the reflexivity of abstraction in the divine context is based on divine simplicity. His account of the semantics of the divine perfections is the same as that used by Bonaventure, and indeed by Boethius. His semantics of the Persons is the same as that in Bonaventure and Albert. And his ontology of the Trinity is the same as that of Bonaventure.

Our methods of formal analysis can also be applied to a number of other points in Aquinas's philosophical theology of the Trinity: his account of the relationship between the divine perfections and their earthly counterparts, and his way of differentiating the Person/property, property/essence, and attribute/essence relationships.

Aquinas sees real distinctions among the divine perfections, distinctions that hold by virtue of the way in which our limited understanding construes all those perfections as projections from a variety of distinct human perfections (goodness, wisdom etc). In each one of the pairs <(human) goodness, God>, <(human) wisdom, God>, the second member is an ultimately perfect projection from the limited perfection of the first member. These two instantiations of the relation, however, have distinct first members, which are grounded in the human perfections, not in God. And so the distinctions that exist among the divine perfections, while real, are not real distinctions in God.

We can give this insight of Aquinas's a formal representation by adding to our matrix of the divine perfections a semantic analysis of the corresponding this-worldly perfections. Figure 9.2 shows that, where a' and b' stand for divine wisdom and goodness, and a'' and b'' stand for nondivine wisdom and goodness, the nondivine perfections do not apply to anything possessing the divine perfections (I have arbitrarily let a'' and b'' stand respectively for individuals *s*,*t* and *s*,*u*); some things possessing nondivine wisdom also possess nondivine goodness (*s*) and some do not (*t* possesses nondivine wisdom but not nondivine goodness, and *u* possesses nondivine goodness but not nondivine wisdom); divine wisdom is the same as the divinely wise and is the same as divine goodness; nondivine wisdom is different from the nondivinely wise and from nondivine goodness.

The divine and nondivine senses are related to each other by analogy:

> Creator and creature reduce to one, not by a community of univocity but of analogy. But such a community can happen in two ways. Either due to the fact that several things participate in some one thing as prior and posterior, (as potency and act participate in the *ratio* of being, and

		*	∧
d	x	x	x
a'	x	–	x
b'	x	–	x
a''	s, t	–	y
b''	s, u	–	z

FIGURE 9.2. Semantics of the divine perfections (Aquinas)

> similarly for substance and accident), or due to the fact that one being and *ratio* is received from the other thing (and such is the analogy of creature to creator; for the creature does not have being except according as it descends from the first being, and so it is not called a being except insofar as it imitates the first being, and similarly for wisdom and for everything else that is said of creatures).[25]

What Aquinas achieves by this move is to show the divine attributes are related to really distinct this-worldly attributes without thereby generating any real plurality within the Divinity.

Our formal analyses can also be applied to Aquinas's descriptions of the different differences among the properties, the essence, and the Persons. There is a categorial difference between the properties and the essence, which is reflected in the ontological structure by which we represented the shared doctrine of Albert, Aquinas, and Bonaventure. He seems to be closer to Bonaventure than to Albert regarding the relationship between Property and Person, and thus Figure 7.2 is perhaps a better representation of his ontology than Figure 8.2. Only the essence, neither the properties nor the Persons, is a substance. The difference between property and Person is, as Aquinas says, like that between abstract and concrete. In our formal analysis, the Persons stand in the *ab* relationship to the Properties. As for the difference between essence and attribute, while the Boethius-style semantics shows no difference at all, it is one of the great merits of Aquinas's account that he is able to differentiate them in the manner exhibited in Figure 9.1. Finally, the "greater rational distinction" noted by Gelber between essence and property, as against that between Person and property, is reflected in our ontology by the fact that the properties relate to the essence only via the Persons.

10

Scotus

> O Lord our God, true teacher that you are, when Moses your servant asked you for your name that he might proclaim it to the children of Israel, you, knowing what the mind of mortals could grasp of you, replied: "I am who am," thus disclosing your blessed name. You are truly what it means to be, you are the whole of what it means to exist. This, if it be possible for me, I should like to know by way of demonstration. Help me then, O Lord, as I investigate how much our natural reason can learn about that true being which you are if we begin with the being which you have predicated of yourself.[1]

These words, from the prologue to Duns Scotus's treatise on God as First Principle, show how the author's aims go beyond the Augustinian project of demonstrating the logical consistency of Trinitarian doctrine: he wants, if possible, to know the whole of being.

Introduction

Scotus brought a new level of sophistication to theorizing about the Trinity. Richard Cross assesses his Trinitarian theology as "a powerful exposition of the Augustinian tradition, perhaps the most consistently rational exposition of this tradition that has ever been attempted."[2] This is not to say (as Cross himself points out) that Scotus never departs from the mainstream of that tradition. For example, he seriously considered departing from Augustine's relational solution to the problem of the distinction between the Persons.

Scotus's writings on the Trinity are voluminous and difficult. They are found in the *Lectura*, the *Reportata Parisiensia* and the *Ordinatio*.[3] There are unresolved scholarly discussions about the texts and their historical interrelations. While not aiming to contribute to those discussions, I shall draw on all these sources as well as on the commentaries on Porphyry and on the *Categories*.

Divine Simplicity

Scotus holds to the thesis of divine simplicity, and he lays down what conditions must be satisfied in order for God to be simple:

> To the first question it is to be said that God is entirely simple.
>
> And about this, three things have to be shown: first, that there is no composition in his essence, and so there is no composition of essential parts there (which is what essential composition means); second, that there is there no composition of quantitative parts, and so there is no quantity; and third that there is there no composition of accident with subject.[4]

Any other types of complexity that are not reducible to these three will not compromise divine simplicity.

Scotus understands God as an infinite being, infinitely perfect. Cross sees Scotus's conception of God as centered on the notion of infinity: "infinity is taken by Scotus as the basic qualifying term distinguishing divine attributes from creaturely ones."[5] But whereas Aquinas's account takes divine simplicity as fundamental, Scotus derives divine simplicity from divine infinitude.[6] His conception of divine simplicity is weaker than the all-encompassing notion defined by Boethius's formula "God is all that he has." Cross summarizes the differences between Scotus and Aquinas concerning divine simplicity:

> Aquinas and Scotus both agree that God is simple in the sense of (i) lacking spatial parts, (ii) lacking temporal parts, (iii) lacking composition from matter and form, and (iv) lacking accidental modifications. But there are two ways in which Scotus disagrees with Aquinas. According to Aquinas, God is (v) identical with his attributes, and (vi) such that his attributes are all identical with each other. Scotus does not believe God to be simple in either of these ways.[7]

Among Scotus's reasons for departing from Aquinas's view is his belief that each one of the words we use to describe God's perfect attributes (words like "good" and "wise") is applied to God and to creatures in a univocal sense. He writes:

> Take, for example, the formal notion of "wisdom", or "intellect", or "will". Such a notion is considered first of all simply in itself and

> absolutely. Because this notion includes formally no imperfection or limitation, the imperfections associated with it in creatures are removed. Retaining this same notion of "wisdom" and "will", we attribute these to God—but in a most perfect degree. Consequently, every inquiry regarding God is based upon the supposition that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it obtains from creatures.[8]

This implies that Scotus's concept of divine simplicity is weaker than that of other writers in the Augustinian tradition, notably Aquinas. Cross notes that "univocity, as understood by Scotus, entails a weak account of divine simplicity, according to which the divine attributes are distinct from each other. . . . Simplicity, for Scotus, entails no more than that a simple being cannot have *really* distinct parts."[9] I will comment on his analysis of the divine perfections later in the chapter.

Abstract and Concrete

In his questions on Porphyry, Scotus distinguishes two sorts of abstract, and two corresponding sorts of concrete, names; and on the basis of these distinctions shows in what sense it is true, and in what sense it is not true, to say that all concrete names are denominatives:

> To the first [argument]: the statement "Every concrete is a denominative" is ambiguous because, just as there are two sorts of abstracts (one that abstracts from a subject, another that abstracts from a form in so far as it is in a suppositum), similarly by opposition there are two sorts of concretes (one that concerns a subject, the other that concerns a suppositum). The proposition in question is true about the first, false about the second.
>
> The same applies to the second [argument]: that a concrete in the first way signifies a form in so far as it is in a subject (and it is like this with accidents, as with the white in regard to whiteness); in the second way, in so far as it is in supposits (and it is like this in substances, as with man in regard to humanity).[10]

"Humanity" is an abstract name of the second sort, and so the corresponding concrete name "man" is not a denominative. This is in agreement with the

Categories definition of paronymy, since while it is true that "man" differs from "humanity" in its grammatical ending, it is not Aristotle's view in the *Categories* than man is *from* humanity. Thus, Scotus takes the position of Albert, rather than that of Bonaventure, on this question.

One application of this position to Trinitarian matters would be that God is not denominated from divinity, since God is a substance. "Divinity," like "humanity," is an abstract name of the second sort.

The eighth of Scotus's questions on the *Categories* asks whether a denominative signifies the same as an abstract. Scotus replies:

> Now, any essence can be understood under its proper *ratio*, since what something is is the first object of the understanding. Therefore the essence can be understood, and so can be signified, under its proper *ratio*. And the abstract way of signifying corresponds to such a way of understanding. In another way it is possible to understand the essence in so far as it informs a subject, and the concrete way of signifying corresponds to this way of understanding. Therefore, just as the same essence is understood under either way of understanding, so the same is signified by a concrete and an abstract name, but in different ways of signifying.[11]

So, while there are two ways of signifying the essence, there is only one essence to be signified. This, however, does not mean that the concrete and abstract names are predicated of the same subjects. In fact, if we consider the *first* sort of abstract and concrete names we see that the white thing is not whiteness.[12] As Giorgio Pini notes, "It is true that they cannot be predicated of one another, but that only means that they signify the same essence conceived in two different ways, in an abstract or in a concrete way."[13]

But can the same be said about the *second* sort of abstract and concrete names? If so, then Scotus is committed to denying propositions such as "God is deity" while affirming that there is one single essence in question. The question is whether the distinction between that abstract and its corresponding concrete is compatible with divine simplicity. Since, as Pini observes, there is only one essence in this case, we can safely conclude that there is no essential or accidental composition, and so divine simplicity is not compromised.

The Persons Compared to the Properties and the Essence

In the *Ordinatio*, Scotus describes the distinction between concrete and abstract as

> a difference of *ratio*, i.e. of different ways of conceiving the same formal object, such as the distinction between the knower and knowledge.[14]

They have the same formal object in the sense that the form inhering in the knower is the form of knowledge. Presumably each Person and its property differ in this way.

Famously, Scotus makes use of a formal distinction among things that are really identical but distinct in definition. The precise meaning of this device has been contested from Scotus's own time to the present day.[15] The factors militating against a settled view of its meaning include the immense subtlety of Scotus's thinking, his fluctuating terminology, the continuing lack of critical editions of some of his writings, and the lack of scholarly agreement about the extent to which his views changed over time. Provisionally, I am inclined to accept Henninger's analysis:

> *x* and *y* are formally non-identical or distinct if and only if (a) *x* and *y* are or are in what is really one thing (*res*); and (b) if *x* and *y* are capable of definition, the definition of *x* does not include *y* and the definition of *y* does not include *x*, or if *x* and *y* are not capable of definition, then if they were capable of definition, the definition of *x* would not include *y* and the definition of *y* would not include *x*.[16]

The formal distinction plays a key role in Scotus's account of the Trinity because he posits a distinction of this type between each of the Persons and the divine essence.[17]

Is Scotus's account of the way in which the Persons are compared to the properties, and of the way in which they are compared to the essence, consistent with divine simplicity? Yes: The Persons are not compared to their properties in any way that involves essential composition. Between the Persons and their properties there is the type of distinction that holds between the concrete and the abstract.

Similar considerations apply to the comparison of the Persons with the essence. Scotus endorses Augustine's formula (*De Trinitate* 7.6.11) that the essence is "that by which the Father is, and that by which the Son is," adding that "it is not that by which the Father is the Father and the Son is the Son."[18] His statement here seems consonant with Henninger's analysis of the formal distinction: Person and Essence are really one thing, but the definition of one does not include that of the other. This analysis also implies that there is no

conflict here with divine simplicity as Scotus understands it, because in the comparison of a Person with the essence there is only one essence, whereas essential composition requires two essences.

As an objection to the possibility of three Persons sharing a single essence, Scotus considers the expository syllogism concluding that the Persons must be simply the same as each other, since they are simply the same as the Essence—where their simple identity with the essence seems to be required by the Lombard's dictum that the divine essence "is whatever it has."[19] He follows Abelard's treatment of the expository syllogism "The divine essence is the Father, the divine essence is the Son, so the Father is the Son": if all propositions are read as *idem quod*, then they are all true.[20]

Scotus subsumes this problem under the general question of the relationship between a nature and its *supposita*. Following the doctrine of the *Categories*, he distinguishes this relationship from the relationship between a universal and its singulars: the latter relationship holds between a universal accident and the singular accidents that fall under it, but these are not its *supposita*. He also distinguishes between the nature/*suppositum* and the *quo*/*quod* relationships: each *quo* has its own *quod*, which may not be a *suppositum*.[21]

The nature/*suppositum* relationship he sees as holding between something that is shareable and something that is unshareable. The nature is shareable in the way that a *quo* or a form is shareable among the things having the form, but also in the way that a universal is shareable among singulars. The singulars *are* the universal, in the sense that the name of the universal can be truly predicated of the singulars ("This man is a man," "This whiteness is a color").[22] But shareability does not entail divisibility, because

> Any nature is shareable by many through identity, therefore the divine nature also is shareable . . . but it is not divisible . . . therefore it is shareable without division.[23]

Scotus's position here is formally very similar to that of Gilbert concerning Rule 5.1. However, unlike Gilbert, he goes on to ask why it is that this position is not self-contradictory:

> But further, there remains another difficulty. For it doesn't seem intelligible that the essence isn't pluralised and the *supposita* are many, unless some distinction is posited between the *ratio* of the Essence and

> the *ratio* of a *suppositum*. And so, in order to salvage this compossibility, we should look at this distinction.[24]

His explains the apparent anomaly in terms that again seem to be consonant with Henninger's analysis of the formal distinction:

> And I say, without assertion and without prejudice of a better judgment, that the *ratio* by which the *suppositum* is formally unshareable (let it be *A*) and the *ratio* of the essence as essence (let it be *B*) have some distinction preceding every act of a created or uncreated understanding.
>
> I prove this as follows. The first *suppositum* formally or really has a shareable being, otherwise it couldn't share it. It also really has an unshareable being, otherwise it couldn't be positively in being through a real *suppositum*. And I understand "really" to mean "in no way through an act of a considering understanding," on the contrary that such a being would be there if there were no reflecting understanding. And for "being there if there is no reflecting understanding" I say "being before every act of the understanding."[25]

The Divine Attributes Compared to the Essence

Richard Cross summarizes Scotus's views about the divine attributes: "Scotus believes that God's attributes are real (constituents of God), that they are in some way distinct from each other, and that each one is in some way distinct from God too."[26] In the *Lectura*, Scotus states that the divine attributes exist in reality prior to any operation of the understanding:

> I reply therefore to the question and I say: the essential perfections in the divine are in reality anterior to the operation of the understanding. For if they were caused by the operation of the understanding, none would without qualification be a perfection nor formally an infinite perfection, just as no relation of reason is without qualification a perfection nor formally an infinite perfection; and so an idea is not without qualification said to be a perfection.[27]

He adds that even though God and creatures share nothing in reality there can be a concept common to both. This concept would then be an imperfect

understanding of God, since a perfect conception of God would be peculiar to him:

> It is clear therefore from what has been said that God and creatures are absolutely diverse, agreeing in nothing, because no act belongs in the same sense to the finite and the infinite, nor is an infinite being capable of any of the perfections of which a finite being is capable, and by reason of which it is determined and contracted; and yet they agree in one concept, in such a way that there can be one concept, formed by an imperfect understanding, that is common to God and creatures and this concept can be caused by an imperfect thing. But a perfect concept of God is not common to God and creatures, which concept is had of God seen in himself. Hence that concept, common to God and creatures, which a creature makes in our understanding, is a curtailed concept of God, which if God were perfectly to make his own concept, would be proper to him, as said previously.[28]

Given that the divine perfections exist in reality, and that there is a concept common to God and creatures, Scotus asks how it is that this concept can fail to express a genus to which both God and creatures belong (thus implying an essential composition):

> It seems that [God is in a genus], because God is formally a being. Being, however, signifies a concept predicated of God quiditatively (*in quid*). This concept of being is not proper to God, but common to God and creature, as was said in distinction 3. Therefore, in order for the common concept to become proper [to God] it must be determined by some determining concept. That determining concept is related to the concept of being just as a qualitative concept (*quale*) to a quidditative concept (*quid*), and consequently as the concept of a *differentia* to a genus.[29]
>
> But here there is a doubt how a concept common to God and creatures can be taken as real, unless [it is taken] from some reality of the same genus—and then it seems that it is in potentiality to that reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, as was previously argued in [the section] "About the concept of genus and difference" [§39]. And then the argument put earlier in favor of the first opinion stands, that if there were some distinguishing reality in the thing, and

> another distinct [thing], it seems that the thing is composite, because it possesses something in which it agrees and [something] in which it differs.[30]

His reply hinges on the difference between the genus-species relation and the relation between a reality conceived as determinable and the same reality conceived under a determinate mode:

> I reply that when some reality is understood with its intrinsic mode, that concept is not simply simple to the extent that that reality could be conceived without that mode (then it would be an imperfect concept of the thing); it can also be conceived under that mode (and then it is a perfect concept of the thing). For example, if there were a whiteness of the tenth degree of intensity, however much it were in every way simple in reality, it could still be conceived under the *ratio* of such a quantity of whiteness (and then it would be conceived perfectly by a concept adequate to the thing itself), or it could be conceived just under the *ratio* of whiteness (and then it would be conceived by an imperfect concept falling short of the thing's perfection). Now, the imperfect concept could be common to this whiteness and others, but the perfect concept would be proper.[31]

The latter is what is known as his modal distinction:

> So a distinction is needed between that from which the common concept is taken, and that from which the proper concept is taken, not such that it is a distinction of reality from reality but as a distinction of reality and a mode that is proper and intrinsic to the one thing, which distinction suffices to give a perfect and imperfect concept of the same thing, where the imperfect concept is common and the perfect proper. But the concept of genus and difference require a distinction of realities, not only of the one reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.[32]

Scotus rejects the idea that the common notion is common in the way that a genus is common to its species, saying that the divine and creaturely cases "share in no reality."[33] Rather, he says that there is "one reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived."[34]

The next question Scotus poses—and this is a crucial question for a philosopher pursuing the Augustinian project—is whether divine simplicity is consistent with a distinction between essential perfections that precedes intellectual activity.[35] In his reply he rejects Aquinas's view that there is a merely conceptual distinction among the divine perfections:

> My reply to the question is that between the essential perfections there is not only a difference of *ratio* (i.e. of different ways of conceiving the same formal object—as there is between the wise and wisdom, or certainly between wisdom and truth).[36]

On the contrary, he argues that the distinction among the divine perfections is prior to intellectual activity:

> So there is here a distinction preceding the understanding in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is real by the thing's nature, and goodness is real by the thing's nature, but real wisdom is not real goodness. This may be proved, because if infinite wisdom were formally the same as infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common. For infinitude does not destroy the formal *ratio* of that to which it is added, because in whatever degree some perfection is understood to be (which degree is a degree of that perfection), the *ratio* of that perfection is not removed on account of that degree, and so if there is no formal inclusion in the common sense, there is none in the infinite sense.[37]

He continues:

> I show this, because to formally include is to include something in its essential *ratio* in such a way that if the definition of what includes were assigned then the definition or part of the definition would be included. But in this way the definition of goodness does not have wisdom within it, nor the infinite the finite. So there is some formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness in so far as they would have distinct definitions if they were definable. But a definition does not only indicate a formal *ratio* caused by the understanding, but the thing's quiddity. So the formal non-identity is on the side of the thing, and I understand in this

> way that the understanding composing [the proposition] "Wisdom is not formally goodness" does not cause the truth of this composition by its combinatory act, but finds in the object the extremes from whose composition the actual truth is produced.[38]

Finally, Scotus suggests that all this is no more than we find in the old doctors:

> And this argument "about the non-formal identity" was stated by the old doctors who posited that in the divine there is a true predication by identity that yet is not formal—which I grant, that goodness is really identical with truth, yet truth is not formally goodness.[39]

Scotus draws his conclusion, referring back to his account of the formal distinction between properties and essence:

> But this formal non-identity is consistent with the simplicity of God, because this difference necessarily exists between the essence and a property, as was shown above in Distinction 2 in the last question, and yet composition is not posited in the Person on this account. Similarly, this formal distinction is not posited between the two properties in the Father (between unbegottenness and fatherhood) which according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* V chapter 6 are not the same property because that by which he is Father is not that by which he is unbegotten. So if there can be two properties in one Person without composition, much more—or at least equally—there can be many essential perfections in God not formally the same without composition, because those properties in the Father are not formally infinite whereas the essential perfections are formally infinite and so each is the same as any.[40]

On Scotus's account of divine simplicity, the reality of the divine attributes does not conflict with divine simplicity because there is no essential composition of them with the divine essence. At the same time, Scotus believes that, because of the infinitude that characterizes the divine attributes, each one of them is the same as any of them. Given the formal distinction between Person and essence, a plurality of Persons cannot compromise divine simplicity.

The Properties Compared to the Essence

In the *Reportata Parisiensia*, Scotus argues that Aquinas's version of the double-aspect theory of relations is self-contradictory:

> The opinion of Doctor Thomas in the *Summa* Part I d.33 q.2 art. 2 is that a relation really existing in God is the same as the essence in reality but differs from it according to the understanding's *ratio*, which difference he specifies in replying to the question saying that it differs from the essence in so far as it imports a relationship to its opposite, which relationship is not imported by the essence. And according to this he says here that in God the being of the relation is none other than the being of the essence, but they are one and the same.
>
> As against this, firstly his words seem to contradict themselves. For when he says firstly that a relation differs from the essence according to the understanding's *ratio*, but says secondly that a relation (unlike the essence) bespeaks a respect towards an opposite, one of these implies the opposite of the other. Proof: a relation, by the nature of a relation, is a respect to an opposite, in the nature of the thing and not only by an act of the understanding. The essence however is to itself. So in the nature of the thing, if there is there a relation, there is a distinction between it and the essence, apart from the understanding's *ratio*. The major is proved, because unless relation in the nature of the thing were a respect to an opposite, and not only according to the understanding's *ratio*, the Person would not be Personal in the nature of thing. For it is constituted by a relation in Personal being. Hence etc. But in the nature of the thing, a relation is nothing but a respect to an opposite.[41]

For Scotus, a relation's relativity cannot be simply a matter of "the understanding's *ratio*." Nor is he bound by Aquinas's notion of divine simplicity. He is free to admit complexities within God so long as they do not involve essential or accidental composition. His own view is that essence and property do not differ solely by an act of the created or uncreated understanding,

> because the Father, in the nature of the thing, before any act of the understanding, in the first sign of origin, has a shareable thing, the Essence, because otherwise it would not share; it also has in the nature of the thing in the first sign of origin before an act of the understanding an

> unshareable thing, because otherwise it would not be a Person in the nature of the thing, and that which is unshareable in the nature of the thing, but this includes a contradiction.[42]

But his critique of Aquinas does not commit him to rejecting all versions of the double-aspect theory of relations. Taking up Henry of Ghent's phrase, he says that a property constituting a Person "springs forth" from the essence; but he immediately adds, it

> springs forth not as the form of the essence but as something naturally God formally by that deity, though not as something informing it but as something existent, the same as it by perfect identity.[43]

Indeed, he holds that the relational properties constituting the Persons are formally distinct from the essence because

> the formal *ratio* of the divine essence is not the formal *ratio* of the relation, or *vice versa*.[44]

Because of their formal distinction from the essence, there can be no essential composition binding them to it.

Scotus did not need to follow the traditional idea that the Persons are constituted by relations. His machinery of distinctions would have allowed him to hold, without denying divine simplicity, that they are constituted by nonrelational properties—just as he was able to hold that the divine perfections are formally nonidentical without having to abandon divine simplicity. The reason why he did not opt for a nonrelational account of the Persons is that he was unable to find nonrelational properties that could plausibly be said to constitute them. (For example, the negative property of being unbegotten could not constitute the Father.) Scotus did in fact seriously consider rejecting the relational account of the Persons in favor of a theory that distinguished the Persons by nonrelational properties—although he eventually settled for the relational theory. In the formal analysis that I am about to propose, I suggest two approaches—a relational account and a nonrelational one.

Formal Analysis

Marilyn McCord Adams notes that we sometimes find in Scotus's writings the assertion that "within what is really one and the same thing (*res*), a plurality

of entities or property-bearers whose non-identity or distinction in no way depends on the activity of any intellect, created or divine."[45] These entities, which underlie the formal distinction, are known as formalities. Scholars disagree about the extent, if any, to which Scotus believed in such entities. I do not pretend to be able to settle this dispute. But I do take note of Richard Cross's reference to Scotus's *Quodlibet* 3, where four senses of "thing" are distinguished: what is noncontradictory, what is extramental, what is nonrelational, and what is substantial. Scotus takes the Personal properties to be relations, and thus to be things in the first two senses.[46] I shall take these four senses of "thing" as a framework within which to construct two alternative formal analyses of Scotus's ontology and semantics, first on the assumption that formalities are things in a strong sense, second on the contrary assumption. I shall take it that the first assumption hypostasizes formalities, so that they become ontological subjects. The second assumption does not do this, while still conceiving of formalities as mind-independent. Perhaps they are thought of as *holding* rather than *existing*—for example, having the status of *being wise* rather than *wisdom*.[47] Later in this chapter I will propose two alternative semantic approaches to the question of formalities in Scotus.

Scotus's view about the divine perfections, as Ross and Bates put it, is that "among things distinct in conception, there are some that, though inseparably realized in God's case, are separately definable and separately realized among finite things, like the attributes of rationality, goodness and wisdom."[48] What this suggests is that, for each of the divine perfections, there is a disjunctive attribute, one of whose disjuncts is realized only in finite beings, and the other only in the divine realm—where the former is an imperfect form of the latter. For example, the abstract of "good" (in a broad sense covering both divine and created instances) might include two elements, one peculiar to created things, the other peculiar to the divine. Similarly, the abstract of "wise" (in a broad sense covering both divine and created instances) might include two such elements. As a consequence, wisdom in its common sense is distinct from goodness in its common sense, even though divine wisdom is the same as divine goodness. In Figure 10.1, a stands for those who are wise (in the common sense covering both the divinely wise and the nondivinely wise), and b stands for those who are good in the common sense (both the divinely and the nondivinely good). The matrix shows that only one being, x, is both divinely wise and divinely good, but while some nondivine being (s) is both wise and good in the common sense, the nondivine beings who are wise in the common sense (s,t) intersect

		*	∧
d	x	x	x
a'	x	–	v
b'	x	–	w
a	x, s, t	–	v, y
b	x, s, u	–	w, z

FIGURE 10.1. Semantics of the divine perfections (Scotus)

with the nondivine beings who are good in the common sense (s,u). Divine wisdom (v) is distinct from divine goodness (w), and both are distinct from God (x). Wisdom in its common sense covers two abstract beings (v,y), one of which is the same as divine wisdom; and similarly for goodness in its common sense.

The differences from Aquinas's semantics of the perfections in their divine and nondivine senses are, first, that Aquinas thinks divine wisdom is really the same as the divinely wise and Scotus does not; second, that Aquinas thinks divine wisdom is really the same as divine goodness and Scotus does not; and third, that Scotus accepts a common disjunctive sense for each of the perfections and Aquinas does not. For Scotus, even though goodness in common is indeed common to divine and earthly goodness, in the way that a disjunction is common to its disjuncts, the relation between common goodness and divine goodness is not that of genus to species, because if it were so then "goodness in common" would be an essential term, and the star-columns against b' and b would not be empty.

Scotus might not be happy with this formal representation, because of its ultimately extensional nature. It distinguishes perfect goodness from perfect wisdom only if something is imperfectly wise but not imperfectly good, or vice versa. But Scotus holds that even before anything exists possessing these imperfections, there was a distinction between perfect wisdom and perfect goodness. Perhaps his concerns could be met by assuming that our semantics reflects a view that covers all times and all possibilities.

As concerns the Persons and properties, we can consider a variety of positions that may be argued to be Scotus's. There is a "strong" theory in which formalities

are property-bearers, and a "weak" theory in which formalities are not property-bearers. There is a theory in which there are relatives, and a theory in which there are no relatives. All four types of theory can be given formal expression.

The "strong" theory about the Trinity can be seen as requiring the existence of entities that on one hand are things in a strong sense and on the other hand are not essences. Such a theory can perhaps be expressed using our methods of formal analysis, adapted in the following way. We will treat a term t as representing a formality provided that something is t, something is essentially t, and nothing is t-ness. Thus, Scotus's formalities, considered in a strong sense, can be considered as abstract beings that are essentially whatever they are, but that do not in turn have higher-order abstracts. The existence of such beings would on Aquinas's view conflict with divine simplicity, but according to Scotus's account it need not do so. Figure 10.2 gives an example of the application of this type of analysis to the terms d ("God"), a' ("divinely wise"), b' ("divinely good"), $\hat{a}'$ ("divine wisdom"), and $\hat{b}'$ ("divine goodness"). Divine wisdom and divine goodness are the extramental things v and w. They are not nothing, but they are not essences either.

In Figure 10.2, x is the being that is God, is the divinely wise, and is the divinely good. x is also the being that is divinity. v is the being that is divine wisdom, w the being that is divine goodness. Divine wisdom and divine goodness are what they are essentially, but there is no such being as divine wisdomness or divine goodness-ness.

A representation of the "weak" theory can be obtained by altering the status of the properties and attributes so that they are no longer substantial things. On this assumption, the properties and attributes will be things, but they will not be essentially what they are, and they will have no abstracts, as shown in

		*	^
d	x	x	x
a'	x	–	v
b'	x	–	w
$\hat{a}'$	v	v	–
$\hat{b}'$	w	w	–

FIGURE 10.2. Semantics of the divine perfections with formalities (Scotus)

		$*$	$\wedge$
d	x	x	x
a'	x	–	v
b'	x	–	w
$\hat{a}'$	v	–	–
$\hat{b}'$	w	–	–

FIGURE 10.3. Semantics of the divine perfections without formalities (Scotus)

Figure 10.3. Either way, we can represent the ontology of the Trinity according to Scotus by the diagram shown in Figure 10.4.

A representation of the theory minus relations can be obtained simply by removing the relatives and the *ad* links from Figure 10.4.

In order for the structure to be realized, some of the principles governing the *Categories* ontology must be dropped. Because Figure 10.4 has a substance standing in the relationship *ab* to something, we must drop Definition 1.3 ("a substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything"). This can be replaced




FIGURE 10.4. Ontology of the Trinity (Scotus)

by Definition 2.1 ("a substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything other than itself"). Rule 1.1 ("an accident, i.e., whatever is in something, is not from anything") is satisfied because only the perfections and the properties are in anything, and none of them is from anything. Rule 1.2 ("only substances have anything in them") is satisfied because what the perfections and properties are in is God, and God is a substance. Rule 1.3 ("what anything is from is an accident, i.e. is in something") is satisfied because only the perfections and properties have anything from them, and they are all in God. Rule 1.8 ("a relative has a correlative") is satisfied because only the Persons are relatives and they have correlatives. Rule 1.10 ("a relative must be from something") is satisfied because only the Persons are relatives and they are from the properties. The remaining rules are satisfied because their antecedents are never true. Thus, for all its apparent complexity, Scotus's Trinitarian ontology drops only one element from the *Categories* ontology.

11

Ockham

> By way of palliating his saying, he expounded his own words as follows: that the plurality of *ratio* between the attributes is not the divine essence and is not in the divine essence. This exposition is vain and twisted and contrary to the common understanding of words, because even though the plurality is not the divine essence nor in the divine essence formally, still it is so fundamentally, and this suffices for a diversity of *rationes*.[1]

Such was the mild rebuke handed down by the Papal Commission at Avignon in 1324 regarding William Ockham's criticisms of the Thomist view that the divine relations were "in" God.

Introduction

It is a characteristic of William Ockham's philosophy, deriving from his meticulous approach to the philosophy of language, that he "scrupulously observed the difference between the mind and its activity on the one hand and the objective reality outside the mind, or what the mind knows, on the other."[2] His strict observance of this difference led him to believe that much of what his illustrious predecessors viewed as belonging to reality actually belonged to language and the mind, and thus it became necessary for him to depart from their doctrines on certain points of philosophical theology.

Ockham lectured on the *Sentences* commencing in 1317, and by 1321 he had reworked his lectures as an *Ordinatio*. His major work on logic, the *Summa Logicae*, was completed later, some time after 1323. Following opposition within England to his views about relations, Ockham was summoned to the Papal court at Avignon to answer charges of heresy that had been brought against him. The commission's judgment on his writings did not amount to a condemnation; that was to come only later, and in relation to certain of his political

views, for which he was excommunicated. Fleeing from Avignon, he spent his last years under the protection of the Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria.

Abstract and Concrete

Early on in his *Summa Logicae*, Ockham distinguishes two broad groups of concrete names. Some, like "just," are not predicable of the corresponding abstract name. Justice is not just, because it is a quality, not (for example) a man. Others, like "God," are so predicable. In fact, "God" and "deity" are synonyms, as are "man" and "humanity," at least if we follow Aristotle's meaning:

> In a broad sense, those are said to be synonyms which without qualification have the same signification in every way, so that nothing in any way is signified by one without being signified in the same way by the other, even if not all users believe them to have the same signification but, being deceived, judge something to be signified by one without being signified by the other—as if some people judged that the name "God" imported a whole and "deity" a part of it.[3]

This second group includes names like "father" and "paternity"—at least according to anyone who holds that relations are not anything distinct from nonrelational things.[4]

Propositions such as "The Father is Father by Paternity" are true in some sense, and false in some senses:

> But of the things that are customarily said about relations, it is certain that many are improper, and some are false and fanciful, as is abundantly clear if we peruse the volumes about this subject edited by the moderns—though some of them can be given a true meaning, e.g. that the Father is Father by Paternity, and the Son is Son by Filiation, and the similar is similar by similarity. In these locutions there is no need to contrive any thing *by* which the Father is Father and the Son is Son and the similar is similar. Nor is there any need to multiply things in locutions such as "A column is to the right by to-the-rightness," "God creates by creation," "is good by goodness," "is just by justice," "is powerful by power," "An accident inheres by inherence," "A subject

> is subjected by subjection," "The fit is fit by fitness," "A chimera is nothing by nothingness," "The blind are blind by blindness," "A body is mobile by mobility," and so on for innumerable others.[5]

(Evidently the "moderns" stretch back as far as Gilbert.) The main point, and the one that is most characteristic of Ockham, is that there is no need to postulate things in order to give a satisfactory analysis of locutions like "The Father is Father by Paternity." He proposes two different analyses that he considers satisfactory. Here is the first:

> Explicitly, therefore, and without any ambiguity in what we say, any of these propositions is to be analyzed into two, using a description in the place of a name, as follows. "The Father is the Father by Paternity," i.e. the Father is the Father because he generates the Son.[6]

What this comes down to when we apply Ockham's analysis of causal propositions is that the following syllogism has true premises, and that the truth of the premises is the cause of the truth of the conclusion or is at least prior to it:[7]

$$\frac{\text{The Father generates the Son} \quad \text{Whoever generates the Son is the Father}}{\text{The Father is the Father}}$$

This analysis may be acceptable, so far as it goes, by anyone who takes generation to be prior to paternity. However, it merely postpones the problem of how to deal with divine relations, because generation is itself a relation. Perhaps for this reason Ockham offers a second analysis:

> But if this way of putting things displeases, locutions of this sort can be salvaged in another way without multiplying things, by postulating that abstract and concrete—say father and paternity, son and filiation, the similar and similarity—have the same signification. And the sense will be: "The Father is Father by Paternity," i.e. by himself; just like "God is the creator by creation," i.e. by himself because active creation is not said of a thing added to God; and "God is good by goodness," i.e. by himself since his goodness is not other than him.[8]

If to say that the Father is the Father by Paternity is equivalent to saying that the Father is the Father by himself, then the Father stands to himself in the relationship *ab*.

Relatives and Relations

Ockham rejects the Aristotelian doctrine that relatives form a category. He thought of relative terms as connotative. Gyula Klima explains, "A connotative term is one that signifies any of its (ultimate) *significata* in respect of something, whereas an absolute term, *ex opposito*, is one that signifies any of its *significata* absolutely, that is, not in respect of anything."[9] Ockham holds that a relative term, because it is connotative, has primary and secondary signification: primarily it signifies the relative's foundation, secondarily the relative's object (its secondary signification). Thus, to talk of a father is to talk about the person who is a father, and about his child.

Claude Panaccio sees Ockham's analysis of relatives as "a highly effective device in the service of ontological economy":

> Because a relational term like "father," for example, is described as primarily signifying fathers and secondarily signifying their children, no extra entity is needed in its explication besides the *relata*.[10]

The impact that Ockham's account of relatives would have if incorporated into the theory of the Trinity is drastic. It would imply that "Father" and "Son" in their divine senses signify God both primarily and secondarily (since God is both the foundation and the relative object of both Father and Son). So "Father" and "Son" are indistinguishable in their signification. Ockham knew all this and, as we shall see, he found a way of avoiding these unacceptable positions.

The case of the Holy Spirit is a little different for those who accept the *filioque* clause. The primary signification of "Holy Spirit" (understood as a relative term, equivalent to "That which proceeds") is similar to the primary signification of the other Personal names. However, its secondary signification (given that the co-relative of the Holy Spirit must according to *filioque* mean the same as "That from which something proceeds") is the pair <Father, Son>, that is, is itself an ordered pair whose first and second members are God. So, even though the names of the three Persons are alike in that they all ultimately signify nothing other than God, the signification of the Holy Spirit's name

exhibits a semantic structure that is not exhibited by the names of the first two Persons.

The semantic analysis of the Personal names that is implicit in Ockham's general approach to the categories is shown in Figure 11.1.

		*	^
d	x	x	x
p	x	–	$\langle x, x \rangle$
f	x	–	$\langle x, x \rangle$
s	x	–	$\langle x, \langle x, x \rangle \rangle$

FIGURE 11.1. Nominalist semantics of the Persons (Ockham)

On the side of reality, there is no difference between the Father and the Son. Thus, the incorporation of Ockham's theory of relations into Trinitarian semantics would lead to a form of Sabellianism, at least for the case of the Father and the Son. Of course, it can be said in favor of this incorporation that it would also enable an account of the difference between the first two Persons and the third. But it should not be thought that Ockham is committed to any form of Sabellianism. We will see why in a little while.

The *Summa Logicae* gives two different treatments of relations depending on whether or not they are assumed to be things. Chapters 49–53 of Part I expound what Ockham takes to be Aristotle's account, and Chapter 54 states what is to be said about relations on the assumption that they are things distinct from absolute things—the latter being the familiar realist account.

On the "Aristotelian" account (which is really Ockham's own nominalist theory), the semantic value of an abstract connotative name is the same as the semantic value of the corresponding concrete name. Thus, as Klima says, "the term 'fatherhood' supposits for the same Persons that the term 'father' does."[11] The reason for this is that to say that something is a relation, according to Ockham, is not to make an essential predication. As Klima states

> according to Ockham's theory, all terms connoting something other than what they supposit for in a proposition are nonessential predicates of their *supposita*. For such a term supposits for one of its ultimate *significata* only if the thing in question is actually related to another thing

> (or some other things) connoted by the term in the manner required by this connotation. Because this *significatum* and this *connotatum* (or these *connotata*) are supposed to be distinct entities, it is at least logically possible for them to exist or not exist independently of one another. . . . This is precisely what it means for the term to be an accidental predicate of this *suppositum*.[12]

Thus, there are true predications of the form "*x* is a paternity," but none of them is an essential predication.

Properties and Essence

Ockham reprises Scotus's objection against Aquinas's version of the double-aspect account of the divine relations. Like Scotus, he finds Aquinas's view to be self-contradictory:

> I argue against this sort of posit: for this way of speaking seems most improper and, taken literally, to include a contradiction, because that some one thing compared to one thing is only a *ratio* and compared to another is a thing, is as if I were to say that a man compared to a cow is an ass and compared to a stone is a quality and compared to fire is a devil. . . . Therefore a relation whether it is compared by the Understanding to the essence or to the opposed relation, remains a genuine thing just as if were not compared—since it is not destroyed by such a comparison. Therefore a relation even compared to the essence will be a genuine thing and the same as if it is compared to the opposed relation.[13]

At the same time he lends qualified support to Scotus's account of relation and essence in terms of a formal distinction:

> So I reply with this opinion, which seems to me most likely, that there is some sort of non-identity between the divine nature and the *suppositum*. And it can be said, correctly understood, that they are distinguished formally even though not really. I support this as follows: whenever things are the same in all ways in the nature of things, whatever belongs to one belongs to the other, unless some grammatical or

> logical mode prevents it. But, supposing that "Father" has all grammatical and logical modes similar to the ones had by the name "essence," and further [that] "The essence is the Son" is true, then similarly "The Father is not the Son" is true. Therefore if the same [term] is to be denied of the Father and affirmed of the essence, this cannot come about on account of some diversity of grammatical or logical modes; so it will be just by reason of some sort of non-identity between that which is signified by "Father" and that which is signified by "essence"; therefore between the Father and the essence there is in the nature of things some sort of non-identity.[14]

The reason he gives in support of a broadly Scotist approach is, however, not an ontological but a logical one. It has to do with the seemingly valid argument:

$$\frac{\text{The Essence is the Father} \quad \text{The Essence is the Son}}{\text{The Father is the Son}}$$

He is willing to accept Scotus's expression "formal distinction," but not in a sense that carries an ontological commitment to the existence of such things as formalities:

> I say that it is not to be granted that there are several formalities in God or several real *rationes* or several things. And so in general concerning essence and relation, it ought no more to be granted that there is any sort of plurality, each of which is really in God, whatever they are called, than [that there is] a plurality of things; and so there are not there several real modes or several formalities.[15]

He favors a minimal sense of the expression "distinction":

> I say that if "to be distinguished" imported only a negation, then it would be obvious that the inference "Essence and relation are not the same, therefore they are distinguished formally" would be good. However, if it doesn't import only a negation but also an affirmation, it can be granted that essence and relation are distinguished formally; but it doesn't follow "They are distinguished formally, therefore they are

> distinguished," because in negatives—whether they are only negative or whether they import an affirmation and negation together—there need not be a formal consequence from a determinable taken with a determination to the determinable taken absolutely.[16]

Ockham adopts a logical rather than an ontological interpretation of the formal distinction:

> Hence I say that in general "to be distinguished formally" is never true of any things except on account of a real distinction, namely when it's truly said of one of them that it is some thing, and of the other it's truly said that it is not that thing, as relation and essence are distinguished formally because the essence is the Father and the Son is not the Father. Rather, to be distinguished formally (as I hold the formal distinction—and this is its nominal definition) is none other than that one of them is some absolute or relative thing and the other is not that thing, as the essence is the Son and the Father is not the Son, and so the essence and the Father are distinguished formally, as a consequence of which they are one thing, because the essence is the Father.[17]

In this reinterpretation of Scotus, Ockham requires that every formal distinction be based on a real distinction, whereas for Scotus a formal distinction may not be so based.

By forswearing an ontological underpinning for the formal distinction between essence and property, Ockham creates a problem for himself. What is it that grounds the real distinction of the Persons? His solution is to reverse the presumptive order of priority by taking the real distinction of the Persons as the ground for the assertion that there is a formal distinction between property and essence:

> I grant that you cannot *a priori* get a real distinction from a formal distinction by itself, and so *a priori* a real distinction between relation and essence does not come from a formal distinction between relation and essence. But the other way round, you can infer a formal distinction between relation and essence from a real distinction between the Persons, and the identity of the essence with the Persons and relations. And so there is a real distinction of the Persons not because essence and the

relation of the Persons are formally distinguished, but because two real relations are distinguished.[18]

Gelber gives an astute summary of Ockham's critique of Scotus:

> Ockham understood Scotus' conception of the formal distinction quite well, for where he did accept its application, between the divine essence and three Persons of the Trinity, Ockham said that it did not involve a distinction between formalities or realities. However, in order to avoid the problem of Sabellianism, the real distinction of the Persons had to precede the formal distinction between the Persons and the divine essence, and the formal distinction could not be the explanation for the real distinction of the Persons.[19]

Contradictions and Logical Principles

Ockham regards the generation of a contradiction as

> the most powerful way of proving a real distinction when it is the case that without any qualification there is a negation, in such a way that through no circumlocution can one of the contradictories be verified of that of which it is denied; but when through such a circumlocution one of the contradictories can be verified of that of which it is denied, only then will there be a way of proving a formal distinction. And so it is in the case in point, because even though "Paternity is not shareable" is true, still "Paternity is that which is shareable" is true. Similarly, even though "The Father is the Son" is not true, still "The Father is that thing which is the Son" is true because the Father is the essence which is the Son. And in general, when this is the case, there is a possible distinction; but this is never the case except in God, and so it is to be posited only in God. Hence I say that there cannot be a formal distinction, nor can a contradiction be verified except where there are really distinct things which yet are really one thing—which is possible only about the divine Persons, because they are three really distinct Persons and yet they are an essence one in number. And so since it is not possible in creatures, no such distinction is to be posited; nor is it ever to be

> posited where faith does not compel; on the contrary it is never to be posited between any things except when one of them is some absolute or relative thing and the other is simply distinguished really from that same thing, as was said before.[20]

This violation of standard logical principles is a singularity that occurs when we reflect on the Trinity:

> This reply is not sufficient, because just as it is a singularity in God that a trinity are a thing one in number, in such a way that the thing one in number is each of those three things, so it is a singularity and beyond all understanding that [the inference] "The essence one in number is the Son, the Father is not the Son, therefore the Father is not the essence" doesn't follow. And so this singularity should not be posited except where the authority of Holy Scripture compels. And so such a consequence never should be denied in creatures, since in creatures no one thing are many things and each of them.[21]

Adams argues that on Ockham's definition of the formal distinction, it is impossible that anything should ever be formally distinguishable from anything, because if *A* and *B* are formally distinct then, by the symmetry and transitivity of real identity *A* is both identical and nonidentical with *B*. (The definition requires that there be some *C* such that *A* is identical with *C* and *B* is not identical with *C*, but *A* is identical with *B*.)[22] And yet, as we have seen, Ockham thinks that in the Trinity there is a formal distinction. She adds that "he takes himself merely to have labeled a mystery and in no way to explain it."[23]

Her reasoning might lead interpreters to think that Ockham is committed to the existence of true contradictions. But this interpretation would not be justified. There is no proposition that Ockham thinks is both true and false. It is just that he thinks that some widely accepted logical principles turn out not to be universally valid on his reckoning.

Relational versus Nonrelational Properties

Both Aquinas and Scotus had held that the properties distinguishing the Persons are relational (although, as we saw in Chapter 10, Scotus gave serious consid-

eration to the alternative view that the properties are nonrelational). Given Ockham's philosophical analysis of the category of relation, it is not surprising that he shows some sympathy with the nonrelational account:

> There could be a fourth opinion, concurring with the prior opinion that the divine Persons are constituted by absolute properties but dissenting from it that nothing is in the end imaginable in God except absolute things.[24]

Adams summarizes Ockham's reasons in favor of this view: "First, because he finds the notion of relative things really distinct from absolute things only marginally intelligible. Second, because [the proposition that the three distinct things that constitute the three divine Persons are really distinct relative things] runs counter to many theorems about relations admitted by those who believe in really distinct relative things."[25] She mentions the ontological principles that a real relation presupposes the existence of its *relata*; that a *suppositum* is somehow prior to its action; and that opposite relations are either alike shareable or alike unshareable.

However, Ockham decides that these ontological principles are not fully general. They admit of exceptions in the Godhead. And he decides in favor of a relational account on theological grounds:

> All the same, on account of the authority of the Saints, I hold neither this opinion nor the prior one, even though it seems to me that it is easier (although not truer) to sustain both this opinion and the previous one (in the respects in which they concur) together conjointly the article [of the faith] "There are three Persons and one God," rather than the opinion about relations.[26]

And so in the *Ordinatio* he adopts a relational account:

> Even if this fourth opinion could seem likely to someone, all the same because the authorities of the Saints seem expressly to posit relations in the divine realm—not only that some relative concepts of the divine Persons are verified, as we say that Socrates is similar and that Socrates is a father or a son, but that there is genuine real paternity and filiation and that there are two simple things of which one is not the other—

> so concurring with them I say that the divine Persons are constituted and distinguished by relations of origin.[27]

This is not just any relational account; it is a realist one. But, given Ockham's criticisms of Aquinas and Scotus, what sort of realist account can he accept? To be consistent, he has to avoid Thomist-style distinctions of reason as well as Scotist talk of formalities; but Ockham is vague about what sort of realist account he feels obliged to adopt. He can invoke his logical criterion for formal distinction. But it remains unclear what kind of being the properties have on his realist view.

We should remember that in the *Summa Logicae*, where he offers two accounts of relations—a detailed presentation of his own nominalist account as well as a sketch of the more widely accepted realist account—he proposes two different ways in which the proposition "The Father is Father by Paternity" can be defended consistently with his nominalist program, first analyzing the proposition as a causal statement, then taking it to mean that the Father is Father by himself. So it seems that, prior to taking Holy Scripture and the sayings of the Saints into account, Ockham has more than one way of accounting for the Persons and properties; but after taking all relevant matters into consideration, the options narrow down to one.

The problem for a nominalist account is how to describe the difference between the Persons, given that it is not grounded in the difference of the properties and is not a difference of three substances. One way of solving the problem would be to identify the Persons with the properties, giving the properties an ontological status less than that of an essence, in keeping with Klima's observation about Ockham's account of relations. This solution will be explored in a formal way later in this chapter.

The Attributes

Concerning the question whether the divine perfections fall under any concepts common to God and creatures, Ockham agrees with Scotus. He holds that "wisdom" and the other abstract names of the divine attributes are true univocally of God and creatures:

> To the first argument I say that [what is] common to many can be predicated either in the concrete or in the abstract. If in the abstract, it

> will be predicated of everything quidditatively, and thus wisdom is predicated *in quid* of both created and uncreated wisdom.[28]

At the same time, he says that the corresponding denominatives are predicated equivocally of divine and created subjects,

> for "wise" is predicated of a creature according to the following definition: viz. "having accidental wisdom." But so understood, "wise" should not be predicated of God. Rather it is predicated of God according to the definition "existing wisdom," the way Anselm says in the *Monologium* that "just" is predicated of God according to the definition "existing justice" and of creatures according to the definition "haver of justice." So understood, "wise" is not predicated of creatures. Therefore, "wise" is predicated equivocally of God and creatures.[29]

In his exposition of the *Categories*, Ockham distinguishes three senses of "denominative." In a broad sense, the denominative/denominating distinction coincides with the distinction between concrete and abstract names, whether or not the abstract name signifies something formally predicable of that of which the concrete name is predicated—and in this way all relative names are denominatives. In a narrow sense, only those concrete names are denominatives whose corresponding abstracts signify a thing truly inhering in what the concrete name stands for. And in the narrowest sense, the further condition is required that the abstract name signifies an accident inhering in the other.[30] He notes that all relative names are denominatives in the broad sense. We may add that the apparent difference between Bonaventure and Albert concerning denominatives arises only because Bonaventure is using the broad sense and Albert the narrowest sense.

Essence and Attributes

In opposition to Aquinas's claim that the distinction of the divine attributes "arises only through the operation of the intellect,"[31] Ockham questions the very idea of the understanding causing a real distinction between *rationes*:

> Besides, I ask: what is it for the understanding to cause a distinction between these *rationes*? Either this is just to understand that thing—whether in one act or in several, so that in the end nothing is understood

> except the thing itself; or it is to compare the same thing to itself; or it is to compare the thing to another thing or other things; or to form something or some things that are not there in the nature of things but only through the operation of the Understanding. Not in the first way, because from the fact that it is always just the same thing and nothing else that is understood, it follows that no multitude is caused there unless perhaps [a multitude] of acts of understanding (supposing it is understood through many acts). Therefore in God there will never be a multitude of attributes that are many attributes and yet are really God himself. Similarly, for the same reason in Socrates and in any thing that I can understand I could cause such a multitude—which is absurd. Not in the second way, because by such a comparison nothing is caused except perhaps a conceptual relationship, according to these people; but a conceptual relationship is not really God himself. Not in the third way, for the same reason. Similarly, in the same way any thing can be compared to itself and to other things such as the divine essence; therefore every such distinction that the Understanding can produce about the divine essence can equally be made about anything. If you say "in the fourth way," the point is established that there may be there many things none of which is in the nature of things, and consequently none of them is in reality God himself.[32]

Thus, Ockham could not accept any theory, such as Bonaventure had attempted, according to which a distinction of reason between items was *eo ipso* a distinction on the side of the things themselves. As Adams puts it,

> Ockham acknowledges that there are many features a thing may have through the agency of something extrinsic to it, and some (e.g. the property of being understood or thought of) that it can have through the activity of the intellect. But identity and distinction are not among such features.[33]

As for Scotus's doctrine that the divine attributes are formally distinct from the essence, Hester Goodenough Gelber neatly summarizes the problem as Ockham sees it: "If the attributal perfections differed from the essence formally and the essence did not differ formally from itself, then there were two modes of identity in God, and one, that of the essence to itself, was greater than that

of the essence with its attributes."[34] She adds, "Consistent with his usual procedure, Ockham refused to complicate matters where a simpler solution would do."[35] So Ockham, while agreeing with Scotus that it would be possible to make such a distinction, refuses to follow Scotus in transferring such a distinction from the case of the essence and the relations to the case of the essence and the attributes:

> And so for this reason I say that divine wisdom is the same as the divine essence in every way in which the divine essence is the same as the divine essence; and so on for divine goodness and justice; nor is there any distinction at all in the nature of things, or even a non-identity. The reason for which is that even if such a distinction could equally easily be posited between the divine essence and divine wisdom as between essence and relation, yet because positing it is most difficult everywhere, and I do not believe it is easier to hold than is a Trinity of Persons together with a unity of essence, so it ought not to be posited except where it obviously follows from beliefs contained in Holy Scripture or the Church's prescriptions, on account of whose authority all argument is held captive. And so since all the things contained in Holy Scripture and the Church's prescriptions and the sayings of the Saints can be preserved without positing such a distinction between essence and wisdom, quite simply I deny that it is possible in this case.[36]

According to Ockham, not only is there no scriptural justification for drawing a formal distinction in the case of the attributes, but this case also fails the "logical" test he uses to determine the need for a formal distinction:

> And so since every thing that is the essence, whether it be absolute or relative, is also divine wisdom and goodness and divine justice, the divine essence and divine goodness or wisdom is in no way distinguished, neither formally nor in any way whatsoever.[37]

His view is that there is but one divine attribute and it is the divine essence, though it can be expressed in many different ways:

> So I say otherwise in relation to the question, that an attributal perfection can be taken in two ways: in one way for some perfection that is without

> qualification divine and which is really God, in another way for something truly predicable of God and of all three Persons together and separately. In the first way I say that there are not several attributal perfections but there is there only one perfection indistinct in reality and in *ratio*, which strictly and literally speaking should not be said to be in God or in the divine essence but is in every way the divine essence itself. In the second way I say that they are nothing but certain concepts or signs which can be truly predicated of God, and more strictly they ought to be called attributal concepts or attributable names rather than attributal perfections, because strictly a perfection is nothing but a certain thing, and such concepts are not strictly things, or are not perfect, because at least they are not perfections without qualification.[38]

Formal Analysis

Whereas Aquinas does not recognize a common sense of wisdom or goodness, Ockham agrees with Scotus that there is a sense of "wisdom" and a sense of "goodness" common to God and creatures. Such senses are shown in Figure 11.2, where the wisdom that is common to God and creatures is shown as x,y, and the goodness that is common to God and creatures is shown as x,z. Their shared intentional component, x, is the wisdom, and the goodness, that is God's alone. Wisdom in its common sense differs from goodness in its common sense because the former has an intentional component, y, not shared by the latter, and the latter has an intentional component, z, not shared by the former.

In this matrix, the terms for the wise and the good in the common sense (a and b) stand for some beings (s,t and s,u respectively) other than the abstract

		*	^
d	x	x	x
a'	x	x	x
b'	x	x	x
a	x, s, t	x	x, y
b	x, s, u	x	x, z

FIGURE 11.2. Semantics of the divine perfections (Ockham)

entities (x,y and x,z respectively) that correspond to them; and this is consistent with Ockham's appropriation of Anselm's formula that just creatures *are* not justice.

Both the wise and the good are shown in Figure 11.2 as including x (God) along with a created individual, s; the wise are shown as including an individual, t, who is not good; and the good are shown as including an individual, u, who is not wise. These representations are consistent with Ockham's views that the wise, in the common sense, include God as well as creatures; and that among creatures the wise and the good overlap.

Ockham holds that the quality divine wisdom and the quality divine goodness do not differ from one another or from divinity—just as Anselm had held. Thus, in Figure 11.2, where the term "divinely wise" is represented by a' and the term "divinely good" by b', the abstract entity corresponding to these is x in both cases—namely the abstract entity corresponding to d ("God"). Scotus, by contrast, holds that the quality of divine goodness and divine wisdom are different from one another.

As we have seen, Ockham takes "God" and "divinity" to be synonyms. He takes the divine perfections to be none other than God.

On the kind of relational account that Ockham takes Church doctrine to require, the properties are entities distinct from the Persons. A semantics for the Personal names, so understood, is shown in Figure 11.3.

Combining the information in Figures 11.2 and 11.3, we can construct a representation of the ontology envisaged by Ockham on the assumption that there are real relations in the Trinity. It is shown in Figure 11.4.

Ockham's ontology of the Trinity differs from that of Scotus in not having God standing in the relationship *ab* to anything. Because of this, there is no need for Ockham to replace the Aristotelian definition of substance (Definition 1.3) with the Augustinian definition (Definition 2.1).

		*	^
d	x	x	x
p	x	–	u
f	x	–	v
s	x	–	w

FIGURE 11.3. Realist semantics of the Persons (Ockham)




FIGURE 11.4. Relational ontology of the Trinity (Ockham)

In order to construct an Ockhamist nonrelational account of the ontology of the Trinity, one could start with Scotus's nonrelational account, making alterations wherever Ockham's views depart from Scotus's. Thus one would identify the divinely good and divine goodness with God, and one would replace the overtly relational properties of Paternity and so on with nonrelational *qualities* from which the Persons are concreted. What these qualities are is a matter that can be left undecided. The resulting structure is shown in Figure 11.5.

Conclusion

The ontological structures implicit in Ockham's relational and nonrelational approaches to the problem of the Trinity do not seem strikingly original when compared with the boldness of what we find in Abelard and Gilbert. What is original in Ockham is his underlying semantics. But in the end, he is unwilling to push that semantics to the limit on theological questions. When it looks like forcing him into views contrary to Church doctrine, he jettisons it in favor of an older semantic approach.




FIGURE 11.5. Nonrelational ontology of the Trinity (Ockham)

Adams raises two very general issues concerning Ockham's account of the Trinity. One concerns the autonomy of philosophy; the other concerns its theoretical generality. Does not Ockham's willingness to allow Scriptural and Church authority to defeat philosophical reasoning show that for him philosophy is not an autonomous discipline? And given that he does allow Church doctrine to force exceptions to his preferred philosophical theses, and thus to reduce the generality of those theses, should he not have replaced those philosophical preferences with ones that can achieve the full generality that a philosophical theory should have?[39]

Concerning the autonomy of philosophy, we should remember that a commentary on the *Sentences*—even one by such an independent thinker as Ockham—is a work of philosophical theology. As such, it would have to make some assumption about the possibility of blending philosophical and theological elements in a unified interpretation. Alfred Freddoso outlines some alternatives for what these assumptions could be. He sees Aquinas and Scotus as belonging to the mainstream Catholic tradition, which "seeks a genuine synthesis of faith and reason." By contrast, he sees Ockham as believing that his theory of relations is "the best account of the significance of relative terms that can be formulated by unaided natural reason" and that its status as such is not altered by its inconsistency with Christian doctrine.[40] In this light one might see Ockham as a firmer believer in the autonomy of philosophy than thinkers such as Aquinas, for whom the perception of an inconsistency between

a philosophical theory and the demands of Faith would lead to a revision of the philosophical theory.

Ockham may have thought of philosophy as having this type of autonomy in his purely philosophical works; but in his works of philosophical theology he, like all practitioners of this hybrid art, had to serve two masters. He had to conform to the dictates of logic as well as to those of ecclesiastical authority.

There are people who think that such a double allegiance inevitably leads either to bad theology or bad logic. For them, there is no such art as the hybrid I have described. Obviously, the authors studied in this book would disagree with that assessment. But this is not say that they found the practice of their art an easy matter. Religious and philosophical writings exist together in a state of tension, and the medieval thinkers felt that tension. But what I have tried to demonstrate is that the best of the medieval thinkers succeeded in the difficult task of bringing the demands of faith and reason into harmonious balance, and that they did so in a number of different ways.

Their work was an interpretive one, and part of it involved the constant adaptation of the available philosophical tools. It is here that their inventiveness shows. While Augustine and Boethius drew on Neoplatonic philosophers and made only small modifications to the interpreting framework provided by the *Categories*, Gilbert replaced that framework wholesale with a new ontology of his own devising, Abelard abandoned the central plank of the Augustinian project by looking for absolute rather than relative ways of distinguishing the Persons, and Scotus introduced a powerful new interpretive device—the formal distinction. There is much to admire in this inventiveness.

There is also much to think about. In revising and adapting the ontology of the *Categories*, the medieval philosopher-theologians articulated what were in effect generalizations of Aristotelian concepts and principles—generalizations designed to cover beings and situations that were never envisaged by the Philosopher. What remains for us to consider is whether any of these generalizations have applications in contemporary ontology.

Appendix: Ontological Systems

The ontological systems discussed in the preceding chapters are summarized here. There are seven systems.

Aristotle

de, *in*, *ab* and *ad* are undefined.

DEFINITION 1.1. $univ(A)$ iff for some $B : A\ de\ B$
DEFINITION 1.2. $acc(A)$ iff for some $B : A\ in\ B$
DEFINITION 1.3. $subst(A)$ iff not $acc(A)$ and for no $B : A\ ab\ B$
DEFINITION 1.4. $indiv(A)$ iff not $univ(A)$ and for no $B : A\ ab\ B$

RULE 1.1. If $acc(A)$, then for no $B : A\ ab\ B$
RULE 1.2. If $A\ in\ B$, then $subst(B)$
RULE 1.3. If $A\ ab\ B$, then $acc(B)$
RULE 1.4. Not $A\ de\ A$
RULE 1.5. If $A\ de\ B$ and $B\ de\ C$, then $A\ de\ C$
RULE 1.6. If $A\ in\ B$ and $B\ de\ C$, then $A\ in\ C$
RULE 1.7. If $A\ de\ B$ and $B\ in\ C$, then $A\ in\ C$
RULE 1.8. If $A\ ad\ B$, then $B\ ad\ A$
RULE 1.9. If $A\ ad\ B$ and $B\ ad\ C$, then $A = C$
RULE 1.10. If $A\ ad\ B$, then for some $C : A\ ab\ C$

Augustine, Boethius

de, *in*, *ab*, *ad*, and *est* are undefined.
Definitions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4; Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.8 to 1.10; plus:

DEFINITION 2.1. $subst(A)$ iff not $acc(A)$ and for no B $(B \neq A)$: $A\ ab\ B$ – in place of Definition 1.3.

RULE 2.1. If *A ab B* ($B \neq A$), then *acc*(*B*)—in place of Rule 1.3.

Abelard

de, *in*, *ab*, *ad*, and *est* are undefined.

Definitions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1; Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.8 to 1.10, 2.1; plus:

RULE 4.1. If for all *C* : *A est C* iff *B est C*, then $A =_{ess} B$

RULE 4.2. If $A =_{def} B$, then for all *C : A ab C* iff *B ab C*

RULE 4.3. If *A est B*, then $A =_{ess} B$

Gilbert

ab, *ad*, *est*, and *adest* are undefined.

Rules 1.8 to 1.10, plus:

DEFINITION 5.1. *A in* * *B* iff *B ab A*

DEFINITION 5.2. *A in B* iff for some *C*: *A adest C* and *C in** *B*

DEFINITION 5.3. *acc*(*A*) iff for some *B*: *A adest B*

DEFINITION 5.4. *subst* (*A*) iff not *acc*(*A*) and for no *B* : both *A adest B* and *A in** *B*

DEFINITION 5.5. *quo*(*A*) iff for some *B*: *A in** *B*

DEFINITION 5.6. *quod*(*A*) iff for no *B*: *A in** *B*

DEFINITION 5.7 *subsistent*(*A*) iff *subst*(*A*) and *quod*(*A*)

(Rule 5.1 is not included here because according to Gilbert it is not valid in all cases, and in particular does not hold in the divine realm.)

RULE 5.2. If *A in** *B* then *quod*(*B*)

RULE 5.3. If *A ad B* then not *subst*(*A*) and not *acc*(*A*)

Bonaventure

de, *in*, *ab*, *ad*, and *est* are undefined.

Definitions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1; Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.8 to 1.10, 2.1 plus:

DEFINITION 7.1. *A opp B* iff for some *C*,*D* : *C ab A* and *D ab B* and *C ad D*

DEFINITION 7.2. *A in** *B* iff for some *C* : *A in** *C* and *C est B*

Scotus

de, *in*, *ab*, *ad*, and *est* are undefined.
Definitions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1; Rules 1.1 to 1.3 and 1.8 to 1.10.

Ockham

de, *in*, *ab*, and *est* are undefined.
Definitions 1.1 to 1.4; Rules 1.1 to 1.3 and 1.9 to 1.10.

NOTES

1. *Background*

1. Plato, *Phaedo* 100C4–6: φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ. Gallop translation.

2. Alexander Nehamas, *Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates* (Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 182.

3. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z6, 1031b11: ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, καὶ ὅσα μὴ κατ᾽ ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ πρῶτα. Ross translation.

4. Plato, *Republic* 6, 509B: καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. Plato, *The Republic,* trans. Desmond Lee, 2nd ed. (Penguin Books, 1974).

5. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.9.5:24–25: ἁπλοῦν δὲ τὸ ἕν καὶ ἡ πάντων ἀρχή. Armstrong translation.

6. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.9.3:43–44: αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μονοειδές, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνείδεον. Armstrong translation.

7. Plato, *Symposium* 211B: αὐτὸ καθ᾽αὑτὸ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς.

8. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.9.6:15–16: ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος. Armstrong translation.

9. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.9.5:42–43: οὐχ οὕτως ἓν λέγοντες καὶ ἀμερές, ὡς σημεῖον ἤ μονάδα λέγομεν· Armstrong translation.

10. Plotinus, *Ennead* V, III, .9.6:2–8: ἤ πλεόνως τιθέμενον ἓν ἢ ὡς μονὰς καὶ σημεῖον ἑνίζεται. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀφελοῦσα καὶ ἀριθμοῦ πλῆθος καταλήγει εἰς τὸ σμικρότατον καὶ ἐπερείδεταί τινι ἀμερεῖ μέν, ἀλλὰ ὃ ἦν ἐν μεριστῷ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ· τὸ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν μεριστῷ οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ μικρότατον· μέγιστον γὰρ ἁπάντων οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. Armstrong translation.

11. Dexippus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium,* 31,11–14: Ἄλλη πάλιν αἰτία καθ᾽ ἕτερον τρόπον τὴν περιττότητα αἰτιᾶται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρός τι διαιροῦνται, καὶ ἐν τούτοις περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσι πάντα τὰ γένη. Dillon translation.

For the date, see Richard Sorabji, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle," in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. Richard Sorabji (Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 17.

12. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, 68,17–21: πρῶτον μὲν ὑπόκειταί τι τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἐφ' οὗ προϋπάρχοντος ἐγγίνεται τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ μόνως ὑφιστάμενα. ἔπειτα τὰ συνυπάρχοντα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ συνθεωρεῖται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ποιότης τε καὶ ποσότης, ἡ μὲν πληθύουσα, ἡ δὲ εἰδοποιοῦσα τὸ ὑποκείμενον. αἱ δὲ σχέσεις θεωροῦνται περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καθ' ἅς θεωροῦνται αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι. Chase translation.

13. Liddell and Scott, 1180B.

14. Aristotle, *Topics* 1.4, 102b4-7: Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστί, μήτε ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι, καὶ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῳοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. Translation in Richard Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD: A Sourcebook, Volume 3, Logic and Metaphysics*, p. 126.

15. Porphyry, *Isagoge* 12,25–13,3: διαιρεῖται δὲ εἰς δύο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χωριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀχώριστον. τὸ μὲν οὖν καθεύδειν χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλαν εἶναι ἀχωρίστως τῷ κόρακι καὶ τῷ Αἰθίοπι συμβέβηκεν, δύναται δὲ ἐπινοηθῆναι καὶ κόραξ λευκὸς καὶ Αἰθίοψ ἀποβαλὼν τὴν χροιὰν χωρὶς φθορᾶς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. Barnes translation.

16. Aristotle, *Categories* 1, 1a14–15: ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Ackrill translation.

17. Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 69,30ff: Ἐ. Τίνων οὖν χρεία ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι παρώνυμα; Ἀ. Τριῶν. Ἐ. Τίνων τούτων; Ἀ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι δεῖ πρᾶγμα οὗ δεῖ μετέχειν, δεύτερον τοῦ ὀνόματος οὗ δεῖ μετέχειν, καὶ τρίτον διαφέρειν τοῦ ὀνόματος μετασχηματισμῷ τινι. Strange translation.

18. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* A22, 83a4–7: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι φῶ ξύλον, τότε λέγω ὅτι ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκῷ εἶναι ξύλον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι. Barnes translation.

19. Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 2a19–21: φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι. Ackrill translation.

20. Aristotle, *Categories* 2, 1a24–25: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν. Ackrill translation.

21. Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 3a7–8: Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι.

22. Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 4a17–21: ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν· οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέλας γίνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ σπουδαῖος. Ackrill translation.

23. Aristotle, *Categories* 2, 1b6–7: ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ κατ' οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται.

24. Porphyry, *Isagoge* 7,23–24: αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γένοιντο ἂν αἱ αὐταί. Barnes translation.

25. Porphyry, *Isagoge* 8,8–17: Διαφορὰ δὲ κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα λεγέσθω. κοινῶς μὲν γὰρ διφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τὸ ἑτερότητι διαλλάττον ὁπωσοῦν ἢ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο· διαφέρει γὰρ Σωκράτης Πλάτωνος τῇ ἑτερότητι καὶ αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ παιδός τε ὄντος καὶ ἀνδρωθέντος καὶ ἐνεργοῦντός τι ἢ παυσαμένου καὶ ἀεί γε ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πῶς ἔχειν ἑτερότησιν. ἰδίως δὲ διαφέρειν λέγεται ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὅταν ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου διαφέρῃ· ἀχώριστον δὲ συμβεβηκὸς οἷον γλαυκότης ἢ γρυπότης ἢ καὶ οὐλὴ ἐκ τραύματος ἐνσκιρωθεῖσα. ἰδιαίτατα δὲ διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, ὅταν εἰδοποιῷ διαφορᾷ διαλλάττῃ, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ἵππου εἰδοποιῷ διαφορᾷ διενήνοχε τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ποιότητι. Barnes translation.

26. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 8a31–32: ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν. Ackrill translation.

27. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b27–30: Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἵον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης λέγεται. Ackrill translation.

28. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 7b15: Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. Ackrill translation.

29. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.6:14: μίαν τινὰ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ὑπόστασιν. Armstrong translation.

30. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.9:3–4: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδους καὶ λόγου μετάληψιν εἶναι.

31. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.7:19–21. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καὶ μενόντων παύεται ἡ σχέσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἄλλη γίγνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ καὶ πλησίον.

32. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.6:1–2. εἴ τις κοινότης γενικὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει.

33. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.6:3–4. εἰ ὑπόστασίς τις ἡ σχέσις ἐστὶν αὕτη.

34. Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, 125, 25–28: Ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ὡς οὐσίας συμπληρωτικὸν οὔτε ὡς ἄλλο τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἅ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις γίνεται, οἷον πάθος ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλά τι ἔξωθεν. διὸ καὶ μὴ πασχόντων τῶν ὑποκειμένων γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται. Strange translation.

35. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.1:20–23. πότερα ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ δέκα, ἢ ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἅπαντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς τὰ μὲν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀνάπαλιν. Armstrong translation.

36. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.1.1:24–25.

37. Matthew 28:19: πορευθέντες οὖν μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ὑιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. Translation in World English Bible.

38. Boethius, *OS* I.1:11–13: . . . *ut Arriani qui gradibus meritorum trinitatem variantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem diducunt*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

39. Boethius, *OS* IV.33–35: . . . *ut Arius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

40. Giuseppe Alberigo, "Concilium Nicaenum I–325," in *Conciliorum, Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta*, editio critica I: The Oecumenical Councils From Nicaea I to Nicaea II (325–787), ed. G. Albergio et al. (Brepols, 2006), pp. 3–15.

41. Ibid., 1–11: Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν· καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί. *Credimus in unum deum patrem omnipotentem visibilium et invisibilium factorem. Et in unum dominum Iesum Christum filium dei, natum de patre, hoc est de substantia patris, deum de deo, lumen de lumine, deum verum de deo vero, natum non factum, unius substantiae cum patre, quod Graecos dicunt homousion. . . .* English translation by Edward Yarnold, in Tanner.

42. Norman P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (Sheed & Ward, 1990), p. 2.

43. Alberigo, "Concilium Nicaenum I–325," 20–26: Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας "ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν" καὶ "πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν" καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας, φάσκοντας εἶναι ἢ τρεπτὸν ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία. *Eos autem qui dicunt: "erat quando non erat," et: "priusquam nasceretur non erat," et quia ex nullis extantibus factus est (quod Graeci exuconton dicunt), vel alia substantia, dicentes mutabilem et convertibilem filium dei, hos anathematizat catholica et apostolica ecclesia.* Translation by Edward Yarnold, in Tanner.

44. *Concilium Constantinopolitanum I–381*, ed. Adolf Martin Ritter, Epistola Constantinopolitani concilii ad papam Damasum et occidentales episcopos, in Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta, 49–51: . . . τῶν παθημάτων τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπαχθέντων ἡμῖν παρὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀρειανῶν δυναστείας. *Multitudinem passionum ab Ariana potentia nobis saepius inlatarum.* Translation by Robert Butterworth, in Tanner.

45. Ibid., 186–62:206: . . . καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἡμᾶς πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, δηλαδὴ θεότητος καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ οὐσίας μιᾶς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πιστευομένης, ὁμοτίμου τε τῆς ἀξίας καὶ συναϊδίου τῆς βασιλείας, ἐν τρισὶ τελειοτάταις ὑποστάσεσιν, ἤγουν τρισὶ τελείοις προσώποις, ὡς μήτε τὴν Σαβελλίου νόσον χώραν λαβεῖν συγχεομένων τῶν ὑποστάσεων εἴτ' οὖν τῶν ἰδιοτήτων ἀναιρουμένων, μήτε μὴν τὴν Εὐνομιανῶν καὶ Ἀρειανῶν καὶ Πνευματομάχων βλασφημίαν ἰσχύειν, τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τῆς θεότητος τεμνομένης καὶ τῇ ἀκτίστῳ καὶ ὁμοουσίῳ καὶ συναϊδίῳ τριάδι μεταγενεστέρας τινὸς ἢ κτιστῆς ἢ ἑτεροουσίου φύσεως ἐπαγομένης. . . . *Docentemque nos credere in nomine patris, et filii, et spiritus sancti. Divinitatem quippe et virtutem atque substantiam unam patris et filii et spiritus sancti credimus et aequalem honorem et dignitatem et imperium coaeternum in tribus perfectissimis subsistentiis seu tribus perfectis personis, ut neque Sabellii languor habeat locum confusione subsistentiarum aut peremptione proprietatum, neque Eunomianorum et Arianorum et Pneumatomachorum, id est spiritui resistentium, blasphemia praevaleat, substantia videlicet secundum illos aut natura aut divinitate divisa et increatae consubstantiali et coaeternae trinitati postrema quaedam vel creata vel alterius substantiae natura detur.* Translation by Robert Butterworth, in Tanner.

46. Boethius, *OS* IV.35–41. *Sabelliani quoque non tres existentes personas sed unam ausi sunt affirmare, eundem dicentes patrem esse qui filius est eundemque filium qui*

pater est atque spiritum sanctum eundem esse qui pater et filius est; ac per hoc unam dicunt esse personam sub vocabulorum diversitate signatam. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

47. Christophe Erismann, "The Trinity, Universals, and Particular Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin," *Traditio* 63 (2008): 279.

48.Ibid.

49. Ibid., pp. 289–290. Philoponus, *Arbiter* chapter 7 *apud* John of Damascus, *Liber de haeresibus* (ed. Kotter) 52:52–55. Αὔτη δὴ οὖν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις, ἡ ἀνθρώπου, καθ' ἣ οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐδενὸς διενήνοχεν, ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀτόμων γινομένη ἰδία λοιπὸν ἐκείνου καὶ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου κοινὴ γίνεται, καθὼς ἐν τῳ τετάρτῳ κεφαλαίῳ ὡρισάμεθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἐμοι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν οὐδενὸς ἄλλου κοινὸν ἐστιν.

50. Ibid., pp. 288–289.

51. Ibid., p. 293.

52. *Concilium Constantinopolitanum I–381*, 25–29: . . . καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον καὶ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον. *Et in spiritum sanctum, dominum et vivificatorem, ex patre procedentem, cum patre et filio coadorandum et conglorificandum*. Translation by Robert Butterworth, in Tanner.

53. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I.11.3. *Et etiam ideo quia in principalibus conciliis, quae apud eos celebrata sunt, ita symbola eorum subjunctis anathematibus sancta sunt, ut nulli de Trinitatis fide aliud docere vel aliter praedicare quam ibi continetur, liceat. In quibus quidem symbolis cum Spiritus sanctus commemoretur procedere a Patre, et non a Filio, quicumque, inquiunt a Filio eum procedere addunt, anathema incurrunt; unde et nos arguunt anathematis reos. Addunt etiam ad assertionem suae opinionis et in testimonium nostrae damnationis, de Symbolo fidei, quod, secundum traditionem praedictorum conciliorum, Leo III Romae transcriptum in tabula argentea post altare beati Pauli posita posteris reliquit pro amore (ut ipse ait) et cautela fidei orthodoxae. In quo quidem symbolo, in processione Spiritus solus commemoratur Pater, his verbis: Et in Spiritus sanctum Dominum, et vivificatorem, ex Patre procedentem, cum Patre et Filio coadorandum et glorificandum, etc*. Silano translation.

54. Aristotle, *Categories* 2, 1b6–7. Ackrill translation.

55. Aristotle, *Categories* 3, 1b10–12: Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ' ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται. Ackrill translation.

56. Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 2b1–2: πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι. Ackrill translation.

57. Aristotle, *Categories* 2, 1a25–26; 1b1–2: ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ.

2. *Augustine*

1. Augustine, *Confessions* 4.13: *haec tunc non noveram, et amabam pulchra inferiora et ibam in profundum, et dicebam amicis meis, `num amamus aliquid nisi pulchrum? quid est ergo pulchrum? et quid est pulchritudo? quid est quod nos allicit et conciliat rebus quas amamus? nisi enim esset in eis decus et species, nullo modo nos ad*

se moverent.' et animadvertebam et videbam in ipsis corporibus aliud esse quasi totum et ideo pulchrum, aliud autem quod ideo deceret, quoniam apte adcommodaretur alicui, sicut pars corporis ad universum suum aut calciamentum ad pedem et similia. et ista consideratio scaturrivit in animo meo ex intimo corde meo, et scripsi libros "de pulchro et apto"—puto duos aut tres: tu scis. Chadwick translation.

2. Edmund Hill, *Saint Augustine, The Trinity (De Trinitate)* (New City Press, 1991), p. 20.

3. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W. J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie (Brepols, 1973) Prologus: 4–5. *De trinitate quae deus summus et verus est libros iuvenis inchoavi, senex edidi.*

4. *1 Corinthians* 3:2–3. γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα, οὔπω γὰρ ἐδύνασθε. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἔτι νῦν δύνασθε. Translation from *World English Bible.*

5. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 1.1.3–4: *Hoc cum dicitur quibusdam, irascuntur, et sibi contumeliose dici putant. . . . Quapropter adjuvante Domino Deo nostro suscipiemus et eam ipsam quam flagitant, quantum possumus, reddere rationem, quod Trinitas sit unus et solus et verus Deus, et quam recte Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unius ejusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, intelligatur* . . . Hill translation.

6. Hill, *Saint Augustine*, 23.

7. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.6.46: *ubi maxime commendatur haec trinitas* . . . Hill translation.

8. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.6.51: *Domine deus noster, credimus in te patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum. Neque enim diceret veritas:* Ite, baptizate gentes in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti *nisi trinitas esses. Nec baptizari nos iuberes, domine deus, in eius nomine qui non est dominus deus*. Hill translation.

9. Augustine, *Confessions* 8.2.3: *perrexi ergo ad Simplicianum, patrem in accipienda gratia tunc episcopi Ambrosii et quem vere ut patrem diligebat. narravi ei circuitus erroris mei. ubi autem commemoravi legisse me quosdam libros platonicorum, quos Victorinus, quondam rhetor urbis Romae, quem christianum defunctum esse audieram, in latinam linguam transtulisset, gratulatus est mihi quod non in aliorum philosophorum scripta incidissem plena fallaciarum et deceptionum secundum elementa huius mundi, in istis autem omnibus modis insinuari deum et eius verbum*. Chadwick translation.

10. Augustine, *City of God* 10.23: *Dicit enim Deum Patrem et Deum Filium, quem Graece appellat paternum intellectum uel paternam mentem; de Spiritu autem sancto aut nihil aut non aperte aliquid dicit; quamuis quem alium dicat horum medium, non intellego*. Dods translation.

11. Augustine, *Confessions* 4.15. 28: *et quid mihi proderat quod annos natus ferme viginti, cum in manus meas venissent aristotelica quaedam, quas appellant decem categorias (quarum nomine, cum eas rhetor Carthaginiensis, magister meus, buccis typho crepantibus commemoraret et alii qui docti habebantur, tamquam in nescio quid magnum et divinum suspensus inhiabam), legi eas solus et intellexi?* Chadwick translation.

12. Alain De Libera, "L'onto-théo-logique de Boèce. Doctrine des catégories et théorie de la prédication dans le *De Trinitate*," in *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, ed. O. Bruun and L. Corti (Vrin, 2005), p. 195: *Le vocabulaire augustinien montre que celui-ci*

*rapproche deux distinctions: d'une part, la dichotomie académicienne des étants, reprise dans la médio-platonisme, à savoir l'opposition entre réalités existant par elles-mêmes (*καθ' αὑτὸ*) et réalités existant par rapport à d'autres réalités (*πρός τι*); d'autre part, l'opposition aristotélicienne entre* οὐσία *et* συμβεβηκός, *présentée selon une chaine d'équivalences* οὐσία = καθ' αὑτὸ = ἑαυτῆς εἶναι *et* συμβεβηκός = πρός τι = ἄλλου εἶναι.

13. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.1:39–44 : . . . *ut sic intellegamus deum si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitatem magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem*. Hill translation V:2.

14. De Libera, "L'onto-théo-logique de Boèce," pp. 194–195: . . *il distingue deux sortes de prédications "divines":* ad se *et* ad aliud. *La prédication ad se se subdivise en deux: ce qui est dit* substantialiter, *à savoir: essence / substance, qualité, quantité, action—le statut de la catégorie action étant ambigu—et ce qui est dit* non substantialiter, *sans être pour autant dit accidentellement, puisqu' il n'y a pas d'accidents en Dieu,* i.e., *les catégories position, habitus, lieu, temps, qui, pour cette raison (à savoir en tant qu'elles ne sont prédiquées ni essentiellement ni accidentellement), sont dites métaphoriquement de Dieu sur la base de ressemblances ou similitudes, "non proprie sed translate, ac per similitudines."*

15. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.5:1–3: *In deo autem nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur quia nihil in eo mutabile est; nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid*. Hill translation V.6.

16. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.16:41–46: *Sicut amicus relative dicitur, neque enim esse incipit nisi cum amare coeperit; fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis ut amicus dicatur. Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua sunt similia*. Hill translation V.17.

17. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.2:1–2. *Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia vel si melius hoc appellatur essentia, quam graeci* οὐσίαν *vocant*. Hill translation V.3.

18. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 7.5:1–8. *De his enim rebus recte intellegitur in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur sicut color aut forma in corpore. Corpus enim subsistit et ideo substantia est; illa vero in subsistente atque in subiecto corpore, quae non substantiae sunt sed in substantia; et ideo si esse desinat vel ille color vel illa forma, non adimunt corpori corpus esse quia non hoc est ei esse quod illam vel illam formam coloremue retinere*. Hill translation VII.10.

19. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 7.5:13–20: *Nefas est autem dicere ut subsistat et subsit deus bonitati suae atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tamquam in subiecto. Unde manifestum est deum abusive substantiam vocari ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus quia incommutabilis est* . . . Hill translation VII.10.

20. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.4:1–15. *Accidens autem dici non solet nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit amitti potest. Nam etsi quaedam dicuntur accidentia*

inseparabilia, quae appellantur graece achorista, sicuti est plumae corvi color niger; amittit eum tamen non quidem quamdiu pluma est sed quia non semper est pluma. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, et ex eo quod desinit esse illud animal vel illa pluma totumque illud corpus in terram mutatur et vertitur, amittit utique etiam illum colorem. Quamvis et accidens quod separabile dicitur non separatione sed mutatione amittatur, sicuti est capillis hominum nigritudo, quoniam dum capilli sunt possunt albescere; separabile accidens dicitur, sed diligenter intuentibus satis apparet non separatione quasi emigrare aliquid a capite dum canescit ut nigritudo inde candore succedente discedat et aliquo eat, sed illam qualitatem coloris ibi verti atque mutari. Hill translation V.5.

21. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.10:2–7. *In rebus enim quae participatione magnitudinis magnae sunt quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnas esse sicut magna domus et magnus mons et magnus animus, in his ergo rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea magnitudine magnus est.*

22. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.10.11. *Sed illa est uera magnitudo qua non solum magna est domus quae magna est et qua magnus est mons quisquis magnus est, sed etiam qua magnum est quidquid aliud magnum dicitur, ut aliud sit ipsa magnitudo, aliud ea quae ab illa magna dicuntur. Quae magnitudo utique primitus magna est multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione eius magna sunt.*

23. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.10:13–14. *Prima aequalitas et prima similitudo*. Hill translation VI.11.

24. Barry Miller, *A Most Unlikely God* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), ch. 5.

25. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.11:4–7. *Sicut enim trinitas unus deus dicitur magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deitas, ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia*. Hill translation V.12.

26. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.7:1–7. *Deus vero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur; sed eadem magnitudo eius est quae sapientia (non enim mole magnus est sed virtute), et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo, et eadem veritas quae illa omnia; et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum aut bonum esse aut omnino ipsum esse*. Hill translation VI.8.

27. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.10.

28. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.4:4–6. *Revera enim quod pater non sit filius et filius non sit pater et spiritus sanctus ille qui etiam donum dei vocatur nec pater sit nec filius, tres utique sunt*. Hill translation V.10.

29. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.5:3–4. *Dicitur enim ad aliquid sicut pater ad filium et filius ad patrem* . . . Hill translation V.6.

30. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.11:23–25. *Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem cum dicitur donum dei. Donum enim est patris et filii* . . . Hill translation V.12.

31. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.13. Hill translation.

32. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.5:4–8: . . . *et ille semper pater et ille semper filius, et non ita semper quasi ex quo natus est filius aut ex eo quod numquam desinat esse fil-*

ius pater esse non desinat pater, sed ex eo quod semper natus est filius nec coepit unquam esse filius. Hill translation V.6.

33. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15:47.

34. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 7.1:106–111. *Huc accedit quia omnis essentia quae relative dicitur est etiam aliquid excepto relativo sicut homo dominus et homo servus et equus iumentum et nummus arra; homo et equus et nummus ad se dicuntur et substantiae sunt vel essentiae; dominus vero et servus et iumentum et arra ad aliquid relative dicuntur*. Hill translation VII.2.

35. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.6:35–41: . . . *non sic ad se dicuntur pater et filius quomodo amici aut vicini. Relative quippe amicus dicitur ad amicum, et si aequaliter se diligunt, eadem in utroque amicitia est; et relative vicinus dicitur ad vicinum et quia aeqaliter sibi vicini sunt (quantum enim iste illi, tantum et ille huic vicinatur), eadem in utroque vicinitas*. Hill translation V.7.

36. See Paul Thom, *The Logic of Essentialism* (Kluwer, 1996), p. 143.

37. Boethius, *OS* IV 33–35: . . . *ut Arius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

38. *Concilium Nicaenum I–325*, in *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta*, 5:20–26: Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας "ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν" καὶ "πρὶν γεννηθῆναι ἦν" καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας, φάσκοντας εἶναι ἢ τρεπτὸν ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία. *Eos autem qui dicunt: "erat quando non erat," et: "priusquam nasceretur non erat," et quia ex nullis extantibus factus est (quod Graeci exuconton dicunt), vel alia substantia, dicentes mutabilem et convertibilem filium dei, hos anathematizat catholica et apostolica ecclesia*. Translation by Edward Yarnold, in Tanner.

3. Boethius

1. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy* I.1:23–27. *Naturae varias reddere causas, / Nunc iacet effeto lumine mentis / Et pressus gravibus colla catenis / Declivemque gerens pondere vultum / Cogitur, heu, stolidam cernere terram*. Tester translation.

2. John Marenbon, *Boethius* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 77.

3. John Moorhead, "Boethius's Life and the World of Late Antique Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, ed. John Marenbon (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 20.

4. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, I.4:57–68. *Quorum Basilius olim regio ministerio depulsus in delationem nostri nominis alieni aeris necessitate compulsus est. Opilionem vero atque Gaudentium cum ob innumeras multiplicesque fraudes ire in exilium regia censura decrevisset cumque illi parere nolentes sacrarum sese aedium defensione tuerentur compertumque id regi foret, edixit: uti ni intra praescriptum diem Ravenna urbe decederent, notas insigniti frontibus pellerentur. Quid huic severitati posse astrui videtur? Atqui in eo die deferentibus eisdem nominis nostri delatio suscepta est. Quid igitur?* Tester translation.

5. Boethius, *OS* I Prologue 31–34. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos venientia fructus extulerint. Translation in Douglas C. Hall, *The Trinity: An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the De Trinitate of Boethius* (E. J. Brill, 1992), p. 30 n. 34.

6. Boethius, *OS* I.2:29–31. *Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est.*

7. Richard Sorabji, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle," in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. Richard Sorabji (Cornell University Press, 1990), p.15.

8. John Marenbon, ed., *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. 3: *Medieval Philosophy* (Routledge, 2003), p. 11.

9. Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Proposition 115. Πᾶς θεὸς ὑπερούσιός ἐστι. Dodds translation.

10. Ibid., Proposition 73. Πᾶν μὲν ὅλον ἅμα ὄν τί ἐστι, καὶ μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὂν ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν . . .. τὸ πρώτως ὂν ἐπέκεινα τῆς ὁλοτητός ἐστι . Dodds translation.

11. Boethius, *OS* III:28–30. *Diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.*

12. Ibid., III:31–34. *Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid, cum esse susceperit.*

13. Ibid., III:35–37. *Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum vero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.*

14. Ibid., III:38–40. *Diversum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic enim accidens hic substantia significatur.*

15. Ibid., III:41–44. *Omne quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio vero participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; est vero ut participet alio quolibet.*

16. Ibid., III:45–48. *Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unam habet. Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.*

17. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. Migne 168A. *Tria sunt autem necessaria ut denominatiua uocabula constituantur: prius ut re participet, post ut nomine, postremo ut sit quaedam nominis transfiguratio.*

18. Boethius, *OS* I.4:23–24. *Idem est enim esse deo quod magno.*

19. Ibid., I.4:14–24. *Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem significare videmur, sed eam quae sit ultra substantiam; cum vero "iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non accidentem, sed eam quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam. Neque enim aliud est quod est, aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse deo quod iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus vel maximus," quantitatem quidem significare videmur, sed eam quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno.*

20. Hall, *The Trinity*, p. 32 n. 41.

21. Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Proposition 119: ἃς θεὸς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἀγαθότητα ὑφέστηκε, καὶ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς οὔτε καθ' ἕχιν οὔτε κατ' οὐσίαν (καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἕχειη καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι δευτέραν καὶ πολλοστὴν ἔλαχον τάξιν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν), ἀλλ' ὑπερουσίως. Dodds translation.

22. Boethius, *OS* I.1:13–15. *Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest.*

23. Ibid., I.2:31.

24. Ibid., I.2:31–40. *Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt. Unum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus vel anima in partem; igitur non est id quod est. Quod vero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed tantum est hoc, illud vere est id quod est; et est pulcherrimum fortissimumque quia nullo nititur.*

25. Ibid., I.4:26–28. *Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse faciant quod dicitur, divise quidem in ceteris, in deo vero coniuncte atque copulate.*

26. Ibid., I.2:40–43. *Quocirca hoc vere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma enim est, formae vero subiectae esse non possunt.*

27. Ibid., I.4:41–44. *"Magnus" etiam homo vel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus vel deus magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus vero ipsum magnus exsistit.*

28. Ibid., I.4:100–104. *Quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei; quodque illa quae ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa vero ut non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant.*

29. Ibid., I.2:29–42. *Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. . . . Quocirca hoc vere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeterquam id quod est*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

30. See Pierre Hadot, "The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle According to Porphyry," in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. Richard Sorabji (Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 125–140.

31. Boethius, *OS* I.4:4–5. *Haec igitur talia sunt qualia subiecta permiserint.* Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

32. Alain De Libera, "L'onto-théo-logique de Boèce. Doctrine des catégories et théorie de la prédication dans le De Trinitate," in *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, ed. O. Bruun and L. Corti (Vrin, 2005), p. 214: *Le lexique de Boèce est cependant bien différent de celui de son "modèle." Surtout, contrairement à Augustin, le* De Trinitate *boècien ne se contente pas de poser que les catégories appliqués à Dieu sont employées en un sens métaphorique, impropre par rapport au sens qui est le leur dans l'onto-logie du crée, mais fait état d'une* mutatio *commandée conceptuellement par le statut d'hypersubstance attribué à l'essence divine et la différence être / étant qui est son arrière-fond.*

33. Boethius, *OS* I.4:99–104. *Iamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum? Quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei; quodque illa*

quae ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa vero ut non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

34. Ibid., I.4 81–82. *Sed hec omnis predicatio exterioribus datur*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

35. Ibid., I.4 82–88. *Cuius praedicationis differentiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est vel deus refertur ad substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo vel deus; qui iustus est refertur ad qualitatem qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus; qui magnus ad quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

36. Ibid., I.4 88–92. *Nam in ceteris praedicationibus nihil tale est. Qui enim dicit esse aliquem in foro vel ubique, refert quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi, sed non quo aliquid est velut iustitia iustus*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

37. Ibid., I.4 82–83. *Omniaque hec quodam modo referuntur ad aliud.*

38. Ibid., I.5:33–40. *Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio vero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur*. Translation in Hall, *De Trinitate*, p. 33 n. 43.

39. Ibid., I.1:24–25. *Sed numero differentiam accidentium varietas facit*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

40. Christophe Erismann, "The Medieval Fortunes of the *Opuscula sacra*," in Marenbon, *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, pp. 168–169.

41. Hall, *De Trinitate*, p. 30.

42. Boethius, *OS* I.6:22–24. *Quod si id in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inveniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

43. Ibid., II:35–40. *Nam qui pater est, hoc vocabulum non transmittit ad filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut veritas ut iustitia ut ipsa quoque substantia, de ceteris diceretur*.

44. Allan Bäck, "Scotus on the Consistency of the Incarnation and the Trinity," *Vivarium* 36 (1998): 83–107.

45. Boethius, *OS* II:62–68. *Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est ad aliquid. Deus vero veritas iustitia bonitas omnipotentia substantia inmutabilitas virtus sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi excogitari potest substantialiter de divinitate dicuntur*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

46. David Bradshaw, "The *Opuscula sacra*: Boethius and Theology," in Marebon, *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, pp. 113–115.

47. Boethius, *OS* II:5–14. *Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo dubitaverit. Sed cum rursus colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Una igitur substantia trium nec separari ullo modo aut disiungi potest nec velut partibus in unum coniuncta est, sed est una simpliciter*. Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

48. Ibid., I.3:47: *idem equidem est, non vero ipse.*

49. Ibid., I.6:1–9: *Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis . . . substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem.*

50. Ibid., I.5:33–40: *Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio vero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest, quo quidem modo id quod vix intelligi potuit interpretatum est, personarum.* Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation.

51. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.2.11. *Tamen cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur.* Hill translation.

52. Boethius, *OS* I.5:42–44: *Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis quidem ei est productio filii, relativa vero praedicatio patris. Ac si meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum sanctum.* Stewart, Rand, and Tester translation, slightly modified.

53. Bradshaw, "The *Opuscula sacra*," p. 115.

4. Abelard

1. Abelard, *Historia Calamitatum*, pp. 195–196: *Vocatus itaque statim ad concilium adfui, et sine ullo discussionis examine me ipsum compulerunt propria manu librum memoratum meum in ignem proicere, et sic combustus est. . . . Cum autem ego ad profitendam et exponendam fidem meam assurgerem ut quod sentiebam verbis propriis exprimerem, adversarii dixerunt non aliud mihi necessarium esse nisi ut Symbolum Athanasii recitarem, quod quivis puer aeque facere posset. Ac ne in ignorantia praetenderem excusationem, quasi qui verba illa in usu non haberem, scripturam ad legendum afferi fecerunt. Legi inter suspira, singultus et lacrimas, prout potui.* Muckle translation.

2. Ibid., p. 192: *Accidit autem mihi ut ad ipsum fidei nostrae fundamentum humanae rationis similitudinibus disserendum primo me applicarem, et quemdam theologiae tractatum* de Unitate et Trinitate *divina scholaribus nostris componerem, qui humanas et philosophicas rationes requirebant et plus quae intelligi quam quae dici possent efflagitabant, dicentes quidem verborum superfluam esse prolationem quam intelligentia non sequeretur, nec credi posse aliquid nisi primitus intellectum, et ridiculosum esse aliquem aliis praedicare quod nec ipse nec illi quos doceret intellectu capere possent, Domino ipso arguente quod caeci essent duces caecorum.*

Quem quidem tractatum cum vidissent et legissent plurimi, coepit in commune omnibus plurimum placere quod in eo pariter omnibus satisfieri super hoc quaestionibus videbatur. Et quoniam quaestiones istae prae omnibus difficiles videbantur, quanto earum maior exstiterat gravitas, tanto solutionis earum censebatur maior subtilitas. Unde aemuli mei vehementer accensi concilium contra me congregaverunt, maxime duo illi antiqui insidiatores, Albericus scilicet et Lotulfus. Muckle translation p.43.

3. Abelard, *Historia Calamitatum*, p. 44: *Cum autem utrique Remis scholas regerent, crebris suggestionibus archiepiscopum suum Radulphum adversum me commoverunt ut, ascito Conano Praenestino episcopo, qui tunc legatione fungebatur in Gallia, conventiculum quoddam sub nomine concilii in Suessionensi civitate celebrarent, meque invitarent quatinus illud opusculum quod de Trinitate composueram mecum afferrem. Et factum est ita. Antequam autem illuc pervenirem, duo illi praedicti aemuli nostri ita me in clero et populo diffamaverunt ut paene me populus paucosque qui advenerant ex discipulis nostris prima die nostri adventus lapidarent, dicentes me tres deos praedicare et scripsisse, sicut ipsis persuasum fuerat*. Muckle translation.

4. John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 26–32.

5. Ibid., p. 54.

6. Ibid., p. 48.

7. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.139: *Idem aliquid cum aliquo essentialiter dicimus quorum eadem numero est essentia, ita scilicet ut hoc et illud sint eadem numero essentia, sicut eadem numero essentia est ensis et mucro, uel substantia et corpus siue animal siue homo siue etiam Socrates, et album idem numero quod durum*. Translation in Jeffrey Brower, "Trinity," in *The Cambridge Companion to Abelard*, ed. Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin Guilfoy (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 227.

8. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.140: *Nonnulla autem essentialiter eadem sunt quae tamen proprietatibus suis distinguuntur, cum eorum scilicet proprietates ita penitus impermixtae maneant, ut proprietas alterius ab altero minime participetur, etiam si sit eadem numero penitus utriusque substantia. Verbi gratia, in hac imagine cerea idem est numero haec cera, hoc est materia ipsa et materiatum, nec tamen ibi materia ipsa et materiatum suas communicant proprietates, cum nec ipsa materia cereae imaginis sit materiata, hoc est ipsa cera sit facta ex cera, nec ipsum materiatum sit materia ibi, hoc est cerea imago sit materia cereae imaginis*. Translation in ibid.

9. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.154: *Diuersa autem definitione sunt quae eadem definitione sententiae terminari non possunt, hoc est quae talia sunt ut sese mutuo non exigant, licet eadem res sit utrumque, sicut est substantia et corpus, uel album et durum. Non enim ex eo quod substantia est corpus est, uel ex eo quod album est durum est, cum hoc sine illo queat esse neque ex se illud exigat*. Translation in ibid., p. 244.

10. Abelard, *Theologia Summi Boni* 2.103: *Sunt tamen ab invicem diversae Personae, id est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ad similitudinem eorum quae diversa sunt secundum diffinitiones, eo videlicet quod, cum eadem penitus essentia sit pater, quae est filius vel spiritus sanctus, aliud tamen proprium est patris, in eo scilicet quod pater est, et aliud filii, et aliud spiritus sancti.*

11. Simo Knuuttila, "How Theological Problems Influenced the Development of Medieval Logic," in *Ad Ingenii Acuitionem: Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù, Textes et Études du Moyen Âge* 38 (2006): 193–194.

12. Abelard, *Theologia Summi Boni* 2.103: . . . *aliud tamen proprium est patris, in eo scilicet quod pater est, et aliud filii, et aliud spiritus sancti, quia cum pater ex eo tantum dicatur quod potens est, filius ex eo quod discretus, id est potens discernere, spir-*

itus sanctus ex eo quod benigum est, proprium est patris posse, filii discernere, spiritus sancti benignum esse.

13. Abelard, *Theologia Summi Boni* 2.104: *Proprium etiam patris est a se ipso esse, ut diximus, et coaeternum sibi filium aeternaliter gignere, filii gigni a solo patre, spiritus sancti procedere tantum ab utroque.*

14. Quoted in Edward Little, "Bernard and Abelard at the Council of Sens, 1140," in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Studies Presented to Dom Jean Leclerq*, ed. Jean Leclercq (Cistercian Publications, 1973), pp. 68–69. *1. Quod Pater sit plena potentia, Filius quaedam potentia, Spiritus Sanctus nulla potentia; 2. Quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit de substantia Patris aut Filii; 3. Quod Spiritus Sanctus sit anima mundi; 13. Quod ad Patrem, qui ab alio non est, proprie vel specialiter attineat omnipotentia, non etiam et sapientia et benignitas.*

15. D. E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 116.

16. Ibid., p. 117.

17. Little, "Bernard and Abelard," p. 65.

18. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, p. 123.

19. Little, "Bernard and Abelard," p. 59.

20. Ibid., p. 66.

21. Abelard, *Theologia Scholarium* 2.1044–1048: *Tantam quippe diuine unitatem substantie ac simplicitatem seu idemtitatem profitemur, ut sicut a partibus ita ab accidentibus immunis omnino perseueret, nec in nullo penitus uariari queat, nec in ipsa quicquam esse possit ipsa non sit.*

22. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.166: *omnium tam formarum quam partium remotionem facere, aut si quis aliquas in hoc quoque formas intelligat, certum est ipsas omnino non esse diuersas res ab ipsis substantiis quibus insunt—ita et Patris istud esse proprium dicimus, illud Filii atque illud Spiritus sancti.*

23. Abelard, *Dialectica* 84:5–7: *ut nulla videlicet substantia in proprietate patris esse queat, nisi aliqua sit in proprietate filii, et si qua filiationis formam susceperit, simul et aliquam formam paternitatis necesse est indui.*

24. Abelard, *Theologia Summi Boni* 2.105–106: *Non tamen, cum proprietates dici audimus, ita intelligendum est, ut formas aliquas in deo opinemur, sed proprietates quasi propria dicimus, eo scilicet modo quo dicit Aristoteles omni substantiae commune esse non esse in subiecto, vel non suscipere magis et minus, sive nihil esse ei contrarium. Nec in his tamen communitatibus, quas scilicet assignat, ullas intelligit formas, quas scilicet communitates potius removendo aliquid quam ponendo assignat. Et quemadmodum dicimus substantiae proprium esse quod per se subsistit, quia videlicet ex eo quod substantia est, hoc solummodo exigit, et rei informis dicimus proprium esse quod formas non habet, vel rei simplicis quod partibus caret, nullasque formas per hoc intelligimus: ita et patris illud esse proprium edicimus, illud filii vel spiritus sancti, quia videlicet ex eo quod pater est, hoc solum exigit, ut sit potens sive etiam omnipotens, hoc est ut nihil ei resistere queat, et ex eo quod filius est, illud tantum, ut sit discretus in omnibus, hoc est ut nihil eum latere queat, et ex eo quod spiritus sanctus est, illud*

aliud, ut videlicet benignus sit, quasi pronus ad adiuvandum et nullis machinans incommodum, sed gratis etiam bona sua largiri paratus aut largiens.
Personam itaque hoc loco diversam alteram ab altera dicimus eo quod diffinitione ab ea disiungatur, hoc est poprietatis suae singularitate, ut videlicet hoc sit huius proprium, quod non sit illius proprium. Quippe deus pater, qui est una Persona secundum ipsam nominis sententiam, recte diffiniendus est divina potentia, hoc est deus potens, et deus filius divina sapientia et spiritus dei divina benignitas. Et ita pater a filio proprietate sive diffinitione diversus est, hoc est alius, et similiter uterque a spiritu sancto.

25. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 4.157: *Si uero dicamus paternitatem esse, tale est ac si ponamus aliquid esse patrem, non ipsam paternitatem esse suam essentiam. Vnde penitus falsum est paternitatem nihil esse, hoc est non esse quamdiu aliquid pater sit, hoc est eam habeat.*

26. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, p. 157.

27. Ibid., pp. 156–161.

28. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 4.154.

29. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, p. 157; Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 4.155. *Cum tamen ipsa paternitas non sit res alia ab ipsis, nec fortassis eadem, cum res omnino recte dici non possit, quae in se ueram non habet essentiam, ut sit in se una res numero a ceteris omnibus quae ipsa non sunt essentialiter discreta.*

30. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.167: *Nolo autem sub silentio praeterire, quare uidelicet in assignandis proprietatibus Personarum tamdiu perstiterim, ut eas quidem proprietates non esse aliud ab ipso Deo uel ab ipsis Personis adstruerem.*

31. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.167: . . . *temporibus nostris nonnulli, inter uere Catholicos computati atque etiam per assiduitatem studii diuinorum librorum cathedram magisterii adepti, in tantam prorumpere ausi sunt insaniam, ut proprietates ipsas Personarum alias res esse ab ipso Deo uel ab ipsis Personis profiteantur, hoc est paternitatem ipsam et filiationem et processionem Spiritus.*

32. Brower, "Trinity," p. 251.

33. See note 11.

34. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum secundum De Trinitate* 1.30, 22–23 (30): *Qualiter et aliqui—Deum multiformem opinantes—potentiam sapientiam bonitatem tanquam diuersas uni simplici Deo attribuunt. Et ipsum unum eundemque Deum secundum potentiam esse Patrem, secundum sapientiam esse Filium, secundum bonitatem esse Spiritum sanctum, quibus possunt—uitreis tamen—non tam argumentis quam argutiis, asserunt.*

5. Gilbert of Poitiers

1. Nikolaus Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966), p. 3.

2. Christophe Erismann, "The Medieval Fortunes of the *Opuscula sacra*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, ed. John Marenbon (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 155–156.

3. Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Poreta's Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the In-*

carnation during the Period 1130–1180 (E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 34: 1. *Quod divina natura, que divinitas dicitur, Deus non sit, sed forma, qua Deus est, quemadmodum humanitas homo non est, sed forma, qua est homo.* 2. *Quod cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unum esse dicuntur, nonnisi una divinitate esse intelligantur, nec converti possit, ut Deus unus vel una substantia vel unum aliquid Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus esse dicatur.* 3. *Quod tres persone tribus unitatibus sint tria et distincte proprietatibus tribus, que non sunt ipse persone, sed sunt tres res eterne et ab invicem et a divina substantia numero differentes.*

4. Marjorie Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court* (Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1956), p. 24. *Credimus simplicem naturam divinitatis Deum esse nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari, quin divinitas sit Deus et Deus divinitas. Sicubi vero dicitur Deum sapientia sapientiem, magnitudine magnum, eternitate eternum, unitate unum, divinitate Deum esse et alia huiusmodi, credimus nonnisi ea sapientia, que est ipse Deus, sapientem esse, nonnisi ea,magnitudine, que est ipse Deus, magnum esse, nonnisi ea eternitate, que est ipse Deus, eternum esse, nonnisi ea unitate unum, que est ipse, nonnisi ea divinitate Deum, que est ipse, id est se ipso sapientem, magnum, eternum, unum Deum.*

Cum de tribus personis loquimur Patre, Filio, Spiritu Sancto, ipsas unum Deum, unam divinam substantiam esse fatemur. Et econverso, cum de uno Deo, una divina substantia loquimur, ipsum unum Deum, unam divinam substantiam esse tres personas profitemur.

Credimus solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum eternum esse nec aliquas omnino res—sive relationes sive proprietates sive singularitates vel unitates dicantur et huiusmodi alia—adesse Deo, que sint ab eterno et non sint deus. Chibnall translation.

5. Ibid., pp. 29–41.

6. Erismann, "The Medieval Fortunes of the *Opuscula sacra*," p. 170.

7. Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, p. 153.

8. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum De Bonorum Ebdomade* §35: *Ait ergo: Diuersum est esse i.e. subsistentia, que est in subsistente, et id quod est i.e. subsistens in quo est subsistentia: ut corporalitas et corpus, humanitas et homo.*

9. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii librum primum De Trinitate* 2.71: *Sic enim dicitur de specie quedam secunda substantia predicari. Non enim hic intelligendum est de eo quod species est, aliquid predicari sed de subsistente pocius in quo est subsistentia specialis: nec de eo id quod est secunda substantia, quod scilicet solum subsistens est—quod omnino impossibile est predicari—sed, que in eo est, subsistentia.*

10. Ibid., 2.59: *. . . ut rationalitas alicuius et generaliter "qualitas" et specialiter "rationalitas" dicitur quoniam et eum qualem facit—sicut et quelibet alie qualitates ea, in quibus sunt, faciunt qualia—et rationalem sicut et cetere rationalitates eos, in quibus sunt, faciunt rationales.*

11. Ibid., 4.99: *Non enim subsistens tantum sed etiam subsistentia appellatur "substantia" eo quod utraque accidentibus, diuersis tamen rationibus, substant.*

12. Ibid., 4.26: *Et dicimus quod non corporalitas colorem aut lineam sed color et linea corporalitatem secuntur. Non enim hec corporalitatis sed horum corporalitas causa est.*

Qua ratione illa corporis est esse: hec uero in eodem corpore illi adsunt. Ideo primum illa, deinde quod ea corpus est, uera ratione est horum substancia: hec uero primum corporalitatis et per eam corporis accidencia. His enim uere substat et corporalitas, cui adsunt, et corpus cui insunt.

13. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii librum Contra Euticen et Nestorium* 4.28: *Nunquam enim id, quod est, predicatur. Sed esse et quod illi adest predicabile est: et sine tropo non nisi de eo quod est.*

14. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate* 2.37: *Neque enim ea, qua ipse est, essencia—que Grece usia dicitur—potest esse non simplex. Neque in eo eidem essencie adesse aliud aliquid potest quo ipse sit. Non enim Deus simplex esset si uel eius essencia constaret ex multis essenciis uel eidem adessent forme in illo quarum uel ipse Deus uere esset uel eius essencia ratione diceretur "subiecta materia."*

15. Boethius, *De Trinitate* II:31–40.

16. Ibid., IV:26–28.

17. Boethius, *OS* I 2:29–42, quoted earlier.

18. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate* 2.55: *Unde etiam usus loquendi est ut de Deo dicatur non modo "Deus est" uerum etiam "Deus est ipsa essencia." Recte utique. Si enim de aliquo qui non modo sapiens sed etiam coloratus et magnus et multa huiusmodi est, ex sapiencie pre ceteris omnibus habundantia dicitur: "Tu quantus quantus es, totus es sapiencia"—tamquam nichil aliud sit quod sibi esse conferat nisi sola sapiencia—multo proprius Deus, cui diuersa non conferunt ut sit, dicitur "ipsa essentia" et aliis nominibus idem ut "Deus est ipsa diuinitas sua, ipsa sua sapientia, ipsa sua fortitudo" et huiusmodi alia.*

19. Ibid., 2.89: *Non enim est a diuinitate aliud quo Deus sit. Nec est unde diuinitas ipsa sit nisi quod ea Deus est.*

20. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius*, p. 15.

21. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate*, second prologue, 3–4: *Quicquid inest alicui, ab eodem diuersum esse necesse est.*

22. Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court*, pp. 29–30.

23. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum De Bonorum Ebdomade* §62: *Ideoque recte dictum uidetur: Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet. Id est: si quis de eo quo uere est simplex dicat "est" et item dicat "est aliquid," nullus intelligere debet quod secunda oratione predicauerit de ipso aliquid proprietate aliqua diuersum ab eo quod predicauerat in prima.*

24. John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West* (Ashgate, 2000), p. 343.

25. Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court*, p. 30.

26. Ibid., p. 31.

27. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum secundum De Trinitate* §§38–40.

28. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate* 3.37: *Cum uero dicitur "Deus Deus Deus"—primum de Patre secundum de Filio tercium de Spiritu sancto. Quod et ipse aperit dicens: "Deus Pater Deus Filius Deus Spiritus sanctus"—*

eorum quidem, qui sunt Deus, numeratio facta est: eius uero, quo sunt Deus, repeticio. Translation from John Marenbon, "Gilbert of Poitiers," in *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*, p. 345. Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate* III:29–40.

29. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate*, second prologue, 42–44: *Sicut numero diuersorum proprietates diuerse sunt ita quoque subsistentie numero sunt diuerse.*

30. Ibid., second prologue, 44–47: *"Una singularis subsistencia non nisi unum numero faciat subsistentem" ut Platonis et Ciceronis non solum accidentales proprietates uerum etiam substantiales, quibus ipsi sunt uerbi gratia uel diuersa corpora uel diuersi homines, diuerse sunt.*

31. Ibid., second prologue, 48–49: *Et quecumque singularis proprietas Platonem corpus esse uel hominem, eadem nullum alium idem esse facit.*

32. Ibid., second prologue, 44ff.

33. Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court*, p. 31.

34. Ibid., p. 38.

35. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum secundum De Trinitate* §64: *Quoniam ergo paternitas et filiatio et conexio diuersa sunt, oportet unitates quoque, que illis assunt, a se inuicem esse diuersas.*

36. Ibid., §72: *Quoniam igitur ille proprietates non sunt substantie—quod ex eo maxime certum est quia non singulariter dicuntur de omnibus diuisim et collectim suppositis—multo magis non pertinet ad substantiam i.e. non est substantialis Trinitas: uidelicet unitates quibus ille proprietates et illi, quorum ipse sunt, numerantur.*

37. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate* 5.43: *Theologice uero persone quoniam eius, quo sunt, singularitate unum sunt et simplicitate id quod sunt, essentiarum oppositione a se inuicem alie esse non possunt. Sed harum, que dicte sunt, extrinsecus affixarum rerum oppositione a se inuicem alie et probantur et sunt.*

38. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum secundum De Trinitate* §64: *Et quia, quamuis substantie substantia alia aut accidens adsit—ut corporalitati animatio et color—accidenti tamen non potest adesse substantia, unitates que adsunt paternitati et filiationi et conexioni—quibus sunt tria non modo hec predicata uerum etiam illa, de quibus hec predicantur, i.e. Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus—nequaquam poterunt esse substantie.*

39. Ibid., §76: *Deus uero i.e. diuinitas, que hoc nomine intelligitur, et ueritas et iusticia et bonitas et omnipotencia et substancia et immutabilitas et uirtus et sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi—i.e. diuersum quidem nomine, idem uero re—excogitari potest, de diuinitate i.e. de Patre et de Filio et de Spiritu sancto substancialiter dicuntur, cum una usya dicuntur uel diuisim uel simul "Deus uerus iustus bonus omnipotens subsistens immutabilis fortis sapiens" et huiusmodi aliis ab eadem usya nominibus esse id, quod sunt, predicantur.*

40. Ibid., prologue §2: *Quia tamen aliqui sensu paruuli—audientes quod Deus est simplex—ipsum et quecumque de eo nominum diuersitate dicuntur—ut: Deus unus*

eternus persona principium auctor Pater Filius Conexio et huiusmodi alia—eiusdem nature eiusdemque rationis esse ita accipiunt ut et essentia qua dicitur esse Deus sit et unitas qua unus est et eternitas qua eternus est et similiter cetera: et e conuerso ipse etiam Pater sit paternitas et unus unitas et eternus eternitas et conuersim: et eodem modo in aliis omnibus que de ipso quacumque ratione predicantur, scribit idem Boecius Iohanni romano diacono de illis specialiter que nominibus his "Pater Filius Spiritus sanctus" predicantur.

41. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate* second prologue 8: *Has igitur naturalium rationes recte sicut uidetur intelligentes Arrius Ethius Eunomius itemque Noetus Sabellius Praxeas Hermogenes et Priscillianus et alii multi sed eorumdem naturalium proprias esse minime attendentes, in theologica usurpauerunt. Et quoniam unius Principii* ex quo et per quem et in quo sunt omnia *non nisi una est essentia que Grece dicitur usia, putauerunt quod sicut unus est solus Deus ita quoque solus unus sit Deus.*

42. For an alternative approach to Gilbert's Trinitarian semantics, see Paul Thom, "Trinitarian Semantics in Gilbert of Poitiers," *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* 7 (2007): 3–16.

6. Peter Lombard

1. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 1, Prologue 4: *Horum igitur et Deo odibilem ecclesiam evertere atque ora oppilare, ne virus nequitiae in alios effundere queant, et lucernam veritatis in candelabro exaltare volentes, in labore multo ac sudore hoc volumen, Deo praestante, compegimus ex testimoniis veritatis in aeternum fundatis, in quatuor libros distinctum. In quo maiorum exempla doctrinamque reperies, in quo per dominicae fidei sinceram professionem vipereae doctrinae fraudulentiam prodidimus*. Silano translation.

2. D. E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 262.

3. Marjorie Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court* (Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1956), pp. 15–16.

4. Peter Lombard, *The Sentences Book I: The Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Giulio Silano (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), pp. xix–xxvi.

5. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 3, prol. N 1.

6. *Fourth Lateran Council (1215): Constitutions 1, in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol.1: Nicaea I to Lateran V*, ed. Norman P. Tanner (Sheed & Ward, 1990), 230:15–19; 231:7–18; 232:4–11: *Haec sancta Trinitas secundum communem essentiam individua et secundum personales proprietates discreta, per Moysen et sanctos prophetas aliosque famulos suos, iuxta ordinatissimam dispositionem temporum, doctrinam humano generi tribuit salutarem . . .*

Damnamus ergo et reprobamus libellum sive tractatum, quem abbas Ioachim edidit contra magistrum Petrum Lombardum de unitate seu essentia Trinitatis, appellans ipsum haereticum et insanum, pro eo quod in suis dixit Sententiis*: "Quoniam quaedam summa res est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et illa non est generans*

neque genita nec procedens," unde asserit, quod ille non tam Trinitatem quam quaternitatem adstruebat in Deo, videlicet tres personas et illam communem essentiam quasi quartam, manifeste protestans, quod nulla res est quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, nec est essentia nec substantia nec natura, quamvis concedat quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una essentia, una substantia, unaque natura; verum unitatem huiusmodi non veram et propriam, sed quasi collectivam et similitudinariam esse fatetur . . .

Nos autem, sacro et universali concilio approbante, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres simul personae ac sigillatim quaelibet earundem, et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quaternitas, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia sive natura divina, quae sola est universorum principium, praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest. Trans. H. J. Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils* (B. Herder, 1937).

7. Peter Lombard, *The Sentences Book I*, p. xxix.

8. Ibid., 1.8.5: *Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat Aug., solum Deum vere simplicem esse, cur dicat eumdem multipliciter dici? Sed hoc non propter diversitatem accidentium vel partium dicit, sed propter diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum quae de Deo dicuntur, quae licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam naturam.*

9. Ibid., 1.8.8.1: *Hujus autem essentiae simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod non est in ea aliquid quod non sit ipsa, sed idem est habens et quod habetur.*

10. Boethius, *OS* I.2:40–51: *Quocirca hoc vere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma enim est, formae vero subiectae esse non possunt.*

11. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, p. 264.

12. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 1.34.3: *Ex praedictis constat quod sicut essentia, ita potentia, sapientia, bonitas de Deo dicuntur secundum substantiam. Quae autem secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, tribus personis pariter conveniunt. Una est ergo potentia, sapientia, bonitas Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti; et hi tres eadem potentia eadem sapientia, eadem bonitas. Unde aperitur in Trinitate summa esse perfectio. Si enim ibi deesset potentia, vel sapientia, vel bonitas, non esset summum bonum. Sed quia ibi est perfecta potentia, infinita sapientia, incomprehensibilis bonitas, recte dicitur et creditur summum bonum. Cumque unum et idem penitus sit in Deo potentia, sapientia, bonitas, in sacra tamen Scriptura frequenter solent haec nomina distincte ad personas referri, ut Patri potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui sancto bonitas attribuatur, quod quare fiat, non est otiosum inquirere.*

13. Ibid., 1.22.5.1: *Sciendum est ergo quod illa quae proprie ad singulas personas pertinent, relative ad invicem dicuntur: sicut Pater et Filius, et utriusque donum Spiritus sanctus. Ea vero quae unitatem essentiae significant, ad se dicuntur; et ea quae ad se dicuntur, substantialiter utique dicuntur, et de omnibus communiter, et de singulis sigillatim dicuntur personis, et singulariter non pluraliter accipiuntur in summa, ut Deus bonus, potens, magnus, et hujusmodi. Quae autem relative dicuntur, substantialiter non dicuntur.*

14. Ibid., 1.34.1.1: *Praedictis est adiiciendum, quod quidam perversi sensus homines in tantam prosilierunt insaniam, ut dicerent, non idem esse naturam Dei et personam sive hypostasim, dicentes, eandem essentiam non posse esse Patrem, et Filium sine personarum confusione. Si enim, inquiunt, ea essentia, quae Pater est, Filius est, idem sibi Pater est et Filius. Si hanc rem dicis esse Patrem, aliam quaere, quam dicas esse Filium. Si vero aliam non quaesieris, sed eandem dixeris; idem genuit et genitus est. Propter haec et huiusmodi inter naturam et personam dividunt, ita ut non recipiant unam deitatis naturam et simplicem esse tres personas.*

15. Ibid., 1.34.1.9: *Non tamen diffitemur aliquam distinctionem habendam fore secundum intelligentiae rationem, cum dicitur hypostasis, et cum dicitur essentia; quia ibi significatur quod est commune tribus, hic vero non. Est tamen hypostasis essentia, et e converso. Fateamur ergo unum atque idem esse tres personas secundum essentiam, differentes autem proprietatibus.*

16. Ibid., 1.33.1.6: *Hoc autem aliqui negant, dicentes quidem proprietates in personis esse, sed non esse personas ipsas, quia ita dicunt esse in personis vel in essentia divina, ut non sint interius, sicut ea sunt quae secundum substantiam dicuntur de Deo, ut bonitas, justitia, sed extrinsecus affixae sunt, atque ita esse rationibus probare contendunt. Si enim, inquiunt, proprietates sunt personae, non eis personae determinantur.*

17. Ibid., 1.33.1.9: *Caeterum haereticorum improbitas instinctu diabolicae fraudulentiae excitata, nondum quiescit, sed in tanta rerum quaestione addit: Si paternitas et filiatio in Deo sive in divina essentia sunt, eadem ergo res est sibi Pater et Filius. Nam in quo paternitas est, Pater est; et in quo filiatio est, Filius est. Si ergo una eademque res habet in se paternitatem et filiationem, ipsa generat et generatur.*

18. Ibid., 1.33.1.10: *Quorum audaciae resistentes atque ignorantiae providentes, audebimus aliquid super hoc loqui. Paternitas et filiatio non ita esse omnino in divina substantia dicuntur, sicut in ipsis hypostasibus; in quibus ita sunt, quod eas determinant, ut ait Joan. Damas., lib. 3 de orthodoxa Fide, c. 6. Characteristica idiomata sunt, id est, determinativae proprietates hypostaseos et non naturae; etenim hypostasim determinant et non naturam. Ideoque licet paternitas et filiatio sint in divina essentia, cum eam non determinent, non ideo potest dici quod divina essentia et generet et generetur; vel quod eadem res sit sibi Pater et Filius. Ita enim proprietas determinat personam, ut hac proprietate hypostasis sit generans, et illa alia hypostasis sit genita; et ita non idem generat et generatur, sed alter alterum.*

19. Ibid., 1.33.1.2: *Cum ergo proprietates ipsae ab aeterno fuerint, quibus ipsae personae determinantur et differunt; quomodo essent, si in eis non essent; et quomodo in eis essent, et ipsae personae non essent, quin ibi esset multiplicitas?*

20. Ibid., 1.33.1.4: *Fateamur ergo, et proprietates esse in tribus personis, et ipsas esse personas atque divinam essentiam.*

21. Ibid., 1.33.2.1: *Ego nescio, non requiro.*

22. Ibid., 1.26.2.2–3: . . . *alia proprietas sive notio est generatio, et alia nativitas, alia processio, quae aliis nominibus dicuntur paternitas, filiatio. Has proprietates designant nomina personarum, scilicet* Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus, *quae relativa sunt, et ad se*

invicem dicuntur, quia notant relationes quae non sunt Deo accidentales, sed in ipsis personis ab aeterno sunt immutabiliter; ut non modo appellationes sint relativae, sed etiam relationes sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in personis, sint.

23. Ibid., p. 141 n. 1.

24. Ibid., *Sentences* I.27.2.1–4. 1: *Nec tamen videtur nobis omnino esse idem dicere aliquid esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; vel aliquid esse Filium, et habere Patrem; vel esse Spiritum sanctum, et procedere ab utroque; alioquin Pater non esset nomen hypostasis, id est, personae, sed proprietatis tantum, similiter Filius, et Spiritus sanctus, et ita non per tria nomina significarentur tres personae.*

2. *Ideoque dicimus quia Patris nomen non tantum relationem notat, sed etiam hypostasim, id est, subsistentiam significat; ita et Filius, et Spiritus sanctus.*

3. *Relationum vero vocabula, scilicet* paternitas, filiatio, processio, *vel* gignere, gigni, procedere, *ipsas tantum relationes, non hypostases significant, sive habere Patrem.*

4. *Ut, verbi gratia, cum dicimus:* Deus est Pater, *nomine* Patris *et relationem notamus, et divinam hypostasim significamus; ut sit intelligentia talis: Deus vel divina essentia est Pater, id est, ille qui genuit, id est, hypostasis quae habet Filium. Similiter, Deus est Filius, id est, hypostasis genita vel habens Patrem. Ita etiam, Deus est Spiritus sanctus, id est, hypostasis procedens ab utroque, sive ille qui procedit. Cum vero nomina relationum ponimus in praedicatis, notiones ipsas tantum significamus, non hypostases; ut cum dicimus: Deus genuit, id est, habet Filium, et Deus genitus est, id est, habet Patrem. Et tunc oportet intelligi in subjectis hypostases tantum, non essentiam, quae illis proprietatibus determinantur.*

7. *Bonaventure*

1. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 2 Prologue: *Salvatoris opitulante gratia, ex quo perventum est ad completionem primi Sententiarum, Patrum interveniente instantia, oportet inchoare secundum. At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum vestigiis non recedem. Non enim intendo novas opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas retexere. Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator.* Translation by Br. Alexis Bugnolo.

2. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 7.5:13–20.

3. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 1.8.7.

4. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 1.8.2 art. unic. q.4: *Item, quod habet superius univocum et essentiale, habet esse in genere determinato; sed Deus habet superius se, ut substantiam, quae dicitur de Deo et creaturis et essentialiter et univoce, quia secundum istam rationem quae est, res per se existens: ergo etc.*

5. Ibid., 1.8.2 art. unic. q.4: *Deus enim est ens per se, quia nullo egens; creatura est ens per se, quia non est in alio ut in subiecto, eget tamen alio ad sui conservationem.*

6. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.11:4–7.

7. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 1.8.8.

8. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 1.23.1.3: *cum in communi in inferioribus inveniatur quod est et quo est, ratione cuius significatur in concretione et in abstractione, ut dicatur homo et humanitas: sic in divinis intelligimus, quamvis non intelligamus in differentia illa duo. Ideo et in abstractione significamus per hoc nomen deitas, et in concretione per hoc nomen Deus. Et ideo imposuimus ei nomen, quo significaretur ipsum quo est, et hoc est essentia; et ipsum quod est, et hoc est substantia.*

9. Ibid., 1.23.1.3: *Et quoniam in Deo idem est quo est et quod est ex una parte, et distinguibile et distinctum ex alia secundum rem, Sancti accipiunt et substantiam et essentiam pro eodem; similiter et hypostasis nomine utuntur Graeci pro supposito actu distincto. Unde distinctio per quo et quod est, et per distinguibile et distinctum in nominibus divinis non facit diversitatem nisi secundum rationem intelligendi.*

10. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 7.6.11; Lombard, *Sentences* 1.25.1.5.

11. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 1.25 dub.2: *Quando aliquid comparatur ad aliud ut informans sive denominans, non ponitur propter hoc diversitas sive distinctio unius ad alterum; sic enim comparatur deitas ad Deum. Alio modo comparatur alterum sicut principium ad principiatum; et tunc de necessitate importatur distinctio.*

12. Ibid., 1.27.1 art. unic. q.3: *Dicendum, quod abstrahi aliquid ab aliquo est dupliciter. Uno modo abstractio est, quae ortum habet a natura rei; et sic abstrahitur universale a particulari, et forma a materia, quoniam utrobique est compositio et diversitas. Alio modo est abstractio, quae ortum habet ab intellectu nostro. Intellectus enim noster cum intelligit aliquid completum, de necessitate dupliciter intelligit sive sub duplici ratione, scilicet per modum ipsius quod est et ipsius quo. Semper enim cum aliquid intelligit, considerat ipsum intelligibile per aliquam rationem, per quam etiam ipsum capit; et ita intellectus noster est resolubilis in intellectum ipsius quod est et ipsius quo, quia compositio erat circa ipsum.*

13. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.1: *Dicendum, quod de comparatione proprietatis ad personam triplex fuit opinio. Prima positio fuit, quod proprietates non sunt personae nec in personis, sed assistunt personis, sicut relationes. Et ratio, quae movit istos, fuit personarum pluralitas et divina simplicitas. Quia enim personae plures sunt, plures habent proprietates, quae vere differentes sunt. Et quia differentes sunt, si essent in persona, auferrent ei simplicitatem. Quae cum non possit auferri a divinis, posuerunt, proprietates esse assistentes personis, non esse personas. Et huic videtur consonare natura relationis, quae non videtur esse in substantia nec praedicare aliquid in subiecto, sed dicere respectum ad aliud. — Et haec positio, etsi rationabilis aliquo modo fuit, tamen stare non potest, quia ponebat, relationes in divinis nec Deum esse nec creaturam. Unde etsi in principio sui modicum contineret errorem, ducebat tamen ad magnum; et ideo retractata fuit in Concilio Rhemensi, et magister Gilbertus Porretanus ore proprio retractavit.*

14. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.1: *Ideo fuit secunda opinio, multum differens ab ista, videlicet, quod proprietates omnino sunt personae nec differunt nisi solummodo in modo loquendi, et tantum sunt tres proprietates, sicut sunt tres personae. Et ista positio fundata est similiter super divinam simplicitatem. Quia enim personae sunt simplicissimae, se ipsis distinguuntur, et ipsae sunt suae proprietates nec habent alias differentes*

re, sed solo modo loquendi. Et ista positio fuit magistri Praepositivi, et magis est probabilis quam praecedens. —Attamen ipsa improbata est supra, distinctione vigesima sexta, quia una persona plures habet relationes, quae sunt verae relationes; et plures personae habent unam proprietatem; et una persona alio et alio modo se habet ad Filium et ad Spiritum sanctum, etiam secundum rem. Ex quo necessario sequitur, quod realiter aliquo modo differt proprietas a persona, et non solum in modo loquendi, sicut dicebat magister Praepositivus.

15. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.1: *Et propter hoc intelligendum, quod utroque praedictarum positionum aliquid veri dixit et in aliquo defecit. Nam prima, quae dicebat, quod proprietates aliquod modo differunt a personis, verum dixit; sed in hoc male, quod dixit simpliciter differre. Sequens, quae dixit, quod proprietates sint personae, verum dixit; sed in hoc excessit, quod dixit, quod nullo modo differunt a personis.*
Ideo ex his duabus positionibus conflatur una vera et communis positio, quam tenent modo magistri communiter, quod proprietates sunt personae et in personis, tamen aliquo modo differunt a personis.

16. Ibid.: *Et quod ista positio sit conveniens, patet, si quis inspiciat naturam proprietatum. Dictum enim est supra, cum quaerebatur, quid esset proprietas in divinis, quod erat relatio. Dictum est etiam, quod relatio ratione comparationis, quam habet ad subiectum, transit in substantiam in divinis; et ideo de subiecto suo omnino vere praedicatur, ut Pater est paternitas. Ratione vero comparationis, quam habet ad obiectum, manet verissime in divinis et habet quodam modo differentiam a persona; nec facit secundum hoc compositionem, sed distinctionem respectu cuius est. Compositio enim attenditur per comparationem proprietatis ad subiectum, distinctio respectu obiecti. Et ex hoc patet, quod proprietas est persona et in persona, quia idem est per essentiam sive modum essendi, differt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi.*

17. Ibid., 1.26 unic art. q.1: *Et ideo nunc communis opinio tenet, in divinis esse proprietates personarum realiter differentes a se invicem, et per hoc etiam differentes a personis aliquo modo.*

18. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.1: *Quia enim aliquantulam habent differentiam proprietas et persona penes modum se habendi, ideo proprietas vere determinat et distinguit; hoc tamen non tollit praedicationem, quia modus ille non addit aliam essentiam.*

19. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.2: *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod alio est Deus, alio est Pater; dicendum, quod ablativus dicit rationem dicendi vel denominandi; unde et alietas, per ablativum significata, attenditur solum quantum ad modum, non quantum ad essentiam, ut patet.*

20. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.5.6; Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 1.26.3.1.

21. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 1.26 art. unic. q.2: *Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum, quod relatio in aliquibus convenit cum aliis generibus, in aliquibus differt. Convenit enim in hoc, quod est praedicamentum et genus entis, et in hoc, quod est accidens; et disconvenit in hoc, quod praeter alia genera habet respectum non solum ad subiectum, sed etiam ad obiectum secundum habitudinem et dependentiam. Quantum ad primas conditiones impossibile est relationem manere in divinis, sicut alia genera, et hoc propter summam simplicitatem. In Deo enim relatio non est praedicamentum nec accidens, sed substania*

est. Quantum vero ad conditiones, quas habet respectu obiecti, necesse est quodam modo manere, scilicet quantum ad habitudinem, et hoc propter veram distinctionem, quae est in divinis, et veram originem et habitudinem; et necesse est quodam modo non manere, scilicet quantum ad dependentiam, et hoc propter omnimodam absolutionem, quae est in divinis.

22. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.2: *Propter hoc ad intelligentiam obiectorum intelligendum, sicut praenotatum est, quod relatio ratione comparationis ad subiectum transit in substantiam, et ideo proprietas est divina substantia; ratione vero comparationis ad terminum sive obiectum remanet; et quantum ad hoc est distinctiva et differt ab essentia, non quia dicat aliam essentiam, sed alium modum se habendi, qui per comparationem ad essentiam vel personam dicit modum, nihil addens; in comparatione vero ad correlativum vere dicit rem et distinctionem.*

23. Ibid., 1.22 art. unic. q.4: *Ad illud quod obiicitur, qualis sit haec diversitas, aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum intelligendi; dicendum, quod secundum modum se habendi, qui non tantum est in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re.*

24. Ibid., 1 d.26 a. unic. Q.1 ad 2: *Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod differunt solum ratione; dicendum, quod differe ratione est tripliciter. Uno modo a parte nostrae apprehensionis, sicut in Deo bonitas et magnitudo. Alio modo differre ratione est secundum differentiam attributionis, quia aliquis modus ponitur circa unum vel attribuitur uni, qui non attribuitur alteri; et sic differunt ratione essentia et persona et notio. Tertio modo differre ratione est differre secundum pluralitatem distinctionis, quae non inducit diversitatem in essentia vel natura, tamen tantam inducit differentiam, quod unum non dicitur de altero; et sic differt ratione persona a persona et proprietas a proprietate. Et prima quidem differentia secundum rationem est minima, quia nihil ei respondet a parte rei; sed ultimae respondet. Non vult ergo Damascenus dividere rem contra rationem, nisi secundum quod res accipitur pro natura; nec etiam sic omnino dividit, sed quasi a principali denominat. Nam in creaturis non solum est communitas rationalis, immo etiam naturalis. Nam Petrus et Paulus non tantum in ratione conveniunt, sed etiam in natura communi.*

25. Hester Goodenough Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought 1300–1335* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974), p. 14. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 1.26 art. unic. q.1.

26. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 1.33.1.4.

27. Ibid., 1.33.2.1.

28. Bonaventure, *Sentences* 1.33 art. unic. q.2: *Sed quia ulterius respectus ille non est essentiae ad aliud, sed personae ad personam; ideo respectus et relationes, proprie loquendo, sunt in personis, non in essentia: quia personae secundum eos referuntur et distinguuntur, in essentia autem non, quia nec refertur nec distinguitur. Sunt tamen in essentia divina, loquendo communiter et improprie, ut dicatur in divina essentia esse omne quod est divina essentia, vel omne quod est in essentia vel persona.*

29. Ibid., 1.33 art. unic. q.1; I.27.1 art. unic. q.3.

30. Robert Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum* (Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1986), 35:307–315: *Qualiter autem relatio*

possit esse substantia, patet illis qui noverunt quomodo prima principia substantiae compositae ad invicem referuntur, scilicet materia pura et forma, quomodo etiam creatura relativa est ad creatorem. Potest autem hoc esse tali ratione: Relatio accidens aliunde est accidens et aliunde relatio; accidens enim est unde inest, relatio unde ad aliquid extra se respectum habet. Tolle ergo hoc ipsum inesse et tulisti accidens. Quod ergo remanet, substantia erit. Ubi ergo nihil est inhaerens, non est accidens. Et tamen bene potest inesse respectus ad aliquid, et ille erit substantia. Et sic est in personis divinis.

8. Albert

1. Dante Alighieri, *La divina commedia: paradiso* 10:97–99: *Questi che m'è a destro più vicino / frate e maestro fummi, ed esso Alberto / è di Cologna, e io Thomas d'Aquino*. Mandelbaum translation.

2. Albert, *Sentences* 1.8.32: *Et cum dicitur substantia non dicitur substantia ab actu substandi secundae substantiae vel accidentibus, sed dicitur substantia ens non per alterum, quod dividitur contra ens ab alio et ens in alio. Et illam substantiam vocant Boetius et Dionysius esse super omnem substantiam, quia haec omnes causat substantias, et illam imitantur.*

3. Iohannes Pagus, *Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* Lectio 11 Q.2: *Ad hoc ultimum dicendum quod ens per se dicitur uno modo quod non est ab alio nec in alio, et sic prima causa est ens per se, secundo modo dicitur quod non est in alio sed est ab alio, ut substantia.*

4. Albert, *Liber Praedicamentorum* 1.4:34–53: *Cum enim dicitur denominativum, propter compositionem praepositionis notatur transitio sive diversitas, quae est inter essentiam denominantem et inter essentiam denominatam. Et ideo quae sunt eiusdem naturae denominationis non suscipiunt praedicationem vel appellationem, unde homo non dicitur humanus ab humanitate, sed dicitur essentialiter homo et animal et rationale et omnia, quae secundum essentiam praedicantur. Et quia etiam proprium essentiale est, quamvis non sit de essentia, ideo non congrue dicitur homo risibilatus; sed in accidentibus etiam, secundum quod ordinata sunt in generibus suis et speciebus, non recipiunt denominationis rationem; albedo enim nec dicitur alba nec dicitur coloratum, sed dicitur color, et sic est de omnibus aliis. Sed quando aliena natura, quae est post esse alterius, intelligitur et significatur alii quasi circumposita vel composita per unius naturae ad alienam congregationem, tunc fit denominatio, ut dicitur homo album vel album quod est res alba.*

5. Albert, *Sentences* 1.33.1: *Dicendum videtur quod secundum rem nihil abstractum est in divinis.*

6. Ibid.: *Dico ergo ad primum, quod in divinis totum esse est ab esse essentiae: et licet non sit accidens in divinis, tamen proprietas in hoc quod est in alio, non per se ens, significatur ut potens intelligi sine illo: et ideo abstrahitur.*

7. Ibid.: *Et similiter cum dicitur, hypostasis distinguitur, et proprietas distinguit, attribuimus hypostasi quod non attribuimus proprietati: haec enim ratio aliquo modo cogit significare proprietatem, quo non significatur persona: et hoc non potest esse nisi abstrahendo.*

8. Ibid.: *Sic autem non est in substantialibus: quia ab illis est esse substantiale: et ideo abstrahi vt denominatiua non possunt: quia abstractis eis, subiectum non remaneret.*

9. Ibid., 1.34.1: *Dicendum ergo et credendeum simpliciter quod propter finem simplicitatis Dei non differunt in eo esse et quod est, et essentia persona re. Differunt tamen in modo supponendi et attribuendi.*

10. Ibid., 1.8.34: *Breviter dicendum, eo quod infra discutietur, quod relatio tria habet in se, scilicet naturam accidentis, et quod proprietas quaedam est (et ex hoc habet inesse soli), et habet in se quod ad alterum opponitur relative (et ex hoc habet determinari extra, ut cum dicitur "pater filii" et "filii patris"). Et quantum ad primum mutat modum praedicandi, quia quoad illud modus praedicandi suus est modus accidentis facientis compositionem concretionis cum subiecto in quo est, et praedicatur denominative de ipso. Et talis praedicatio in Deo non potest esse. Et ideo in divinis amittit naturam accidentis, et remanet natura proprietatis inquantum est proprietas, scilicet quod est soli convenire; et ulterius remanet ei intellectus relationis ad alterum, ut dictum est. et ideo quidam dixerunt quod in divinis relatio nihil est in persona, sed est persona ipsa, et id quo persona ad alterum est, volentes per hoc dicere quod naturam accidentis amittit, et sic non inest, et retinet naturam proprietatis et relationis. Quod autem Boethius dicit, quod est assistens relatio, intelligit quoad secundum, scilicet quoad naturam relationis ut relatio, et non quod naturam proprietatis quae est in relatione. Ex hoc patet quod non tollit simplicitatem, quia non tolleret nisi per naturam accidentis ut est accidens, quod inducendo diversum ens, id est, ens diversae naturae a substantia, faceret multiplex ens, et compositionem concretionis inter illa. Persona enim non habet accidens aliquod, sed verissime est substantia et suppositum. Et haec sententia infra magis discutietur 26. Distinctione.*

11. Ibid., 1.8.31: *Solutio. Ad hoc debet dici, quod omnia generalissima ex generibus accidentis duo habent in se, scilicet quod accidentia sunt, et differentiam qua ab invicem distinguuntur. Quod enim quantitas est quantitas, non habet ab eo quod est accidens, sed ab eo quod est dimensio vel mensura substantiae intus vel extra. Similiter quod qualitas est qualitas, non habet ab eo quod est accidens, sed ab eo quod est dispositio substantiae naturalis vel adveniens intus vel extra. Et sic est de aliis. Ab eo autem quod sunt accidentia omnia dicunt ordinem ad substantiam. . . . Ergo cum hoc modo sit ens imperfectum, et ens in alio, omnia quae aliquid praedicant in eo de quo praedicantur, ratione generis remouentur a divinis. Et ad hoc iterum intelligendum notandum, quod Boetius dicit, quod praedicamentorum quaedam praedicant aliquid inesse ei, de quo praedicantur: quaedam autem extrinsecus assistunt: quaedam autem praedicant rem se habere ad id quod extrinsecus adiacet, vt locus et tempus. . . . Illa vero quae extrinsecus assistentia ad alterum sunt, gratia eius quod est accidentis natura in eis, non praedicantur, sed mutantur in substantiam: sed ratione eius quod addunt in generalissimo, non dicunt ordinem ad substantiam et ideo manent.*

12. Ibid.,1.33.1: . . . *quia cum dicimus, Pater refertur ad Filium, et refertur ad Spiritum sanctum; nisi diceremus relationem aliquid esse, oporteret quod eodem modo Pater se haberet ad Filium et Spiritum sanctum: et hoc non est verum. Et similiter cum dicitur, hypostasis distinguitur, et proprietas distinguit, attribuimus hypostasi quod non*

attribuimus proprietati: haec enim ratio aliquo modo cogit significare proprietatem, quo non significatur persona: et hoc non potest esse nisi abstrahendo.

13. Ibid., 1.8.34: *Si forte dicatur quod relatio non dicit aliquid ut inhaerens, sed ut assistens (ut videtur velle Boetius et Porretaniani dixerunt) ad hoc videtur sequi haeresis Sabellii. Si enim relatio nihil dicit in re, videtur quod ipsa non constituat rem in qua est. In divinis autem nihil habemus quod constituere possit personas nisi relationes. Ergo videtur quod in illae in re nihil sint quod non fiat distinctio personarum sed sola sit nominum trinitas, ut dicit Sabellius.*

14. Ibid., 1.26.6: . . . *relatio quae est in inferioribus inest relativo, et ad alterum referri facit; in divinis est relativum secundum substantiam, et facit ipsum referri ad aliud. Et ideo non est extrinsecus assistens tantum.*

15. Ibid., 1.33.2: *Solutio igitur erit quod dicemus proprietates esse in personis et personas sicut Magister hic dicit: in personis autem ut diversas ab ipsis in modo intelligendi et attribuendi, ipsas autem personas ut idem in re existentes cum eis sicut et cum essentia, quia quicquid est in Deo, Deus est.*

16. Ibid., 1.33.5: *Sed nos accipimus inesse per modum intelligendi et non per diversitatem rei. Est enim in relatione considerare naturam accidentis, et secundum illam non ponit respectum nisi ad substantiam quae est subiectum generum aliorum, et quoad hoc relatio, sicut alia genera, mutat modum praedicandi. Et sic ipsa proprietas est persona in qua est, et per consequens essentia in qua est ipsa persona.*

9. Aquinas

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences*, Prologue: *Ego sapientia effudi flumina: ego quasi trames aquae immensae defluo: ego quasi fluvius Dorix, et sicut aquaeductus exivi de Paradiso. Dixi: rigabo hortum plantationum, et inebriabo pratus mei fructum. Eccli. 24, 40. Inter multas sententias quae a diversis de sapientia prodierunt, quid scilicet esset vera sapientia, unam singulariter firmam et veram apostolus protulit dicens Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam, qui etiam nobis a Deo factus est sapientia, 1 ad Corinth. 1, 24 et 30. Non autem hoc ita dictum est, quod solus filius sit sapientia, cum pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sint una sapientia, sicut una essentia; sed quia sapientia quodam speciali modo filio appropriatur, eo quod sapientiae opera cum proprietatibus filii plurimum convenire videntur. Per sapientiam enim Dei manifestantur divinorum abscondita, producuntur creaturarum opera, nec tantum producuntur, sed etiam restaurantur et perficiuntur: illa, dico, perfectione qua unumquodque perfectum dicitur, prout proprium finem attingit*. Trans. Ralph McInerny in *Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings* (Penguin, 1988).

2. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 45.

3. Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, 1.1: *Ponimus ergo in Deo substantiam et esse, sed substantiam ratione subsistentiae non ratione substandi; esse vero ratione simplicitatis et complementi, non ratione inhaerentiae, qua alteri inhaeret.*

4. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.40.1: *Considerandum tamen est quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, consideratur duplex realis identitas in divinis eorum quae differunt in rebus creatis. Quia enim divina simplicitas excludit compositionem formae et mate-*

riae, sequitur quod in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum, ut deitas et Deus. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

5. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 44.

6. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.40.1: *Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subiecti et accidentis, sequitur quod quidquid attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia, et propter hoc sapientia et virtus idem sunt in Deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia. Et secundum hanc duplicem rationem identitatis, proprietas in divinis est idem cum persona. Nam proprietates personales sunt idem cum personis, ea ratione qua abstractum est idem cum concreto. Sunt enim ipsae personae subsistentes; ut paternitas est ipse pater, et filiatio filius, et processio spiritus sanctus. Proprietates autem non personales sunt idem cum personis secundum aliam rationem identitatis, qua omne illud quod attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia. Sic igitur communis spiratio est idem cum persona patris et cum persona filii, non quod sit una persona per se subsistens; sed, sicut una essentia est in duabus personis, ita et una proprietas, ut supra dictum est.* Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

7. Ibid.: *Ad primum ergo dicendum quod persona et proprietas sunt idem re, differunt tamen secundum rationem. Unde non oportet quod, multiplicato uno, multiplicetur reliquum.* Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

8. Aquinas, *Sentences* I.2.1.5: *Sciendum est igitur, quod proprietas personalis, scilicet relatio distinguens, est idem re quod divina essentia, sed differens ratione, sicut et de attributis dictum est. Ratio autem relationis est ut referatur ad alteram. Potest ergo dupliciter considerari relatio in divinis: vel per comparationem ad essentiam, et sic est ratio tantum; vel per comparationem ad illud ad quod refertur, et sic per propriam rationem relationis relatio realiter distinguitur ab illo. Sed per comparationem relationis ad suum correlativum oppositum distinguuntur personae, et non per comparationem relationis ad essentiam: et ideo est pluralitas personarum realis et non tantum rationis.*

9. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.39.1: *Relatio autem, ad essentiam comparata, non differt re, sed ratione tantum, comparata autem ad oppositam relationem, habet, virtute oppositionis, realem distinctionem. Et sic una essentia, et tres personae.* Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

10. Aquinas, *Disputations, De Potentia* 8.2: *Dicendum quod, supposito quod relationes in divinis sint, de necessitate oportet dicere quod sint essentia divina: alias oporteret ponere compositionem in Deo, et quod relationes in divinis essent accidentia, quia omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam substantiam est accidens. Oporteret etiam quod aliqua res esset aeterna, quae non erit substantia divina; quae omnia sunt haeretica.*

11. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.28.2: *Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc dicitur Gilbertus Porretanus errasse, sed errorem suum postmodum in Remensi Concilio revocasse. Dixit enim quod relationes in divinis sunt assistentes, sive extrinsecus affixae.*

12. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate* 5.43: *Theologice uero Persone quoniam eius, quo sunt, singularitate unum sunt et simplicitate id quod sunt, essentiarum oppositione a se inuicem alie esse non possunt. Sed harum, que dicte sunt, extrinsecus affixarum rerum oppositione a se inuicem alie et probantur et sunt.*

13. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.28.2: *Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto, accidentis enim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum. Et in aliis quidem generibus a relatione, utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum comparationem ad subiectum, nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae. Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra. Si igitur consideremus, etiam in rebus creatis, relationes secundum id quod relationes sunt, sic inveniuntur esse assistentes, non intrinsecus affixae; quasi significantes respectum quodammodo contingentem ipsam rem relatam, prout ab ea tendit in alterum. Si vero consideretur relatio secundum quod est accidens, sic est inhaerens subiecto, et habens esse accidentale in ipso. Sed Gilbertus Porretanus consideravit relationem primo modo tantum.*

14. Aquinas, *De Potentia* 8.2: *Unde dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse inhaerens, quod tamen non significatur ut inhaerens, sicut etiam actio non significatur ut in agente, sed ut ab agente, et tamen constat actionem esse in agente. Et similiter, licet ad aliquid non significetur ut inhaerens, tamen oportet ut sit inhaerens. Et hoc quando relatio est res aliqua; quando vero est secundum rationem tantum, tunc non est inhaerens. Et sicut in rebus creatis oportet quod sit accidens, ita oportet quod sit in Deo substantia, quia quidquid est in Deo, est eius substantia. Oportet ergo relationes secundum rem, esse divinam substantiam; quae tamen non habent modum substantiae, sed habent alium modum praedicandi ab his quae substantialiter praedicantur in Deo.*

15. Ibid.: *Unde quidam attendentes modum significandi in relativis, dixerunt, ea non esse inhaerentia substantiis, scilicet quasi eis assistentia: quia significantur ad quoddam medium inter substantiam quae refertur, et id ad quod refertur. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod in rebus creatis relationes non sunt accidentia, quia accidentis esse est inesse. Unde etiam quidam theologi, scilicet Porretani, huiusmodi opinionem usque ad divinam relationem extenderunt, dicentes, relationes non esse in personis, sed eis quasi assistere. Et quia essentia divina est in personis, sequebatur quod relationes non sunt essentia divina; et quia omne accidens inhaeret, sequebatur quod non essent accidentia. Et secundum hoc solvebant verbum Augustini inductum, quod scilicet relationes non praedicantur de Deo secundum substantiam, nec secundum accidens.*

16. Ibid.: *Sed ad hanc opinionem sequitur quod relatio non sit res aliqua, sed solum secundum rationem: omnis enim res vel est substantia vel accidens. Unde etiam quidam antiqui posuerunt relationes esse de secundis intellectis, ut Commentator dicit XI Metaph. Et ideo oportet hoc etiam Porretanos dicere, quod relationes divinae non sunt nisi secundum rationem. Et sic sequetur quod distinctio personarum non erit realis; quod est haereticum.*

17. Ibid.: *Respondeo. Dicendum quod, supposito quod relationes in divinis sint, de necessitate oportet dicere quod sint essentia divina: alias oporteret ponere compositionem in Deo, et quod relationes in divinis essent accidentia, quia omnis res inhaerens alicui*

praeter suam substantiam est accidens. Oporteret etiam quod aliqua res esset aeterna, quae non erit substantia divina; quae omnia sunt haeretica.

18. Aquinas, *Compendium Theologiae* I.24: *Cum enim intellectus noster essentiam eius in se ipsa capere non sufficiat, in eius cognitionem consurgit ex rebus quae apud nos sunt, in quibus inveniuntur diversae perfectiones, quarum omnium radix et origo in Deo una est, ut ostensum est. Et quia non possumus aliquid nominare nisi secundum quod intelligimus (sunt enim nomina intellectuum signa), Deum non possumus nominare nisi ex perfectionibus in aliis rebus inventis, quarum origo in ipso est: et quia hae in rebus istis multiplices sunt, oportet multa nomina Deo imponere. Si autem essentiam eius in se ipsa videremus, non requireretur nominum multitudo, sed esset simplex notitia eius, sicut est simplex essentia eius: et hoc in die gloriae nostrae expectamus, secundum illud Zachar. ultimo:* in illa die erit dominus unus, et nomen eius unum.

19. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1.13.4: *Respondeo dicendum quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter, in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa, licet significent unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.*

20. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1.13.3: *In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare, scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et huiusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo, habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.*

21. Aquinas, *Sentences* I.33.1.3: *Respondeo dicendum, quod proprietates sunt in essentia et in personis; sed diversimode: quia in essentia sunt per identitatem rei, et non sicut in supposito; sed in personis sunt sicut in supposito; sed diversimode, secundum quod aliquid dicitur suppositum alicujus dupliciter: vel naturae per quam constituitur, sicut humanitas est in Socrate, et hoc modo proprietates personales sunt in personis; vel sicut illud quod advenit post esse constitutum, sicut albedo est in Socrate; et ita secundum intellectum proprietates non personales, ut innascibilitas et communis spiratio, sunt in personis; non tamen ita quod suppositum sit aliquid aliud ab eo quod inest*

secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum concreti et abstracti, ut dictum est, art. praeced.

22. Ibid., I.33.1.2: *Et ideo dicimus, quod proprietates et personae sunt idem re, sed differunt ratione, sicut et de proprietatibus et de essentia dictum est. Sed in hoc differt, quod ratio proprietatis et essentiae differt sicut ratio diversorum generum, ut dictum est; sed ratio proprietatis et personae differt sicut ratio abstracti et concreti in eodem genere acceptorum. In concreto autem est duo considerare in rebus creatis; scilicet compositionem, et perfectionem; quia quod significatur concretive, significatur ut per se existens, ut homo vel album. Similiter de ratione abstracti duo sunt, scilicet simplicitas, et imperfectio; quia quod significatur in abstracto, significatur per modum formae, cujus non est operari vel subsistere in se, sed in alio. Unde patet quod sicut etiam est in aliis quae de Deo dicuntur, neutra ratio secundum totum divinis competit; ex quo probatur, Lib. de causis, propos. 6, quod nihil proprie de Deo dicitur; quia nec abstractum propter imperfectionem, nec concretum propter compositionem. Sed quantum ad aliquid utrumque vere dicitur; quia et concretum propter perfectionem, et abstractum propter simplicitatem.*

23. Hester Goodenough Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974), p. 20.

24. Ibid., p. 25.

25. Aquinas, *Sentences* 1 Proem. q.1: *Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse dupliciter. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit, et talis est analogia creaturae ad creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit: unde nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur.*

10. Scotus

1. Duns Scotus, *De Primo Principio*, Prologue: *Domine Deus noster, Moysi servo tuo, de tuo nomine filiis Israel proponendo, a te Doctore verissimo sciscitanti, sciens quid posset de te concipere intellectus mortalium, nomen tuum benedictum reserans, respondisti: Ego sum, qui sum. Tu es verum esse, tu es totum esse. Hoc, si mihi esset possibile, scire vellem. Adiuva me, Domine, inquirentem ad quantam cognitionem de vero esse, quod tu es, possit pertingere nostra ratio naturalis ab ente, quod de te praedicasti, inchoando*. Trans. Allan B. Wolter.

2. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 71.

3. Hester Goodenough Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought 1300–1335* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 71–72.

4. Scotus, *Lectura* 1.8.2, §8–9: *Ad quaestionem primam dicendum est quod Deus est omnino simplex.*

Et circa hoc sunt tria ostendenda: primo, quod in essentia sua non habet compositionem, ita quod ibi non sit compositio partium essentialium (quae dicitur esse com-

positio essentialis); secundo, quod non est ibi compositio partium quantitativarum, ita quod non habet quantitatem; et tertio, quod ibi non est compositio accidentis cum subiecto.

5. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 41.

6. Scotus, *Ordinatio* 1.33–34 q. unic., §3: . . . *perfectum simplicitatem divinam, quae sequitur ex perfecta infinitate illius essentiae.*

7. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 29.

8. Scotus, *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.1–2 n.39: *Exemplum de formali ratione sapientiae (vel intellectus) vel voluntatis: consideratur enim in se et secundum se; et ex hoc quod ista ratio non concludit* [concludit = *A* includit *rell. edd.*] *formaliter imperfectionem aliquam nec limitationem, removentur ab ipsa imperfectiones quae concomitantur eam in creaturis, et reservata eadem ratione sapientiae et voluntatis attribuuntur ista Deo perfectissime. Ergo omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem, univocum, quem accipit ex creaturis*. Translation in Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 38.

9. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 43.

10. Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphrii Isagoge*, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (The Franciscan Institute, 1999), 16:39–40: *Ad primum, cum dicitur "omne concretum est denominativum," distinguendum est quod sicut est duplex abstractum, scilicet quod abstrahit a subiecto, aliud quod abstrahit a forma ut est in supposito, ita duplex est concretum per oppositum: unum modo quod concernit subiectum, et aliud quod concernit suppositum. De primo vera est dicta propositio, de secunda falsa.*
Per idem ad secundum: quod concretum primo modo significat formam ut est in subiecto, et est tantum in accidentibus, sicut album respectu albedinis; secundo modo ut est in suppositis, et sic est in substantiis, ut homo respectu humanitatis.

11. Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (The Franciscan Institute, 1999), 8:18: *Quamlibet autem essentiam contingit sub propria ratione intelligere, cum quod quid est sit primum obiectum intellectus. Istam igitur essentiam contingit sub propria ratione intelligere, et sic significare. Et tali modo intelligendi correspondet modus significandi abstractus. Alio modo contingit intelligere istam essentiam in quantum informat subiectum, et huic modo intelligendi correspondet modus significandi concretus. Sicut igitur eadem essentia intelligitur sub utroque modo intelligendi, sic idem significatur per nomen concretum et abstractum, sed diverso modo significandi.*

12. Scotus, *Praedicamenta* 11:36: *Et concedendum est quod album non est albedo.*

13. Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Brill, 2002), p. 180.

14. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I.8.1 q.4, §191: *differentia rationis, hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale (talis enim distinctio est inter sapiens et sapientiam).*

15. See, for example, Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 22–26; Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Ashgate, 2005), pp. 240–242; Stephen D. Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," *Vivarium* 43 (2005): 7–62; Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, pp. 80ff.

16. Mark G. Henninger, S.J., *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 82.

17. Ibid., p. 83.

18. Scotus, *Ordinatio* 1.5.2, §131: *Ista autem essentia—secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate—est qua Pater est et qua Filius est, licet non sit qua Pater est Pater et Filius est Filius.*

19. Scotus, *Ordinatio* 1.2.2 q.1, §191: . . . *quaecumque uni et eidem simpliciter sunt simpliciter eadem, inter se sunt omnino eadem. . . . Sed Personae divinae sunt simpliciter et omnino "eadem" essentiae divinae, quae in se est omnino et simpliciter eadem . . .. Minor etiam patet, quod ipsa essentia sit simpliciter eadem, quia ipsa propter summum sui simplicitatem est quidquid habet, secundum* Magistrum Sententiarum *distinctione 8, et secundum Augustinum 10* De Civitate *cap. 11.*

20. Scotus, *Lectura* I.2.2 qq.1–4, n. 278–280.

21. Scotus, *Ordinatio* 1.2.2 q.1, §378: *Ubi notandum quod natura non se habet ad suppositum sicut universale ad singulare, quia in accidentibus etiam invenitur singularitas sine ratione suppositi . . . neque se habet natura ad suppositum sicut "quo" ad "quod," nam cuicumque "quo" correspondet proprium "quod" vel "quis," et ita, sicut natura et "quo," ita habet proprium "quod" vel "quis" quod non contrahit ad suppositum.*

22. Ibid., 1.2.2 q.1, §§379–380: *Ubi sciendum quod communicabile dicitur aliquid vel per identitatem, ita quod illud cui communicatur sit "ipsum," vel per informationem, ita quod illud cui communicatur sit "ipso," non "ipsum."*
Primo modo universale communicatur singulari, et secundo modo forma materiae. Natura igitur quaecumque quantum ex se et de ratione naturae est communicabilis utrique modo, videlicet pluribus suppositis, quorum quodlibet sit "ipsum"—et etiam ut "quo," tamquam forma, quo singulare vel suppositum sit ens quiditative, vel habens naturam, suppositum autem est incommunicabile duplice incommunicabilitate opposita.

23. Ibid., 1.2.2 qq.1–4 §381: *Natura quaecumque est communicabilis pluribus per identitatem, igitur et natura divina est communicabilis (hoc etiam patet ex quaestione praeposita); non est autem divisibilis, ex quaestione de unitate Dei; igitur communicabilis sine divisione.*

24. Ibid., 1.2.2 qq.1–4 §388: *Sed adhuc restat ulterior difficultas. Non enim videtur intelligibile quod essentia non plurificetur et supposita sint plura nisi aliqua distinctio ponatur inter rationem essentiae et rationem suppositi. Et ideo ad salvandum istam compossibilitatem praedictam, oportet videre de ista distinctione.*

25. Ibid., I.2.2 qq.1–4 §§389–390: *Et dico sine assertione et praeiudicio melioris sententiae quod ratio qua formaliter suppositum est incommunicabile (sit* A*) et ratio essentiae ut essentia (sit* B*) habent aliquam distinctionem praecedentem omnem actum intellectus creati et increati.*

Hoc probo sic: primum suppositum formaliter vel realiter habet entitatem communicabilem, alioquin non posset eam communicare; habet etiam realiter entitatem incommunicabilem, alioquin non posset esse positive in entitatem reali suppositum. Et

intelligo sic "realiter," quod nullo modo per actum intellectus considerantis, immo quod talis entitas esset ibi si nullus intellectus esset considerans; et sic esse ibi, si nullus intellectus consideraret, dico "esse ante omnem actum intellectus."

26. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, p. 104.

27. Scotus, *Lectura* I.8.1 q.4, §172, 62:7–12: *Respondeo igitur ad quaestionem et dico: perfectiones essentiales in divinis sunt in re ante operationem intellectus. Si enim essent causatae per operationem intellectus, nulla esset perfectio simpliciter nec perfectio formaliter infinita, sicut nec relatio rationis est perfectio simpliciter nec perfectio formaliter infinita; et ideo idea non dicit simpliciter perfectionem.*

28. Scotus, *Lectura* I.8.1 q.3, §129, 46:22–47:6: *Patet igitur, ex dictis, quod Deus et creatura sunt primo diversa, in nulla realitate convenientia, quia nulla actio unius rationis convenit enti finito et infinito, nec infinita entitas est capax alicuius perfectionis istarum quarum entitas finita est capax, ratione cuius determinatur vel contrahitur; et tamen conveniunt in uno conceptu, ita quod potest esse unus conceptus formatus per intellectum imperfectum, communis Deo et creaturae, et conceptus iste communis potest causari a re imperfecta. Sed perfectus conceptus Dei non est communis Deo et creaturae, qui conceptus habetur de Deo in se viso. Unde ille conceptus communis Deo et creaturae, quem creatura facit in intellectu nostro, est conceptus deminutus Dei, qui si Deus perfecte faceret conceptum suum, ille esset proprius ei, ut prius dictum est.*

29. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I.8 n.39. Trans. Stephen Dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus," pp. 315–316.

30. Ibid., I.8.1 q.3, §137: *Sed hic est dubium, quomodo potest conceptus communis Deo et creaturae "realis" accipi, nisi ab aliqua realitate eiusdem generis, - et tunc videtur quod sit potentialis ad illam realitatem a qua accipitur conceptus distinguens, sicut prius argutum est "de conceptu generis et differentiae," et tunc stat argumentum superius factum pro prima opinione, quod si esset aliqua realitas distinguens in re, et alia distincta, videtur quod res sit composita, quia habet aliquid quo conveniat et quo differat.*

31. Ibid., I.8.1 q.3, §138: *Respondeo quod quando intelligitur aliqua realitas cum modo suo intrinseco, ille conceptus non est ita simpliciter simplex quin possit concipi illa realitas absque modo illo, sed tunc est conceptus imperfectus illius rei; potest etiam concipi sub illo modo, et tunc est conceptus perfectus illius rei. Exemplum: si esset albedo in decimo gradu intensionis, quantumcumque esset simplex omni modo in re, posset tamen concipi sub ratione albedinis tantae, et tunc perfecte conciperetur conceptu adaequato ipsi rei, - vel posset concipi praecise sub ratione albedinis, et tunc conciperetur conceptu imperfecto et deficiente a perfectione rei; conceptus autem imperfectus posset esse communis albedini illi et alii, et conceptus perfectus proprius esset.*

32. Ibid., I.8.1 q.3, §139: *Requiritur ergo distinctio, inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus communis et inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus proprius, non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis sed ut distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem,— quae distinctio sufficit ad habendum conceptum perfectum vel imperfectum de eodem, quorum imperfectus sit communis et perfectus sit proprius. Sed conceptus generis et differentiae requirunt distinctionem realitatum, non tantum eiusdem realitatis perfecte et imperfecte conceptae.*

33. Ibid., 1.8.1.3 n. 82.
34. Ibid., 1.8.1.3 n. 139.
35. Ibid., I.8.1 q.4.
36. Ibid., I.8.1 q.4, §191: *Ad quaestionem respondeo quod inter perfectiones essentiales non est tantum differentia rationis, hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale (talis enim distinctio est inter sapiens et sapientiam, et utique maior est inter sapientiam et veritatem).*
37. Ibid., I.8.1 q.4, §192: *Est ergo ibi distinctio praecedens intellectum omni modo, et est ista, quod sapientia est in re ex natura rei, et bonitas in re ex natura rei, —sapientia autem in re, formaliter non est bonitas in re. Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi. Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen "gradus" est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter "ut in communi, in communi," nec "ut infinitum, infinitum."*
38. Ibid., I.8.1 q.4, §193: *Hoc declaro, quia "includere formaliter" est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaretur, inclusum esse definitio vel pars definitionis; sicut autem definitio bonitatis non habet in se sapientiam, ita nec infinita in finitam: est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles. Definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatam ab intellectu, sed quiditatem rei: est ergo non-identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens istam "sapientia non est formaliter bonitas," non causat actu suo collativo veritatem huius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione fit actus verus.*
39. Ibid., I.8.1 q.4, §194: *Et istud argumentum "de non formali identitate" dixerunt antiqui doctores ponentes in divinis aliquam esse praedicationem veram per identitatem quae tamen non esset formalis: ita concedo ego, per identitatem bonitatem esse veritatem in re, non tamen veritatem esse formaliter bonitatem.*
40. Ibid., I.8.1 q.4, §209: *Ista autem non-identitas formalis stat cum simplicitate Dei, quia hanc differentiam necesse est esse inter essentiam et proprietatem, sicut supra distictione 2 quaestione ultima ostensum est, —et tamen propter hoc non ponitur compositio in persona. Similiter, ista distinctio formalis ponitur inter duas proprietates in Patre (ut inter innascibilitatem et paternitatem), quae, secundum Augustinum V* De Trinitatem *cap. 6, non sunt eadem proprietas, quia non est "eo quo Pater quo ingenitus." Si ergo in una persona possint esse duae proprietates absque compositione, multo magis, vel saltem aequaliter, possunt esse plures perfectiones essentiales in Deo "non formaliter idem" sine compositione, quia illae proprietates in Patre non sunt formaliter infinitae, essentiales autem perfectiones sunt infinitae formaliter, —ergo quaelibet eadem cuilibet.*
41. Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensia* I.33 q.1. Wadding XI 393A–394A: *Opinio D. Thomae, in I parte* Summae *q.28 articulo secundo, est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, differt tamen ab ea secundum intelligentiae ra-*

tionem, quam differentiam specificat, respondendo ad quaestionem, dicens ipsam differre ab essentia prout importat respectum ad oppositum qui respectus non importatur nomine essentiae. Et secundum hoc dicit quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et esse essentiae sed unum et idem. . . . Contra ista, et primo videntur verba contradicere sibi ipsis. Cum enim primo dicit quod relatio differt ab essentia secundum intelligentiae rationem, secundo quod relatio dicit respectum ad oppositum, non sic essentia, ex uno sequitur oppositum alterius. Probatio, nam relatio ex natura relationis et non tantum per actum intellectus est respectus ad oppositum ex natura rei; essentia vero est ad se; ergo ex natura rei si sit ibi relatio est distinctio ejus ab essentia praeter intelligentiae rationem. Major probatur quia nisi relatio ex natura rei esset respectus ad oppositum et non tantum secundum intelligentiae rationem, non esset Persona ibi Personali ex natura rei; constituitur autem relatione in esse Personali; quare etc. Sed relatio non est nisi respectus ad oppositum ex natura rei.

42. Ibid., I.33 q.1. Wadding XI 395B: . . . *quia Pater ex natura rei ante omnem actum intellectus in primo signo originis habet rem communicabilem, ut essentiam, quia aliter eam non communicaret; habet etiam ex natura rei in primo signo originis ante actum intellectus rem incommunicabilem, quia aliter non esset Persona ex natura rei, et illa quae est incommunicabilis ex natura rei, immo hoc includit contradictionem.*

43. Scotus, *Ordinatio* 1.5.2, §131: *ipsa pullulat non ut forma essentiae sed ut nata esse Deus ipsa deitate formaliter, licet non ut informante ipsam sed ut exsistente eadem sibi, perfectissima identitate*. Translation in Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, p. 178.

44. Ibid., 1.5.2, §116: *et tamen formalis ratio essentiae divinae non est formalis ratio relationis, nec e converso*.

45. Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 22.

46. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, p. 242; Scotus, *Quodlibet* 3 nn.2–3, 5. Wadding XII, 67–68, 71.

47. Adams (*William Ockham*, p. 51) suggests that Scotus's later view converts formality-names into adverbial modifiers, so that the formal distinction between divine wisdom and divine goodness amounts to a claim that "wisdom-wise" the divine essence is definable in one way but "goodness-wise" in another way.

48. James F. Ross and Todd Bates, "Duns Scotus on Natural Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 211.

11. Ockham

1. J. Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess IV–V," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 8 (1936): 180, Art. 25: *Ad palliandum autem dictum suum exponit se sic quod illa pluralitas rationis inter attributa non est essentia divina nec in essentia divina. Ista expositio est vana et extorta et contra communem intellectum verborum, quia quamvis illa pluralitas non sit essentia divina nec in ea subiective et formaliter, tamen est ibi fundamentaliter, et hoc sufficit ad diversitatem rationes.*

2. Hester Goodenough Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought 1300–1335* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974), p. 177.

3. Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, 1.6: 7–19: *Stricte dicuntur illa synonyma quibus omnes utentes intendunt simpliciter uti pro eodem, et sic non loquor hic de synonymis. Large dicuntur illa synonyma quae simpliciter idem significant omnibus modis, ita quod nihil aliquo modo significatur per unum quin eodem modo significetur per reliquum, quamvis non omnes utentes credant ipsa idem significare, sed decepti aestiment aliquid significari per unum quod non significatur per reliquum, sicut si aliqui aestimarent quod hoc nomen "Deus" importaret unum totum et "deitas" partem eius. Isto secundo modo intendo uti in isto capitulo, et in multis aliis, hoc nomine "synonyma." Et dico quod concretum et abstractum quandoque sunt synonyma, sicut secundum intentionem Philosophi ista nomina sunt synonyma "Deus" et "deitas," "homo" et "humanitas," "animal-animalitas," "equus" et "equinitas."*

4. Ockham, *Summa Logicae*,1.6:65–69: *Et non solum talia nomina concreta et abstracta sunt synonyma, sicut dicere habent sic opinantes, quin etiam, secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod relatio non est alia res distincta realiter a rebus absolutis, nomina concreta et abstracta relativa sunt nomina synonyma, sicut "pater" et "paternitas."*

5. Ockham, *Summa Logicae* 1.51:173–184: *Quae vero consueta sunt dici de relationibus, multa impropria, nonnulla falsa et fabulosa esse constat, sicut latissime patet perscrutanti volumina de his edita a modernis, licet eorum aliqua verum habeant intellectum, ut quod pater paternitate est pater et filius filiatione est filius et similis similitudine est similis, et his similia. In quibus locutionibus non oportet fingere rem aliquam, per quam pater sit pater et filius sit filius et similis sit similis. Nec oportet multiplicare res in talibus locutionibus "columna est dextera dexteritate," "Deus est creans creatione, bonus bonitate, iustus iustitia, potens potentia," "accidens inhaeret inhaerentia," "subiectum subiicitur subiectione," "aptum est aptum aptitudine," "chimaera est nihil nihileitate," "caecus est caecus caecitate," "corpus est mobile mobilitate," et sic de aliis innumeris.*

6. Ibid., 1.51:185–187: *Explicite igitur et absque ambiguitate loquendo quaelibet harum propositionum resolvenda est in duas, utendo descriptione loco nominis, ut: Pater est pater paternitate, id est, pater est pater quia genuit filium.*

7. Ibid., 2.34:10–11, 21–23: *Ad ueritatem autem causalis requiritur quod quaelibet pars sit uera, et simul cum hoc quod antecedens sit causa consequentis. . . . Vel requiritur quod propositio illa sit prior alia, ita quod praedicatum antecedentis prius praedicetur de subiecto suo quam praedicatum consequentis praedicetur de subiecto suo.*

8. Ibid., 1.51:191–197: *Si vero hic modus ponendi displiceat, possunt aliter salvari huiusmodi locutiones absque rerum multiplicatione, ponendo quod abstractum et concretum, puta pater et paternitas, filius et filiatio, similis et similitudo idem significant. Et tunc erit sensus: pater est pater paternitate, id est se ipso, sicut Deus est creator creatione activa, id est se ipso, quia creatio activa non dicit rem additam Deo; et Deus est bonus bonitate, id est se ipso, cum eius bonitas non sit aliud quam ipse.*

9. Gyula Klima, "Ockham's Semantics and Ontology of the Categories," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 128.

10. Claude Panaccio, "Semantics and Mental Language," in ibid., p. 58.

11. Klima, "Ockham's Semantics," p. 130.

12. Ibid., pp.131–132.

13. Ockham, *Ordinatio* 1.2.11, 360:5–22: *Contra istum modum ponendi arguo: videtur enim iste modum loquendi impropriissimus et, de virtute sermonis, includens contradictionem, quia quod aliquid idem comparatum uni sit ratio tantum et comparatum alteri sit res, simile est ac si dicerem quod homo comparatus bovi sit asinus et comparatus lapidi sit una qualitas et comparatus igni sit unus diabolus. . . . Igitur relatio sive comparetur ad essentiam per intellectum sive ad relationem oppositam, cum per talem comparationem non destruatur, remanebit vera res, sicut si non comparetur. Igitur relatio etiam comparata ad essentiam erit vera res, et eadem quae erit si comparetur ad relationem oppositam.*

14. Ibid., 1.2.11, 365:7–22: *Ideo respondeo cum ista opinione, quae videtur mihi probabilior, quod est aliquis modus non-identitatis inter naturam divinam et suppositum. Et potest dici, secundum bonum intellectum, quod distinguuntur formaliter, quamvis non realiter. Hoc confirmo sic: quandocumque aliqua sunt idem omnibus modis ex natura rei, quidquid competit uni competit alteri, nisi aliquis modus grammaticalis vel logicalis impediat; sed posito quod Pater habeat omnes modos grammaticales et logicales consimiles quales habet hoc nomen "essentia," adhuc haec est vera "Essentia est Filius," et haec similiter est vera "Pater non est Filius." Igitur quod illud idem negetur de Patre et affirmetur de essentia non potest hoc contingere propter aliquam diversitatem modorum grammaticalium vel logicalium, igitur praecise hoc erit ratione alicuius modi non-identitatis inter illud quod significatur per Patrem et illud quod significatur per essentiam; igitur inter Patrem et essentiam est ex natura rei aliquis modus non-identitatis.*

15. Ibid., 1.2.11, 368:2–8: . . . *dico quod non est magis concedendum quod sunt plures formalitates in Deo vel plures rationes reales vel plures res. Et ita universaliter de essentia et relatione non debet plus concedi pluralitas quorumcumque, quorum quodlibet sit realiter in Deo, quocumque nomine nominentur, quam pluritas rerum; et ita non sunt ibi plures modi reales nec plures formalitates.*

16. Ibid., 1.2.11, 373:19–374:3: . . . *dico quod si "distingui" importaret puram negationem, tunc esset manifestum quod haec esset bona consequentia "Essentia et relatio non sunt idem formaliter, igitur distinguuntur formaliter." Si tamen non importet praecise negationem sed etiam affirmationem, potest concedi quod essentia et relatio distinguuntur formaliter. Nec valet "Formaliter distinguuntur, igitur distinguuntur," quia in negativis—sive sint praecise negativae sive simul importent negationem et affirmationem—non oportet a determinabili sumpto cum determinatione ad determinabile absolute sumptum esse consequentiam formalem.*

17. Ibid., 1.2.1, 19:3–15: *Unde universaliter dico quod nunquam de aliquibus verificatur distingui formaliter nisi propter distinctionem realem, quando scilicet de uno illorum vere dicitur quod est aliqua res et de reliquo vere dicitur quod non est illa res, sicut relatio et essentia distinguuntur formaliter, quia essentia est Pater et Filius non est*

Pater. Immo distingui formaliter non est aliud, sicut ego teneo distinctionem formalem, et hoc est quid nominis ipsius, scilicet quod unum illorum est aliqua res absoluta vel relativa et alterum non est illa res, sicut essentia est Filius et Pater non est Filius, ideo essentia et Pater distinguuntur formaliter, ex quo sunt una res, quia essentia est Pater.

18. Ibid., 1.2.11, 372:9–17: . . . *concedo quod ex sola distinctione formali non contingit habere distinctionem realem a priori et ideo ex sola distinctione formali relationis et essentiae non contingit a priori distinctio realis Personarum, sed e converso ex distinctione reali Personarum et identitate essentiae cum Personis et relationibus contingit inferre distinctionem formalem relationis et essentiae. Et ita distinctio realis Personarum non est quia essentia et relatio Personarum distinguuntur formaliter, sed quia duae relationes reales distinguuntur.*

19. Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, p. 182.

20. Ockham, *Ordinatio* 1.2.11, 374:5–375:2: *Ad secundum dico quod contradictio est via potissima ad probandum distinctionem realem quando ita est quod est negatio simpliciter, ita quod per nullam circumlocutionem potest alterum contradictoriorum verificari de illo a quo negatur; sed quando per talem circumlocutionem contingit alterum contradictoriorum verificari de illo a quo negatur, tunc tantum erit una via ad probandum distinctionem formalem. Et sic est in proposito, quia quamvis haec sit vera "paternitas non est communicabilis," haec tamen est vera "paternitas est illa res quae est communicabilis." Similiter, quamvis haec non sit vera "Pater est Filius," tamen haec est vera "Pater est illa res quae est Filius," quia Pater est illa essentia quae est Filius. Et universaliter, quando ita est, tunc est illa distinctio possibilis; sed numquam ita est nisi in Deo, et ideo est in solo Deo ponenda. Unde dico quod non potest esse distinctio formalis, nec talis contradictio verificari nisi ubi sunt distinctae res realiter quae tamen sunt una res realiter, quod solum est possibile de Personis divinis, quia sunt tres Personae realiter distinctae et tamen sunt una essentia numero. Et ideo cum non sit possibile in creaturis non est talis distinctio ponenda; nec unquam est ponenda ubi credita non compellunt, immo nunquam est ponenda inter aliqua nisi quando unum illorum est aliqua res absoluta vel relativa, et simpliciter aliud distinguitur realiter ab illa eadem, sicut dictum est prius.*

21. Ibid., 1.2.6, 175:1–10: *Haec responsio non sufficit, quia sicut est singulare in Deo quod tres sunt una res numero et ideo illa res una numero est quaelibet illarum trium rerum, et tamen una illarum trium rerum non est reliqua, ita est singulare et excedens omnem intellectum quod non sequitur: essentia una numero est Filius, Pater non est Filius, igitur Pater non est essentia. Et ideo illud singulare non debet poni nisi ubi auctoritas Sacrae Scripturae compellit. Et ideo talis consequentia nunquam debet negari in creaturis, quia ibi nulla auctoritas Sacrae Scripturae compellit, cum in creaturis nulla una res sunt plures res et quaelibet earum.*

22. Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1,001.

23. Ibid., pp. 1102–1103.

24. Ockham, *Ordinatio* 1.2.11, 152:4–7: *Quarta posset opinio, concordando cum opinione priori quod Personae divinae constituuntur per proprietates absolutae sed discordando ab ea quod nihil est penitus imaginabile in Deo nisi tantum absoluta.*

25. Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1,003.

26. Ockham, *Ordinatio* 1.2.11, 153:2–7: *Verumtamen nec istam opinionem nec priorem teneo propter auctoritates Sanctorum, quamvis mihi videatur quod tam ista quam praecedens, quantum ad illud commune in quo concordant, facilius, quamvis non verius, posset sustineri cum isto articulus "Tres sunt Personae et unus Deus," quam opinio de relationibus.*

27. Ibid., 1.26.1, 156:22–157.7: *Quamvis ista quarta opinio posset alicui videri probabilis verumtamen quia auctoritates Sanctorum videntur expresse ponere relationibus in divinis, —non tantum quod aliqui conceptus relativi de Personis divinis verificentur, sicut dicimus quod Sortes est similis et quod Sortes est pater vel filius, sed quod est vera paternitas realis et filiatio et quod sunt duae res simplices quarum una non est alia—, ideo tenendo cum eis dico quod Personae divinae constituuntur et distinguuntur per relationes originis.*

28. Ibid., 1.3.3, 430:20–431:2: *Ad argumentum primae opinionis dico quod commune ad multa potest praedicari vel in concreto vel in abstracto. Si in abstracto, praedicabitur de quolibet quiddatitive, et ideo sapientia praedicatur in quid de sapientia increata et de sapientia creata.*

29. Ockham, *Quodibet* 2.4:11–20: *. . . nam "sapiens" praedicatur de creatura secundum istam definitionem "habens sapientam accidentalem" et "sapiens" sic dictum non praedicatur de Deo; sed de Deo praedicatur secundum istam descriptionem "existens sapientia," sicut secundum Anselmum* Monologion, *"iustus" praedicatur de Deo secundum istam descriptionem "existens iustitia," et de creatura secundum istam "habens iustitiam"; et "sapiens" sic descriptum non praedicatur de creatura, igitur "sapiens" aequivoce praedicatur de Deo et creatura.* Translation in Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 948.

30. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* 3:69–74, 84–86, 88–90: *Verumtamen sciendum quod denominativum multipliciter accipitur, scilicet large, stricte et strictissime. Large dicitur omne concretum cui correspondet aliquod abstractum, sive illud abstractum significet rem formaliter inhaerentem illi de quo vel pro quo praedicatur suum concretum vel non. Et isto modo omnia nomina relativa concreta sunt denominativa. . . . Secundo modo dicitur denominativum cui correspondet abstractum differens sola terminatione, importans rem in alio formaliter existentem et ab eo totaliter differens. . . . Strictissime dicitur denominativum cui correspondet aliquod abstractum importans accidens formaliter inhaerens alteri, et quod differt ab abstracto solo casu.*

31. Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, pp. 173–174.

32. Ockham, *Ordinatio* 1.2.2, 58:16–59:14: *Praeterea, quaero: quid est intellectum causare distinctionem istarum rationum? Aut hoc est praecise intelligere illam rem, sive uno actu sive pluribus, ita quod nihil penitus intelligatur nisi res ipsa; aut hoc est comparare eandem rem ad se ipsam; aut comparare eandem rem ad aliam vel alias res; aut formare aliquid vel aliqua quae non sunt ibi ex natura rei sed tantum per opus intellectus. Non primo modo, quia per hoc quod semper eadem res praecise et nihil aliud intelligitur, nulla multitudo ibi causatur nisi forte actuum intelligendi si pluribus actibus intelligatur; igitur in Deo nunquam erit multitudo attributorum quae sint plura attributa et tamen realiter ipse Deus. Similiter, eadem ratione, in Sorte et in qualibet re quam possum intelligere possem causare talia multa, quod est absurdum. Nec secundo*

modo, quia per talem comparationem non causatur nisi forte respectus rationis, secundum istos; sed respectus rationis non est realiter ipse Deus. Non tertio modo, propter idem. Similiter, eodem modo potest comparari quaelibet res ad se ipsam et ad alias res sicut essentia divina; igitur omnem talem distinctionem quam potest intellectus facere circa divinam essentiam potest facere circa omnem rem aequaliter. Si dicatur quarto modo, habetur propositum: quod sint ibi multa quorum nullum illorum est ex natura rei, et per consequens nullum illorum est realiter ipse Deus.

33. Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 20.

34. Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, p. 173.

35. Ibid.

36. Ockham, *Ordinatio* 1.2.1, 17:9–18:5: *Ideo propter istam rationem dico quod sapientia divina omnibus modis est eadem essentiae divinae quibus essentia divina est eadem essentiae divinae, et sic de bonitate divina et iustitia; nec est ibi penitus aliqua distinctio ex natura rei vel etiam non-identitas. Cuius ratio est, quia quamvis talis distinctio vel non-identitas formalis posset poni aeque faciliter inter essentiam divinam et sapientiam divinam sicut inter essentiam et relationem, quia tamen est difficillima ad ponendum ubicumque, nec credo eam esse faciliorem ad tenendum quam trinitatem Personarum cum unitate essentiae, ideo non debet poni nisi ubi evidenter sequitur ex creditis traditis in Scriptura Sacra vel determinatione Ecclesiae, propter cuius auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari. Et ideo cum omnia tradita in Scriptura Sacra et determinatione Ecclesiae et dictis Sanctorum possunt salvari non ponendo eam inter essentiam et sapientiam, ideo simpliciter nego talem distinctionem ibi possibilem.*

37. Ibid., 1.2.1, 19:18–21: *Et ideo cum omnis res quae est essentia, sive illa sit absoluta sive relativa, est etiam sapientia et bonitas divina et iustitia divina, ideo essentia divina et bonitas divina vel sapientia nullo modo distinguuntur, nec formaliter nec quocumque modo.*

38. Ibid., 1.2.2, 61:14–62-4: *Ideo dico aliter ad quaestionem quod perfectio attributalis potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo pro aliqua perfectione simpliciter divina quae sit realiter Deus; alio modo pro aliquo praedicabili vere de Deo et de omnibus tribus Personis coniunctim et divisim. Primo modo dico quod non sunt plures perfectiones attributales, sed tantum est ibi una perfectio indistincta re et ratione, quae proprie et de virtute sermonis non debet dici esse in Deo vel in divina essentia, sed est omnibus modis ipsa divina essentia. Secundo modo dico quod non sunt nisi quidam conceptus vel signa quae possunt vere praedicari de Deo, et magis proprie deberent dici conceptus attributales vel nomina attributalia quam perfectiones attributales, quia proprie perfectio non est nisi res aliqua, et tales conceptus non sunt proprie res, vel non sunt perfectae, quia saltem non sunt perfectiones simpliciter.*

39. Adams, *William Ockham*, pp. 1,007–1,010.

40. Alfred J. Freddoso, "Ockham on Faith and Reason," in Spade, *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, pp. 344–346.

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